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A FAMOUS VICTORY: COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING PROTECTIONS AND THE
STATUTORY AGING PROCESS
JAmES J. BRUDNEY*
When it enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935,
Congress gave statutory recognition to collectively bargained terms
and conditions of employment. In recent decades, the number of
cases in which the Supreme Court has interpreted the NLRA has
declined, leaving the Act's interpretation and enforcement
primarily to the National Labor Relations Board and the federal
courts of appeals.
In this Article, Professor Brudney presents the results of his
study of 1,224 NLRB adjudications and their fate upon federal
court review, from 1986 to 1993. Professor Brudney analyzes the
reversal and affirmance data, and identifies areas of general
Board-court agreement and disagreement regarding how the Act
should be construed. In particular, Professor Brudney identifies
a cluster of NLRA issues involving the survival of the collective
bargaining relationship, over which the Board and courts
markedly split. A closer look at recent cases presenting these
issues, Professor Brudney argues, reveals recurrent Board-court
tensions over the relative importance of stable collective bargaining
relationships versus individual employee free choice
Professor Brudney contends that by preferring employee free
choice to bargaining stability, courts are reflecting the emphasis on
individual rights and freedom that pervades contemporary
employment law, as well as contemporary law and society in
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generaL He further argues that the federal courts' apparent effort
to "update" the sixty-year-old Act to conform to the larger legal
landscape is misguided and may bring considerable costs.
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INTRODUCTION
"And everybody praised the Duke,
Who this Great Fight did win."
"But what good came of it at last?"
Quoth little Peterkin.
"Why, that I cannot tell," said he;
"But 'twas a famous victory."'
Nearly twenty years ago, Grant Gilmore described American
legal culture as passing through statutory middle age.2 Citing the
New Deal as the major incubation period for federal legislation,
Gilmore predicted that "mouldering statutes and elderly agencies"
would plague our legal system in years to come.3 Gilmore's concern
about the proliferation of aging statutes has been amplified more
recently by other legal scholars4 and-in pointed terms-by public
officials as well.5
1. Robert Southey, The Battle of Blenheim, in A TREASURY OF GREAT POEMS 690
(Louis Untermeyer ed., 1942).
2. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (1977).
3. Id at 91.
4. See, ag., GUIDO CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1-2
(1982) (describing our legal system as "choking on statutes" and advocating that courts be
given the authority to limit or retire obsolete statutes); Jack Davies, A Response to
Statutory Obsolescence: The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4 VT. L. REv. 203,204-06 (1979)
(proposing that legislatures act to withdraw primacy from enactments that are over 20
years old, allowing courts to reform or modify statutes after that point); Donald C.
Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the
Court in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 672, 688-725 (1987) (discussing
role of Supreme Court in updating banking laws enacted in 1930s).
5. See, eg., Pub. L. No. 104-88,109 Stat. 803 (1996) (abolishing Interstate Commerce
Commission, established in 1887); S. 141 and H.R. 500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(proposing to repeal Davis-Bacon Act of 1931); H.R. 246, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
1996]
942 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act)6 surely
qualifies as one of the aging New Deal-era laws. Enacted sixty years
ago to regulate relations between private firms and employees who
seek to unionize and bargain collectively, the NLRA has remained
essentially unchanged since 1947 in its approach to labor-management
relations.7 In recent years, with the precipitous decline of private
sector unionism,' the Act has been dismissed as largely irrelevant to
the contemporary workplace9 or even as contributing to the demise
of the unions it was initially enacted to protect.'0 There have been
(proposing to repeal Service Contract Act of 1962); H.R. 1756, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (proposing to abolish Department of Commerce, established in 1913).
6. Pub. L. No. 74-198,49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
169 (1994)). I use "NLRA" to refer to the 1935 statute as amended in 1947, 1959 and at
other later dates. The 1935 enactment is referred to as the Wagner Act. The Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1994)), is referred to as the LMRA, or Taft-Hartley Amendments.
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), is referred to as the
LMRDA or Landrum-Griffin Amendments.
7. Congress in 1947 significantly modified the original Wagner Act when it enacted
the Taft-Hartley Amendments over President Truman's veto. The Landrum-Griffin
Amendments of 1959 were aimed principally at regulating the internal affairs of unions.
The LMRDA effected only minor adjustments in the statutory scheme that governs
conduct of unions and management during the organizing campaign and the bargaining
process. See ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 97-98 (11th
ed. 1991); ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 5-6 (1976).
8. The proportion of the private nonagricultural workforce represented by unions was
as high as 35% in the 1950s, but fell to 20% by 1980 and to 11.2% in 1993. See
FACrFINDING REPORT ISSUED BY THE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 24 (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT]; Samuel
Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 3, 9-10 & n.23 (1993).
9. See Estreicher, supra note 8, at 9-14 (arguing that our decentralized adversarial
model of labor relations is incompatible with pressures of modern, globally competitive
product markets); Joel Rogers, Reforming U.S. Labor Relations, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97,
97-110 (1993) (arguing that the New Deal system of labor relations cannot survive the
elimination of closed national economies and of large, dominant, stable firms); see also
DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 10-16, 21-23 (noting dramatic changes in
occupational structure of U.S. workforce, including shift to professional and service jobs
and to temporary and part-time work); WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM:
THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 3 (1993) (stating that
decline of private sector unions is far more attributable to market factors than to the law
itself).
10. See Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for
Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 62-63 (1993) (stating that Act fails to
protect employees who seek to unionize against employer reprisal, and fails to protect
employees who choose to strike against being permanently replaced); Paul Weiler, Striking
a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98
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numerous calls to amend the statute in modest or far-reaching
fashion, emanating from legislators and legal academics as well as
interested parties."
Amidst the chorus of criticism, a significant overlooked dimen-
sion of the NLRA's current utility or lack thereof involves the
interaction between the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
Board) and the federal appellate courts. The NLRB, charged with
implementing statutory protections and prohibitions, acts almost
exclusively through adjudication. 2 The courts of appeals are
authorized to review, enforce, and set aside the Board's decisions.3
This Article begins an empirical and analytical examination of
tensions that exist between the NLRB and the appellate courts over
the contemporary meaning of the Act.
There is ample reason to focus attention on decisionmaking by
the expert agency and the primary reviewing courts as a means to
HARv. L. REV. 351, 358-63 (1984) [hereinafter Weiler, New Balance] (criticizing Act's
prohibitions and remedies as inadequate to deter employers from unlawfully refusing to
bargain in good faith with newly certified unions); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep:
Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769,
1776-93 (1983) [hereinafter Weiler, Promises] (stating that Act's provisions are inadequate
to deter employers from unlawfully discharging union supporters during organizing
campaigns); Cathy Trost & Leonard M. Apcar, AFL-CIO Chief Calls Labor Laws a 'Dead
Letter', WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at 8 (reporting that AFL-CIO President called federal
labor laws a "dead letter" and suggested workers may be "better off with the law of the
jungle").
11. For recent examples of proposed legislative reform, see, e.g., National Right to
Work Act, S. 581 and H.R. 1279, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing to modify §
8(a)(3) to bar contracts between unions and management that require union membership
as a condition of employment); Teamwork for Employees and Management Act, S. 295
and H.R. 743, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing to modify § 8(a)(2) to facilitate
employer-initiated collaborative efforts); S. 777, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing
to provide equal time on the employer's premises for unions to present information to
employees during organizing campaigns); S. 778, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing
to require that Board hold expedited elections in 30 days upon a showing of interest by
60% of employees); Workplace Fairness Act, S. 55 and H.R. 5, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (proposing to add new § 8(a)(6) that would ban the permanent replacement of
strikers). For reforms proposed by legal academics, see, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 8, at
35-46 (proposing modest reforms); Gottesman, supra note 10, at 68-96 (proposing extensive
reforms). See also Matthew W. Finkin, The Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts on
Nonmajority Employee Representation, 69 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 195, 199-218 (1993)
(proposing "members only" representation as an alternative to exclusive representation
based on majority support); Gould, supra note 9, at 151-79 (proposing long list of changes).
12. The Board has long had rulemaking authority under the NLRA, see Pub. L. No.
74-198, § 6, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1994)), but it exercised
this authority for the first time only in 1989, American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S.
606, 617-20 (1991).
13. Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 10(e), (f), 49 Stat. 449,453 (1935) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f) (1994)).
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understanding'how the NLRA has evolved or aged over time.14
Congress has long been unable to muster a working majority to
overhaul or even modify the Act's provisions."5 Legislative grid-
lock-attributable in large part to the de facto veto power of com-
peting interest groups-is likely to persist for the foreseeable
future. 6 The Supreme Court regularly announced groundbreaking
interpretations of the NLRA during the initial decades following its
enactment and then modification in 1947. Over the past twenty years,
however, the Court has become noticeably less active in accepting
cases and issuing opinions that construe the NLRA. Accordingly,
the Board and the appellate courts have assumed the mantle of
interpreting-and perhaps updating-the Act on an interstitial basis.
The interplay between these two institutions may well have become
the prime source of policymaking in labor-management relations
today.
Moreover, rifts identified between the Board and the courts raise
important questions concerning the interpretation of aging statutes in
general. Given the limited capacity of Congress and the Supreme
Court, the burden of interpreting older statutes in light of changed
circumstances will tend to rest on agencies and lower courts. The
interpretive process in turn will often involve tensions between fidelity
14. The aging of a statute is a complex phenomenon, involving the need to apply
original text to new or unforeseen circumstances in light of significant intervening changes
in the law or in the society at large. Changes in market factors, technology, and the nature
of the workforce certainly help explain the NLRA's perceived inadequacies. My focus,
however, is on how the priorities and values embodied in the Act may be regarded
differently today than in earlier eras, and differently by the Board than by the appellate
courts.
15. Apart from the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Amendments, discussed supra note 7, and
a 1974 amendment addressing health care institutions, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994)), efforts to reform the Act have been notably
unsuccessful. The one major pro-union reform effort, launched in 1977, proposed
expedited election procedures and stronger remedial provisions. The bill gained House
approval but fell short of the 60 votes needed to cut off Senate debate. See H.R. 8410,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); 123 CONG. REc. 32613 (1977) (bill passes House); 124 CONG.
REC. 17749, 18398 (1978) (fifth and sixth cloture votes fail in Senate; bill withdrawn).
Other less ambitious pro-union efforts also have stalled in the Senate on cloture votes.
See S. 55, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); 138 CONG. REc. S8237 (1992) (cloture vote fails
on bill banning permanent replacement of strikers); 140 CONG. REC. S8844 (1994) (same).
Current pro-employer efforts in a Republican-controlled Congress face the similarly
daunting task of securing supermajority support.
16. Both organized labor and the business community have had enough supporters in
the Senate to prevent enactment. Given the fiercely partisan nature of this issue,
legislative reform seems attainable only if one party secures at least 60 seats in the Senate
plus the Presidency.
17. See infra part I.B.2 for a full discussion.
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to original statutory purposes and conformity to contemporary legal
norms. An understanding of this process in the labor law area may
therefore be instructive with regard to the evolving meaning of other
statutes.
My empirical inquiry is directed at disagreements that arose
between the Board and the appellate courts during a recent yet
extended time period: from late October 1986 to early November
1993. The examination covers 1,224 appellate court cases during this
seven-year period that reviewed decisions rendered by the NLRB:
each of the 280 cases reversing, remanding, or modifying Board
orders; and a random sample of the 944 cases fully enforcing or
affirming the Board. The data collected from these cases are
classified in terms of general case outcomes and issue-specific
outcomes. Analysis of court reversal rates keyed to particular
substantive issues as well as general case results offers more refined
insights into the complex nature of Board-court tensions.
With respect to general case outcomes, the empirical results
suggest that reversal rates' turn more on whether the Board has
found a statutory violation than on the identity of the culpable party.
Once an employer (or union) was charged by the Board's General
Counsel with committing an "unfair labor practice"-that is, conduct
violative of the NLRA-the courts were significantly less likely to
reverse a Board decision that the employer (or union) had committed
the unfair labor practice than a Board decision that the employer (or
union) was "innocent" of the charged conduct. Further, while Board
decisions determining that the union had violated the Act were
reversed at a slightly lower rate than Board decisions establishing a
violation by the employer, the difference was not statistically
significant. The latter finding is surprising in light of the conventional
wisdom that appellate courts are result-oriented or hostile to unions.
Also surprising-in view of the administrative agency's presumed
expertise in remedial matters-is the fact that Board decisions
awarding requested relief against a culpable employer were reversed
at a significantly higher rate than Board decisions finding statutory
liability as charged.
Turning to issue-specific outcomes, 9 Board determinations were
18. The term "reversal rate" refers to the rate at which Board decisions are reversed,
remanded, or modified, not simply reversed. "Affirmance rate" (which is 100% minus the
reversal rate) refers to the rate at which Board decisions are affirmed or enforced in full.
19. Examples of issues decided by the appellate courts include specific types of
violations by an employer under § 8(a) of the NLRA, specific types of union violations
1996]
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reversed at a significantly high rate on a cluster of issues that involve
the survival of a collective bargaining relationship. In my view, this
distinctive division between expert agency and intermediate courts
stems from the Act's simultaneous commitment to the value of
collective action by workers and to the right of those same workers
to choose the entity that will represent them. In seeking to reconcile
a statutory goal of maintaining-and at times establishing-collective
bargaining relationships with a goal of protecting employees' free
choice of their bargaining representative, the Board and the courts
conspicuously diverged during this seven-year period.
The divergence is manifested with respect to certain discrete yet
related issues. At the liability stage, when the Board determines that
an employer has violated its duty to bargain by improperly
withdrawing recognition from an incumbent union, the courts
frequently overturn the Board, invoking the employer's reasonably
grounded good faith doubt as to the union's continued majority status.
At the remedy stage, when the Board decides that an employer's
serious misconduct disrupted an election campaign-making a fair
rerun election unlikely-and orders the employer to bargain with the
union which lost the election but had previously demonstrated
majority support, the courts often reject this relief concluding that the
Board has failed to establish that a free and fair election is impossible.
Moreover, when the Board decides that an employer's improper
withdrawal of recognition from an incumbent union warrants a
bargaining order to restore the status quo ante, courts frequently
reject the remedy-even when affirming the violation-insisting on an
election or a cease-and-desist order as more appropriate forms of
relief
Each of these issues involves an alleged uncertainty as to the
union's continued majority status, and the perceived impact of that
uncertainty on the legitimacy of a collective bargaining relationship.
Given the strong evidence that appellate courts disagree with the
Board's approach, the Article pursues a detailed doctrinal analysis of
the cases in which these issues are raised. Review of the relevant
Board and court opinions indicates that the high reversal rate is
attributable in part to matters of substantive law, such as whether the
Board must consider the passage of time and employee turnover
before issuing a bargaining order, and in part to matters of factual
under § 8(b), specific remedial issues under § 10(c), and "other" issues such as jurisdiction,
procedure, or constitutional questions. See infra part II.C for a full description.
[Vol. 74
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record, such as whether the Board has truly considered the totality of
circumstances when evaluating an employer's asserted good faith
doubt that the union still enjoys majority support. Yet underlying
these reversals, whether justified in legal or factual terms, is a
persistent conflict in values. The Board gives primary weight to
preserving the stability of bargaining relationships, or establishing
those relationships, based on earlier evidence of majority employee
support. By contrast, the courts tend to worry more about the risk of
retaining, or imposing, a representative that current employees may
not want.
One way to explain the tension in values is by analyzing the
conflicting positions from the vantage point of the statutory aging
process. The Board can be seen as emphasizing the primacy of the
bargaining relationship based on a sense of fidelity to historical
legislative purpose. The appellate courts' pronounced sympathy for
protecting current employee choice reflects, by contrast, sensitivity to
the re-established paradigm of individual rights, a paradigm that now
dominates both the workplace and the larger legal culture. Such
judicial sensitivity to current legal values raises serious questions as to
whether courts should engage on their own in reshaping a regulatory
scheme when Congress has not chosen to do so. Viewing the Board-
court conflict in historical and institutional terms offers insights into
both the judicial updating process and the risks in having intermediate
courts update an aging statute.
Part I provides an overview of the NLRA and its lifespan. It sets
forth the Act's original goals-emphasizing the novelty and impor-
tance of federal recognition for collective bargaining-and briefly
describes the Act's unusual political origins in 1935. Part I also
identifies subsequent developments of relevance here, notably
Congress's renewed attention in 1947 to preserving individual
employee freedom, and the Supreme Court's declining interest in
reviewing Board decisions that have interpreted and applied the Act.
Part II describes the methodology used and the results reached
in the empirical study. It discusses the general case outcome results
and raises a number of questions about those results. Part II also
explains how review of issue-specific outcomes helps illuminate the
nature and extent of Board-court disagreements. Finally, it identifies
the issue cluster involving survival of the collective bargaining
relationship that then becomes the basis for further analysis.
Part III presents doctrinal analysis of the cluster of issues
involving tensions between bargaining stability and employee free
choice. It considers the specific cases in greater detail, and concludes
1996]
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that the divergence between Board and courts reflects a basic conflict
in value preferences over the relative importance attributed to stable
collective bargaining relationships.
Part IV considers this tension from the perspective of different
institutional approaches to an aging statute. In identifying the
divergence between an agency pursuing original purpose and courts
reflecting contemporary values, it also points to the risks involved in
a dynamic or "updating" approach to statutory interpretation.
I. OVERVIEW OF AN ANOMALOUS STATUTE
A. The Wagner Act
A proper appreciation for current tensions between the Board
and the appellate courts requires some understanding of the NLRA's
historical origins. The Wagner Act represented both a major
innovation in federal labor policy and a singular political achievement.
1. A Novel Emphasis on Collective Bargaining
When Congress passed the Wagner Act in 1935, it set forth a
national labor policy shaped heavily by the economic exigencies of the
times. In the midst of a major depression, the Act announced a
policy of "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining"' in order to achieve certain overriding legislative goals.
Statutory recognition for collective bargaining was meant to address
the twin objectives of promoting industrial peace and restoring mass
purchasing power, objectives that were linked closely to prevailing
ideas about how to achieve national economic recovery."1
Faced with industrial unrest on a large if not unprecedented
scale, the Wagner Act's chief proponents contended that federal
protection for collective bargaining would reduce the costly effects of
conflict between management and workers.' While labor-
20. Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1994)).
21. 1d (identifying industrial strife and inadequate mass purchasing power as major
burdens or obstructions to interstate commerce, burdens the new statute intended to
ameliorate); see IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY
90 (1950); Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947, 61
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1947); Leon H. Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?, in THE WAGNER
Acr. AFTER 10 YEARS 5, 7-18 (Louis G. Silverburg ed., 1945).
. 22. See S. REp. No. 573,74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2300, 2300-02
(1985) [hereinafter LEGIS. HIST.]; H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-8 (1935),
[Vol. 74
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management disputes were regarded as inevitable, proponents viewed
government facilitation of the collective bargaining process as creating
a more nearly equal balance of power that would channel many of
these disputes into negotiated solutions.'
Collective bargaining also was central to the Act's declared effort
to address the underconsumption that was exacerbating the business
depression. Leading supporters in Congress maintained that increases
in mass purchasing power were essential to the short-term revival and
long-term health of the economy.24 The growth of collective
bargaining would produce substantial economic improvement for
workers, which in turn would help the nation to spend its way out of
the depression.
In addition to improving the country's economic future, the
enforceable recognition of collective bargaining was justified as
promoting basic fairness and as democratizing the workplace.
reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra, at 2910,2915-17; 79 CONG. REc. 7573 (1935) (statement
of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra, at 2321, 2341-42.
23. S. REP. No. 573, supra note 22, at 2, reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at
2301 (stating that "[d]isputes about wages, hours of work, and other working conditions
should continue to be resolved by the play of competitive forces," but adding that "[iut is
... believed feasible to remove the provocation to a large proportion of the bitterest
industrial outbreaks by giving definite legal status to the procedure of collective bargaining
and by setting up machinery to facilitate it"); see also 79 CONG. REc. 7573 (1935)
(statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 2341 (advocating
pursuit of industrial peace through collective bargaining and rejecting compulsory
arbitration approach adopted by some European countries). See generally Kenneth
Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner
Act, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 285,286 (1987) (recognizing Act's goal of channeling economic
conflict between employers and employees); James B. Zimarowski, A Primer on Power
Balancing Under the National Labor Relations Act, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 47, 65 (1989)
(same).
24. S. REP. No. 573, supra note 22, at 3-4, reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22,
at 2302-03 (encouraging the procedure of collective bargaining as a means that would help
"permit the masses of consumers to relieve the market of an ever-increasing flow of
goods," and justifying such encouragement as part of a congressional effort "[h]aving in
mind both the temporary expediency of priming the pump of business and the permanent
objective of crystallizing antidepressive forces for the future"); see 79 CONG. REc. 7567-68
(1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HST., supra note 22, at 2327-30
(describing Congress's unsuccessful effort under § 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery
Act to raise wages, increase mass purchasing power, and "thus prime the pump of
business," and predicting that "[i]f the more recent quickening of business activity is not
supported by rises in wages [achievable through the spread of collective bargaining], either
we shall have to sustain the market indefinitely by huge and continuous public spending
or we shall meet the certainty of another collapse").
25. See Casebeer, supra note 23, at 291-92; Keyserling, supra note 21, at 8-12; David
Plotke, The Wagner Act, Again: Politics and Labor, 1935-37,3 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEv.
105, 125 (1989).
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Supporters insisted that protecting employees' freedom to organize
and bargain collectively was "a matter of simple justice" needed to
offset employers' concentration of economic power.26 Senator
Wagner, pointing to recent government-sanctioned increases in
industrial combinations, urged that "[i]n order that the strong may not
take advantage of the weak, every group must be equally strong."' 7
Proponents also extolled the virtues of industrial democracy, drawing
support from the analogous political right to representation. By
providing for workers' voices to be part of industrial decisionmaking,
the bill furthered the "inherent" American right of democratic self-
government in the workplace,' and thereby effectively discouraged
more extreme challenges to the social order.29
These four major legislative goals-reducing industrial strife,
restoring mass purchasing power, promoting a fairer distribution of
economic resources, and furthering self-government by
employees-did not receive equal billing in the congressional debates
leading up to enactment of the NLRA." While disputes persist as
26. Hearings Before the Committee on Education and Labor on S. 1958, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 126 [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Lloyd K. Garrison, Dean of The
University of Wisconsin Law School and former chair of pre-NLRA National Labor
Relations Board), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 1505-06; see, e.g., id. at 101-
02 (statement of William Green, President of American Federation of Labor), reprinted
in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 1477-78; id. at 172-73 (statement of H.A. Millis, Chair
of Economics Department of The University of Chicago), reprinted in 1 LEGIs. HIsT.,
supra note 22, at 1552-53.
27. Hearings, supra note 26, at 34-35, reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at
1410-11; see BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 100-01.
28. 79 CONG. REC. 9691 (1935) (statement of Rep. Withrow), reprinted in 2 LEGIS.
HIST., supra note 22, at 3132. See generally Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace:
Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 502-04
(1993) (reviewing historical justifications for Wagner Act that invoked the themes of
democracy and self-government).
29. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 26, at 125 (statement of Lloyd K. Garrison),
reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 1505 (supporting bill "first as a safety
measure, because I regard organized labor ... as our chief bulwark against communism
and other revolutionary movements"); id at 179 (statement of H.A. Millis), reprinted in
1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 1559 (expressing belief that protection for labor's right
to organize and bargain collectively will reduce friction between classes); Keyserling, supra
note 23, at 13 (reproducing 1937 speech by Senator Wagner in which he stated that "[t]he
denial or observance of this right [to bargain collectively] means the difference between
despotism and democracy"). See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 102 (citing
testimony from proponents who viewed collective bargaining as an antidote to calls for
social rebellion).
30. The Act's economic goals of reducing strife and promoting purchasing power were
highlighted in the debates before enactment. Arguments for fairness and democratization
also were advanced, but they were not featured as prominently either in the key
committee reports or in the floor statements by the bill's manager and recognized leader,
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to the priority and weight that should be given to each goal in
understanding the Act's meaning, 1 what is important for present
purposes is that all four goals were predicated on the virtues of
collective action in the workplace. To be sure, achieving the status of
Senator Wagner. S. REP. No. 73, supra note 22, at 1-4, reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra
note 22, at 2300-03 (identifying industrial peace, and economic adjustment through
enhanced purchasing power, as the bill's general objectives); H.R. REP. No. 969, supra
note 22, at 6-8, reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 2915-17 (emphasizing
particularly the bill's objective of reducing industrial unrest); 79 CONG. REC. 7565-68,7573
(1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 2321-30,
2341-42 (setting forth objectives of restoring mass purchasing power and promoting
industrial peace); see also Plotke, supra note 25, at 125-27 (discussing the four legislative
goals and concluding that the fairness and industrial democracy arguments-stressed by
labor groups more than by economists or other professionals--"were not well-developed
in the pre-passage debates and took shape slowly thereafter").
The prominence of the two economic objectives may reflect strategic judgments,
both as to what would persuade congressional colleagues and what would pass
constitutional muster when challenged in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra
note 21, at 104-05 (describing Wagner's argument that strikes caused by unfair practices
burdened interstate commerce, and that Congress had constitutional authority to regulate
or remove such obstructions); Casebeer, supra note 23, at 308 (describing constitutional
argument in § 1, formulated by Wagner's principal staff aide Leon Keyserling, that denial
of right to bargain collectively burdens interstate commerce by adversely affecting
performance of economy without regard to existence of strikes or other disruptive
practices); Keyserling, supra note 21, at 7-12 (describing Senator Wagner's effort to situate
NLRA efforts in the mainstream of federal attempts to foster national economic recovery).
See generally PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 229-30 (1982) (discussing
Keyserling's strategy with respect to Act's possible constitutional infirmity).
31. Compare, ag., Becker, supra note 28, at 502 (characterizing democratization of
workplace as "[a]t the forefront of the goals professed by" Wagner Act supporters) with
Casebeer, supra note 23, at 293-96 (ascribing central importance to Act's goal of increasing
purchasing power) and Zimarowski, supra note 23, at 65 (stressing Act's "need to redress
the pervasive power imbalance between employers and employees, and the need to
provide a dispute resolution forum"). See also Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy
of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbo4 and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379,
1465-89 (1993) (arguing that Senator Wagner intended collective bargaining system to be
cooperative rather than adversarial, with goal of enhancing trust and productivity in the
marketplace). See generally Howell Harris, The Snares of Liberalism? Politics, Bureaucrats
and the Shaping of Federal Labour Relations Policy in the United States, ca. 1915-47, in
SHOP FLOOR BARGAINING AND THE STATE 148, 169-70 (Steven Tolliday & Jonathan
Zeitlin eds., 1985) (rejecting argument of "revisionist scholars" that Wagner Act was even
potentially a radical charter for participatory democracy in industry, and viewing Act
instead as embodying more modest collectivist goals); Plotke, supra note 25, at 130-38
(rejecting arguments that Wagner Act was an exercise in capitalist autoreform or a project
of internally-directed enhancement of state powers, and viewing Act as process of political
reform, led by progressive liberals in coalition with labor movement); Theda Skocpol,
Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxlst Theories of the State and the Case of
the New Deal, 10 POL. & SOC'Y 155, 168-69, 182-85 (1981) (rejecting argument of neo-
Marxists that Wagner Act was planned and promoted by big business to stabilize and
revitalize national economy, and viewing Act instead as extension of state power to
manage the economy, achieved over business opposition).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a collectively bargained agreement redounds to the benefit of
individual workers, insofar as it offers them greater economic rewards
and participatory opportunities. But the Act's emphasis on the
collective nature of this negotiated status entailed a subordination of
traditional individualistic perspectives.
Statutory recognition of collectively bargained terms and
conditions of employment meant that individuals gave up their
contractual freedom to negotiate their own job conditions."2 The
enforceable nature of this recognition meant-again departing from
traditional contract law-that employers were compelled to bargain
in good faith with this collectively constituted entity. 3 The recog-
nized primacy of collective bargaining also supplanted historical
notions that individuals should take moral and legal responsibility for
decisionmaking in the economic arena.34
The creation of collectively defined rights and responsibilities for
the nation's private workplaces was a novel development in federal
labor law, only dimly foreshadowed by earlier federal interventions. 5
At the same time, the shift in emphasis toward collective decision-
making and collective responsibility was part of a broader change in
federal policy that extended to other aspects of the economy as part
of the New Deal. The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)3 6
inaugurated a system of "fair competition" codes, formulated by trade
associations and other industry groups to regulate trade practices and
certain minimum working standards.37 By suspending the enforce-
32. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337-39 (1944); see, e.g., S. REP. No. 573,
supra note 22, at 13, reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 2313 (noting that "the
making of [collective bargaining] agreements is impracticable in the absence of majority
rule"); 79 CONG. REC. 7571 (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEOIs. HIST., supra
note 22, at 2337 ("Majority rule, with all its imperfections, is the best protection of
workers' rights.").
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), 158(d) (1994); see S. REP. No. 573, supra note 22, at 12,
reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 2312; Gottesman, supra note 10, at 83.84.
34. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at ix.
35. See GORMAN, supra note 7, at 1-5 (describing Clayton Act of 1914, which created
labor antitrust exemption that was then given limited effect by Supreme Court; and Norris-
LaGuardia Act of 1932, which stated a public policy in favor of collective bargaining that
was "promoted" not by establishing substantive rights but simply by limiting the equity
jurisdiction of the federal courts); Harris, supra note 31, at 152-61 (describing role of courts
in 19th century, sanctioning competitive individualistic relations between employers and
employees, and noting limited federal regulatory efforts during World War I and the
1920s).
36. Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). The NIRA was declared unconstitutional
in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-51 (1935).
37. Pub. L. No. 73-67, §§ 3-4,48 Stat. 195, 196-98 (1933); see IRONS, supra note 30, at
17-23; Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and Business, in THE NEW DEAL: THE NATIONAL
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cement of antitrust laws, Congress in the NIRA esch6wed traditional
notions of competition among individual firms, and instead embraced
collective action by businesses to set prices and control production.3
Similarly, the Agricultural Adjustment Acts of 1933 and 1938
(AAA)39  authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to sanction
collective action by farmers and agricultural processors in lieu of free
market competition among individual producers.' Responding to
substantial overproduction of crops, plummeting prices, and a
disastrous decline in the purchasing power of American farmers, the
AAA allowed farmers to receive a federal subsidy for crops not
grown, and allowed processors to fix prices through marketing
agreements that were exempted from the antitrust laws.4' This
approach paralleled the NLRA and NIRA in enabling and en-
couraging collective action by particular occupational groups to
improve the economic status of their members. The federal
government's active promotion of co-determination by various
economic subgroups marked a major policy change from the pre-New
Deal orientation toward individual self-determination in the economic
arena.
42
LEVEL 50, 60-61 (John Braeman et al. eds., 1975).
38. Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 5,48 Stat. 195, 198 (1933); see IRONS, supra note 30, at 17-23;
Hawley, supra note 37, at 60-61. At the insistence of organized labor, the NIRA also
required each code of fair competition to include assurances that workers within the
industry could organize into unions and bargain collectively. Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 7(a), 48
Stat. 195, 198 (1933). The dismal record of employer compliance under § 7(a) of the
NIRA contributed to the origins of the NLRA. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 57-77;
IRONS, supra note 30, at 203-25.
39. Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933); Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938)
(codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). The first AAA was declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-78 (1936). The second
AAA was upheld against constitutional challenge in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-
33 (1942).
40. See IRONS, supra note 30, at 111-35; Richard S. Kirkendall, The New PDeal and
Agriculture, in THE NEW DEAL: THE NATIONAL LEVEL, supra note 37, at 83, 86-88.
. 41. Pub. L. No. 73-10, .§§ 1 (Declaration of Emergency) and 8, 48 Stat. 31, 31, 34
(1933); Pub. L. No. 75-430, §§ 2, 101-104, 52 Stat. 31, 31-36 (1938); see IRONS, supra note
30, at 114-16; Kenneth Finegold, From Agrarianism to Adjustment: The Political Origins
of New Deal Agricultural Policy, 11 POL. & SOC'Y 1, 2-5 (1982); Kirkendall, supra note 40,
at 84-88.
42. See Skocpol, supra note 31, at 156 (viewing New Deal as transforming federal
government "from a mildly interventionist, business-dominated regime into an active
'broker-state' "that incorporated commercial farmers and organized labor into processes
of political bargaining at the national level). See generally James Holt, The New Deal and
the American Anti-Statist Tradition, in THE NEW DEAL: THE NATIONAL LEVEL, supra
note 37, at 27-49 (discussing the shift from pre-New Deal self-determination to a policy of
co-determination).
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The Wagner Act itself consisted of four basic provisions. Section
7 set forth employee protections in the form of certain rights;43
section 8 prohibited as unfair labor practices specified employer
conduct that interfered with or abridged those rights;" section 9
authorized the Board to certify exclusive representatives that had
been selected or designated by a majority of employees;45 and
section 10 regulated the Board's procedure in investigating and
adjudicating unfair labor practice cases and included provisions for
judicial review of Board decisions by the courts of appeals.46 Of
particular interest here are section 8(a)(5), requiring the employer to
bargain collectively with duly designated employee representatives,
and the provisions of section 10, setting forth Board enforcement
authority as well as standards for judicial review.
The bill that became the Wagner Act originally identified four
employer unfair labor practices but did not prohibit employer refusals
to bargain collectively with the employees' designated represen-
tative.4 Senator Wagner explained the omission by stating that the
employees' explicit right to organize and bargain collectively imposed
an implicit duty on the employer to bargain with the employees'
chosen representative, and that the absence of an explicit unfair labor
practice was due simply to "the difficulty of setting forth this matter
precisely in statutory language."" Undaunted by the problems
43. Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 7,49 Stat. 449,452 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1994)). The three central rights--conferred on employees as a group-were the
rights to organize, to bargain collectively, and to engage in concerted self-help activity such
as strikes or picketing. See id.
44. § 8, 49 Stat. at 452-53 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1994)). Four
of the five employer unfair labor practices included in the Wagner Act remain unaltered
to this day; the fifth (now designated as § 8(a)(3)) was amended in minor respects in 1947.
With the addition in 1947 of union unfair labor practices, the five employer prohibitions
were redesignated as §§ 8(a)(1) to (5).
45. § 9, 49 Stat. at 453 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1994)).
46. § 10, 49 Stat. at 453-55 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1994)).
47. S. 1958,74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1935) reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HiST., supra note 22,
at 1295, 1299-1300. The four unfair labor practices identified are today codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) to (4) (1994).
48. Hearings, supra note 26, at 43 (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 LEGIS.
HIST., supra note 22, at 1419; Hearings Before the Committee on Labor on H.R. 6288,74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935) [hereinafter Hearings fl] (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted
in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 2490; see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 95 (stating
that Wagner and Keyserling had reservations about expressing the employer's duty to
bargain in statutory language, and that they "omitted [the duty] in hope that the board
would establish the obligation on a common law basis" as previous nonstatutory labor
boards had done); Casebeer, supra note 23, at 329-30 (stating that Keyserling described
the Biddle amendment, adding § 8(5), as a "refinement and specification" of what the
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associated with drafting an enforceable duty to bargain,49 supporters
of the bill pushed for such language to be added. During the
hearings, Francis Biddle, chair of the current nonstatutory labor
board, proposed to add a fifth employer unfair labor practice as
follows: "(5) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)."50
Testimony from Biddle and others who had served on the labor board
emphasized the practical necessity of an explicit employer obligation
if the new law was to foster genuine efforts by employers to reach an
agreement through collective bargaining."' The Biddle amendment
was adopted by both Senate and House committees and incorporated
into the Act; 2 its language, now in section 8(a)(5), remains
unchanged to this day.
Section 10 of the bill that became the Wagner Act called for an
independent agency with its own investigation and enforcement
Act's authors meant).
49. Senator Wagner's unsuccessful 1934 bill, see infra note 58 and accompanying text,
had included a provision making it an unfair labor practice for an employer "[t]o refuse
to recognize and/or deal with representatives of his employees, or to fail to exert every
reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements with such representatives." S. 2926,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(2) (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 1, 3. The
last part of this provision, requiring employers to make "every reasonable effort,"
occasioned disagreement among supporters. Compar e.g., Hearings on S. 2926 Before the
Committee on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1934) (statement of Dr.
Sumner Slichter, professor of economics at Harvard Business School, objecting to "the
notion of merely putting pious wishes into statutes"), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra
note 22, at 89, with id. at 117-18 (statement of Dr. Francis 3. Haas, member of
nonstatutory National Labor Board, urging that language requiring every reasonable effort
by employers was "of utmost importance" to assure meaningful negotiations between the
parties), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 147-48.
50. Hearings, supra note 26, at 79 (testimony of Francis Biddle), reprinted in 1 LEGIS.
HIsT., supra note 22, at 1455; Hearings II, supra note 48, at 176 (testimony of Francis
Biddle) (containing slightly modified form of quotation), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra
note 22, at 2650. The nonstatutory labor board had been established pursuant to
Executive Order as a means of implementing § 7(a) of the NIRA. See infra note 58.
51. See Hearings, supra note 26, at 79 (testimony of Francis Biddle), reprinted in 1
LEGIs. HIsT., supra note 22, at 1455; Hearings, supra note 26, at 137 (testimony of Lloyd
K. Garrison), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 1517; Hearings, supra note 26,
at 171 (testimony of Edwin S. Smith), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 1551.
52. See S. REP. No. 573, supra note 22, at 12, reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra note
22, at 2312 (stating that employees' right to bargain collectively "is a mere delusion if it
is not accompanied by the correlative duty on the [employer] to recognize [the employees']
representatives.., and to negotiate with them in a bona fide effort to arrive at a collective
bargaining agreement"); 79 CONG. REC. 7565, 7571 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner),
reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 2335-36 (supporting addition of "the
correlative duty of employers to recognize and deal in good faith with" the representatives
of their employees).
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authority, unencumbered by ties to any other executive branch
department.53 Spurred by the failures of weak nonstatutory labor
boards under the NIRA, Senator Wagner and his aides used the
independently established Federal Trade Commission as their model
for the new Board.' The NLRB was granted separate powers of
investigation, prosecution, and adjudication, and also the authority to
petition courts of appeals for enforcement of its orders.55 The
Board's findings of fact were entitled to broad deference on appeal,5 6
and the Board's equitable remedial discretion-"to take such
affirmative action.., as will effectuate the policies of this Act"-was
broader still.5
2. Unusual Political Origins
The Wagner Act may have shared a collectivist purpose with
certain other New Deal-era laws, but it was quite distinctive in its
political origins. Senator Wagner's initial effort in 1934 to create
meaningful statutory protections for collective bargaining was rebuffed
by a hostile employer community, uninterested congressional
colleagues, and an Administration still enamored of the NIRA's softer
approach to industrial self-governance. 58 Wagner's next effort,
53. S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1935), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note
22, at 1295, 1301-04. Section 10 was modified only slightly in its legislative path to
enactment. See S. 1958, as reported, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGIS.
HIST., supra note 22, at 2285, 2291-95.
54. See IRONS, supra note 30, at 228; Casebeer, supra note 23, at 292.
55. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 88 10(b), (c), (e), and (f), 49 Stat. 449,453-55 (1935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(b), (c), (e), and (f) (1994)); see BERNSTEIN, supra note 21,
at 97; IRONS, supra note 30, at 228-29.
56. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 88 10(e) and (f), 49 Stat. at 454-55 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f) (1994)) (specifying that when a Board decision is before a court of
appeals, "the findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall.., be
conclusive").
57. § 10(c), 49 Stat. at 454 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994)); see also
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) (majority opinion of Frankfurter,
J.) ("Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative
competence, courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's discretion and must
guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the
more spacious domain of policy.").
58. See S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22,
at 1-14 (Labor Disputes Act, introduced March 1, 1934). Wagner conceded defeat in June
1934 when his Senate colleagues gutted his bill. See 78 CONG. REc. 12016, 12017-18
(1934), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 22, at 1181-84; see also BERNSTEIN, supra
note 21, at 64-75 (discussing ill-fated 1934 Wagner bill); IRONS, supra note 30, at 213-14,
226 (same).
Despite language in the 1933 NIRA specifying that the fair competition codes
must protect employees' right to organize and bargain collectively, employers' widespread
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introduced in February 1935, succeeded through a combination of
political events that could hardly have been anticipated. These events
included: a stunningly large advantage for Democrats following the
1934 congressional elections;" a series of strikes in 1934 and 1935
that threatened industrial stability yet at the same time strengthened
pro-labor forces within the newly emergent Democratic coalition;'
the business community's temporarily eclipsed status following its
failed strategies for economic recovery and its excessive reliance on
the declining Republican party;6' and Senator Wagner's strength and
perseverance in mobilizing a team to draft the bill, devising a strategy
to push the measure through extensive hearings and committee
consideration, and leading the fight to convert the public, Congress,
and the Roosevelt Administration.62
resistance to recognizing unions went virtually unpunished under the nonstatutory labor
boards that sought to enforce the NIRA. See IRONS, supra note 30, at 203-25 (describing
unsuccessful efforts to implement § 7(a) of 1933 Act, first under the National Labor Board
established informally by President Roosevelt in August 1933 and augmented by Executive
Order in February 1934, and then under the National Labor Relations Board authorized
by congressional resolution in June 1934 and implemented by Executive Order in July
1934); Harris, supra note 31, at 165-67 (describing the NLB and the first NLRB as largely
ineffective due to minimal authority and faltering official support during 1933 and 1934).
59. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 88 (observing that 1934 elections brought
lopsided Democratic majorities of 45 in Senate and 219 in House, and that the "election
for practical purposes eliminated the right-wing of the Republican Party"); Kenneth
Finegold & Theda Skocpol, State, Party, and Industry: From Business Recovery to the
Wagner Act in America's New Deal, in STATEMAKING AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 159,181
(Charles Bright & Susan Harding eds., 1984) (stating that 1934 elections, on the heels of
massive Democratic victory in 1932, resulted in Democrats' gaining nine additional seats
in Senate and nine in House, Republican right-wing's being "practically eliminated," and
Southerners' role in ruling Democratic coalition being reduced).
60. See Plotke, supra note 25, at 116-17 (discussing impact of labor disputes, as simul-
taneously threatening public order and pressuring Congress to do more than simply allow
the disputes to be settled under status quo conditions); see also Harris, supra note 31, at
166 (observing that Congress and the administration were sensitive to possibility of
national strikes even before the 1934 elections).
61. See Finegold & Skocpol, supra note 59, at 181-83 (concluding that failure of
NIRA's approach to economic recovery temporarily deprived business community of its
traditional "hegemony with respect to definitions of 'what is good for the economy' "and
enhanced the credibility of Wagner's arguments that economic recovery required
government intervention to achieve higher wages and thereby restore mass purchasing
power); Harris, supra note 31, at 167 (observing that business community's strategy of all-
out opposition was ineffective because it relied on the truncated Republican presence in
Congress); Skoepol, supra note 31, at 189 (noting that business community's decision to
pursue pure opposition strategy after 1934 gave Wagner and liberal allies "more space for
legislative maneuver[ing]").
62. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 112-28 (describing Wagner's critical role in
developing content and political strategy); Harris, supra note 31, at 168 (same); Keyserling,
supra note 21, at 7-25 (same).
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B. Post-Wagner Act
In the sixty years since it became law, the Wagner Act has been
modified more than once by Congress, and applied by the Supreme
Court, the appellate courts, and the NLRB itself. Two aspects of the
Wagner Act's "maturation" warrant attention here as lead-ins to the
empirical and doctrinal discussion in Parts II and Ill.
1. The 1947 Amendments
The Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947 made substantial changes
in the Wagner Act's structure and approach. Of interest for present
purposes are the addition of an employee's right to refrain from
participating in collective activity by fellow workers, and the creation
of union unfair labor practices that protect this right to refrain and
parallel the employer unfair labor practices created twelve years
earlier.63 Congress enacted these changes in response to the
widespread perception that unions were abusing their privileged legal
status through excessive strikes and disruptive secondary activities.'
One effect of the Taft-Hartley Amendments was to alter the Wagner
Act's policy of unqualified support for the growth of collective
bargaining. The Amendments placed the federal government in a
more nearly neutral position by recognizing statutory protections that
Even with all of these factors, enactment was hardly a sure bet at the completion
of hearings and committee action in early May of 1935. In addition to virulent business
opposition, the press criticized the measure as likely to obstruct economic recovery, to
subvert personal liberty and the rights of workers, and to encourage the growth of coercive
union bureaucracies. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 109-10, 117; Plotke, supra note 25,
at 124-25. While the Administration was officially neutral, the Secretary of Labor and her
top aides strongly opposed the creation of an independent enforcement agency and also
urged that union organizers be subject to the same restraints as management in their
contacts with employees. See IRONS, supra note 30, at 230; Casebeer, supra note 23, at
312. President Roosevelt finally declared his support for the bill following a White House
meeting with congressional leaders on May 24. BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 117-18;
IRONS, supra note 30, at 231. What ultimately ensured the bill's legislative success,
however, was the Supreme Court decision three days later in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The Court's invalidation of the NIRA, id. at
541-42, strengthened Administration resolve to support the Wagner Act as an alternate
national labor policy. Perhaps more important, the Court's pronouncement led opponents
to conclude that a bruising floor fight was unnecessary because the Wagner Act would fail
under the same constitutional test. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 120-23; IRONS, supra
note 30, at 231; Harris, supra note 31, at 168.
63. Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 140-43 (1947) (amending 88 7 and 8 of
Wagner Act; codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(b) (1994)).
64. See Cox ET AL., supra note 7, at 93-94; THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 35-37
(Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992).
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offset the right to self-organization-notably the employee's freedom
of choice not to be represented by a union and not to be coerced by
union agents into support for a union's organizing or self-help
efforts.65
At the same time, a more neutral approach toward the expansion
of union power through organizing and economic self-help did not
disturb the Act's basic support for collective bargaining. The
amended NLRA retained its commitment to collective action as an
essential means to the multiple ends discussed above.66 Under
section 8(a)(5) the employer's obligation endured to establish and
maintain bargaining relationships with the representative designated
or selected by its employees. Indeed, the Board's prior decisions
holding employers to a standard of good faith in bargaining with those
representatives were essentially endorsed by the addition of section
8(d).67
65. See Pub. L. No. 80-101,61 Stat. at 140 (adding §§ 8(b)(1) and (4)); Cox, supra note
21, at 24-38, 44; THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 64, at 39-41.
66. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) (as amended) (Taft-Hartley added to the findings and
policies of § 1 a justification for curbing union excesses, but left the rest of that section
intact); supra text accompanying notes 21-32 (discussing Act's four major goals); cf JAMES
B. ATLESON, VALUES AND AssuMprIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 47 (1983)
(describing Taft-Hartley's effect as "limit[ing] collective activity primarily to the specific
relation of employer and certified or legally recognized bargaining agent," while
prohibiting or leaving unprotected "[a]ctivities that were based on class or worker
solidarity or that existed outside the contractual regime").
67. Section 8(d) defined collective bargaining as "the performance of the mutual
obligation... to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment ... but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." Pub.
L. No. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. at 142 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994)).
The statutory language paralleled the Board's "good faith" approach as approved by the
courts of appeals. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co., 37 N.L.R.B. 100, 118-19 (1941),
enforced, 133 F.2d 676, 684-88 (9th Cir. 1943); George P. Pilling & Son Co., 16 N.L.R.B.
650, 662-63 (1939), enforced, 119 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1941). The final version of this
section rejected in conference the House's effort to prescribe a longer and more objective
definition of collective bargaining. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8,
34-35 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 505, 512, 538-39 [hereinafter LMRA LEGIS. HIST.]; see also 93
CONG. REC. 3694,3719 (1947) (statement of Rep. Norton, criticizing House definition of
collective bargaining as "detailed[,]... cumbersome and.., an empty formula"), reprinted
in 1 LMRA LEGIS. HIST., supra, at 811-12; 93 CONG. REC. 6601 (1947) (statement of Sen.
Taft, explaining conferees' adoption of Senate version of § 8(d), and rejection of House
definition), reprinted in 2 LMRA LEGIS. HIST., supra, at 1541. See generally Archibald
Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Part Two, 61 HARV. L.
REV. 274, 282 (1948) (noting that the language of § 8(d) was a "close paraphrase" of
prevailing Board and court law).
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The Taft-Hartley Amendments also imposed new limits on the
Board's factflnding authority under section 10. The Board was now
required to support its unfair labor practice findings based on "the
preponderance of the testimony," and its findings were to be reviewed
under a "substantial evidence" standard.' These changes reflected
congressional intent to broaden the scope of judicial review following
perceived Board excesses in the past.69 Yet even with these changes,
the new standard left the Board with considerable leeway in carrying
out its factflinding responsibilities. 70 Further, the Board's remedial
discretion under section 10(c) remained broad, and the Board's
already established practice of imposing bargaining orders when
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act was essentially
ratified.?
2. The Supreme Court's Declining Attention to the Act
Throughout its existence, the Board has relied on adjudication
rather than rulemaking to interpret and apply the NLRA.72 Because
contested Board adjudications are without legal effect until enforced
by an appellate court, judicial review is critically important to
sustaining the Board's decisionmaking judgments. During the first
several decades of the NLRA, the Supreme Court played a major role
68. Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. at 147-49 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
160(c), (e), (f) (1994)). Formerly, the Board was authorized to make findings based simply
on "all the testimony taken," and the Board's findings were to be deemed conclusive "if
supported by evidence" as opposed to "substantial evidence on the record considered as
a whole." See Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 10(c), (e), 49 Stat. at 454 (1935).
69. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 510, supra note 67, at 53-56, reprinted in 1 LMRA
LEGIS. HIST., supra note 67, at 505, 557-60; S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26
(1947), reprinted in 1 LMRA LEGIS. HIST., supra note 67, at 407,432; H.R. REP. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-43 (1947), reprinted in 1 LMRA LEGIS. HIST., supra note 67, at
292, 332-34. See generally Cox, supra note 21, at 38-39 (linking criticism of Board orders
at that time to broader congressional concern regarding the relationship between courts
and administrative agencies).
70. See, eg., S. REP. No. 105, supra note 69, at 26-27, reprinted in 1 LMRA LEGIS.
HIST., supra note 67, at 432-33 (conforming judicial review standard to substantial evidence
test used in Administrative Procedure Act); H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 69, at 40-42,
reprinted in 1 LMRA LEGIS. HIST., supra note 67, at 331-33 (stating that Act continues to
"give great effect to findings that rest on th[e] evidence," and that "trials de novo in the
courts will not be required"); 93 CONG. REC. 3955 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft,
explaining that the substantial evidence test, while increasing the scope of judicial review
over Board decisions, still authorizes greater deference to Board factfinding than is
authorized when reviewing district court findings), reprinted in 2 LMRA LEGIS. HIST.,
supra note 67, at 1014.
71. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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in this judicial review process. Between 1935 and 1975, the Court
issued a stream of decisions reviewing Board adjudications, including
major pronouncements as to the scope and meaning of the Act's key
provisions. Since the mid-1970s, however, there has been a notable
decline in the Court's attention to NLRA cases in which the Board is
a party. Full opinions by the Court in cases in which the NLRB is a
party have fallen from over forty per decade in the 1940s, 1950s, and
1960s, to just over twenty during the 1980s and only six in the first
five years of the 1990s (Chart One).
CHART ONE: NUMBER OF LABOR FULL OPINIONS,
FIVE-YEAR TRENDS
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A similar trend is apparent when examining labor full opinions as a
percentage of all full opinions issued each Term.73
Another indicator of declining Supreme Court attention is the
Court's response to certiorari petitions in which the Board is a party.
After granting certiorari in more than twenty percent of all such
petitions during the 1940s and 1950s, the Court's "grant rate" has
declined steadily since the 1960s, reaching a ten percent level in the
73. After staying at or above three percent for almost the entire period from the late
1930s to the early 1970s, the percentage of full opinions that involved the Board as a party
declined below two percent during the 1980s and below one percent during the early
1990s. For data on the basis of which Charts 1 through 3 were created, see LEE EPSTEIN
ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS,
Tables 2-5 & 2-6 (1994); Search of Westlaw SCT-OLD database on March 3, 1995 (search
was [ TI (N.L.R.B. NLRB "National Labor Relations Board") & DA (AFT 8/36 & BEF
1994) ) ); Search of Westlaw SCT database on March 3, 1995 (same search).
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early 1990s (Chart Two). 74 This lower grant rate may also reflect
competing demands placed on the Court's limited capacity to hear
cases.
CHART Two: PERCENTAGE OF LABOR CERTIORARI PETITIONS
IN WHICH CERTIORARI WAS GRANTED,
TEN-YEAR TRENDS
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Mirroring, and perhaps contributing to, the Court's reduced
interest is the conduct of the parties themselves. Certiorari petitions
involving the Board as a party constituted a noticeably larger portion
of the Court's certiorari docket during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s
than they have in recent decades (Chart Three)7
74. While Chart 1 refers to the calendar years in which full opinions were issued,
Charts 2 and 3 rely on the Supreme Court Terms in which certiorari petitions were
processed. Thus, references to "1940-49" in Charts 2 and 3 cover all petitions acted upon
between the start of October Term 1940 and the end of October Term 1949, i.e., between
October 1940 and June 1950.
The charts depicting Supreme Court labor opinions and certiorari petitions omit a
number of cases that were before the Court where the Board was not a party but some
provision or dimension of the NLRA was being construed. Such cases include preemption
doctrine decisions, cases applying section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Amendments, and cases
construing the Landrum-Griffin Amendments of 1959. There is no reason to believe that
the addition of these cases would materially alter the larger picture. In any event, they are
excluded because they are at best marginally relevant to my focus on tensions between the
Board and the appellate courts. Also omitted from the database of Supreme Court labor
cases are decisions construing analogous federal labor relations statutes-notably the
Railway Labor Act and the Federal Labor Relations Act-that may shed light on the
meaning of the NLRA.
75. The reference to "all Paid Certiorari Petitions" in Chart 3 excludes petitions filed
in forma pauperis (IFP). While the number of paid petitions per year rose steadily
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CHART THREE: LABOR CERTIORARI PETITIONS AS A
PERCENTAGE OF ALL PAID CERTIORARI PETITIONS,
TEN-YEAR TRENDS
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One possible explanation for the Supreme Court's diminished
labor law appetite is that the menu has become thinner. As union
density has sharply declined,76 the Board has fewer occasions in
which to issue orders, ergo fewer Board decisions reach the appellate
courts and the Supreme Court simply has less to choose from. There
is at best modest empirical support for this explanation. The number
of appellate court decisions reviewing Board adjudications has
declined, but the decline has occurred only since 1985, which is more
than a decade after the Supreme Court's attentiveness to labor cases
began to wane.77 Moreover, during earlier periods when the volume
between 1940 and 1992 (from 814 to 2441), the number of IFP petitions per year rose
explosively over the same time period (from 120 to 4792). See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note
73, at Tables 2-5, 2-6. Inclusion of the IFP petition numbers would not alter the trend
presented in Chart 3, but would reduce all columns in a substantial and distortive way.
76. See supra note 8 (describing sharp decline in union density between the 1950s and
1993).
77. Between 1965 and 1984, the Supreme Court indicia of labor law interest-number
of full labor law opinions and percentage of all labor law certiorari petitions that were
granted-declined markedly. See supra Charts 1 and 2. During this same 20-year period,
the number of labor cases on petitions for review or enforcement that reached the
appellate courts notably increased: starting at 1,351 cases from the years 1965-69; to 1,682
from 1970-74; dipping slightly to 1,465 from 1975-79; and then soaring to 1,949 from 1980-
84. See 31 NLRB ANN. REP., Table 19 (1966) through 50 NLRB ANN. REP., Table 19
(1985).
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of appellate court labor cases fell temporarily, the Supreme Court's
interest in these same cases rose dramatically.78
A more persuasive explanation for the Court's reduced role has
to do with the age of the statute. During the first several decades of
NLRA operation, the Supreme Court issued scores of landmark
decisions settling within broad outlines the meaning of the Act's
major provisions. 79 After this onslaught of interpretive efforts, many,
if not most, of the "hard questions" of statutory interpretation had
been initially addressed; subsequent cases often involved refinement
or extension of earlier decisions." At the same time, the Court's
attention was drawn to other federal laws-and in particular to newer
statutes protecting the rights of employees-that required initial
interpretive clarification."1
78. The Supreme Court issued 30% more full labor law opinions in the 1955-59 period
than it had in the 1950-54 period, and these opinions constituted a 10% increase in the
percentage of the Court's overall decision docket. See supra Chart 1 and note 73.
Between these same periods, the appellate courts went from 643 to 428 labor cases, a
decline of over 30%. See 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 168 (1950); 16 NLRB ANN. REP. 253
(1951); 17 NLRB ANN. REP. 213 (1952); 18 NLRB ANN. REP., Table 19 (1953) through
24 NLRB ANN. REP., Table 19 (1959).
79. For cases construing § 8(a)(1), see, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). For cases construing § 8(a)(3), see, e.g., Textile Workers
Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380
U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). For cases
construing § 8(a)(5), see, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. Wooster Div.
of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); Franks
Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944). For cases construing § 7, see, e.g., NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956);
NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953). For cases
construing § 10(c), see, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); Gissel, supra;
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
80. See, ag., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (extending Babcock, 351
U.S. 105, on meaning of § 8(a)(1)); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of
Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989) (applying Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. 333, on meaning
of § 8(a)(3)); Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987) (extending
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) on meaning of § 8(a)(5)); see
also First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (extending Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 217 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) on
meaning of § 8(a)(5)). These decisions all had major impact, but they no longer involved
issues of first impression.
81. The Supreme Court decided its first case interpreting Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act in 1971. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The trend for full
Court opinions interpreting Title VII since 1970 is as follows: 1970-74, 11 full opinions;
1975-79,36 full opinions; 1980-84,32 full opinions; 1985-89,25 full opinions; 1990-93, 9 full
opinions. Search of Westlaw Database (May 8, 1995) (search was I HE (Title VII, 42
USCA 2000e) ) ). Beginning in the late 1970s, the Supreme Court also has issued a
growing volume of full opinions interpreting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
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Whatever the reason or reasons for the Supreme Court's
diminished interest in reviewing Board decisions, the Supreme Court
has become less of a factor-and the appellate courts have conse-
quently assumed greater importance-in the ongoing dialogue
between the agency and the judicial branch. Indeed, given that the
Board can enforce its decisions against reluctant employers or unions
only through the courts of appeals, the Board's track record before
the appellate courts becomes even more significant in the absence of
regular Supreme Court participation. Accordingly, I now turn to an
examination of that record.
II. EMPIRICAL METHOD AND RESULTS
A. Methodology Used in Compiling and Reviewing Appellate Court
Decisions
1. The Data-Gathering Process
The population under study consists of all appellate court
decisions rendered between October 28, 1986 and November 2, 1993
that reviewed adjudications by the NLRB. The seven-year period
from late 1986 to late 1993 was selected for several reasons. It was
the most recent period of appellate court decisions at the start of the
project; it therefore is likely to reflect the nature and extent of any
contemporaneous differences in outcome and doctrinal perspective
between the Board and the courts. In addition, a period of seven full
years insures that the population of decisions under study is not
unduly influenced by events or disputes that flamed and fizzled in a
particular year. Finally, Presidents Reagan and Bush appointed all
Board members who served during this time,' and the conservative
of 1967, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, and other recent
"workplace" statutes. See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981)
(construing ERISA); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)
(construing Rehabilitation Act of 1973); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192
(1977) (construing ADEA).
82. With the exception of six earlier Board cases, every Board order reviewed by the
appellate courts between late 1986 and late 1993 was issued by the Board between January
1985 and December 1992. The 11 Board members who served during this eight-year
period were appointed by Presidents Reagan (nine appointees) and Bush (two appointees
and two reappointments). See listing of Board Members at 273 NLRB iii (1984-1985)
through 309 N.L.R.B. iii (1992). Of the six earlier Board cases, five were decided in 1984
when all but one of the Board members was a Reagan appointee. The other early case
was decided in 1982.
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views of those Presidents shaped the appellate bench as well. 3 For
this reason, partisanship and ideology are less likely to be major
factors in accounting for whatever Board-court differences exist.
The 1,224 appellate court cases appeared on monthly lists of
closed Board cases; these lists are compiled on a regular basis by the
Appellate Division in the office of the General Counsel, and they
were furnished to me for research purposes.8 4 The court decisions
reviewed Board adjudications addressed to unfair labor practice
(ULP) issues. In each instance, the Board had determined (i) the
liability of employers or unions under section 8, and/or (ii) the
appropriate remedies under section 10 for practices violative of
section 8, and/or (iii) procedural or jurisdictional matters related to
ULP liability or remedies.
Of the 1,224 appellate court cases, all 280 decisions that reversed,
remanded, or modified a Board order ("reversals") were analyzed.
Of the 944 appellate court cases that wholly enforced or affirmed a
Board order ("affirmances"), I analyzed a stratified random sample
of 275 cases." Most appellate court decisions included opinions
83. At the start of the seven-year period in October 1986, President Reagan had
appointed 59 active appellate court judges, and there were 85 active circuit court judges
in all appointed by Republican presidents as opposed to 63 appointed by Democratic
presidents. Reagan appointees constituted a majority on four circuits-D.C., Second,
Sixth, and Seventh-each of which reviewed a high volume of Board decisions.
Democratic appointees constituted a majority on only one circuit-the Eleventh-which
heard relatively few Board cases. See Judges of the Federal Courts with Date of
Appointment, 810 F.2d vii, vii-xxviii (1987). By November 1993, Presidents Reagan and
Bush had appointed 99 active appellate court judges, more than two-thirds of the total of
146. Reagan and Bush appointees constituted a clear majority in every circuit except the
Fourth; even there, Republican appointees-including Nixon and Ford appoin-
tees-outnumbered the appointees of Democrats by 9 to 4. See Judges of the Federal
Courts with Date of Appointment, 9 F.3d vii, vii-xiv. These numbers exclude ap-
pointments to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, because that circuit's jurisdiction does
not extend to appeals from NLRB decisions. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292, 1295 (1994).
84. Board personnel were helpful throughout this project. They were thoroughly
professional in responding to my requests for information, without attempting to influence
my project design or analysis. They, of course, bear no responsibility for my results, and
they may well question some of my analysis, but I am deeply grateful for their assistance.
85. The samples were chosen using simple random sampling within each year.
Distinctions were drawn on a fiscal year basis of October 1 to September 30. Thus, there
were eight separate groups from which samples were randomly chosen; the eighth group
included affirmed or enforced cases between October 1 and November 2, 1993.
Allocations of the total sample size of 275 to each year were proportional to the number
of affirmed/enforced cases in that year. The "stratified" approach to sampling reduced the
chance of a disproportionate number of cases being chosen from a narrow time period that
does not adequately reflect the entire seven-year context.
Unless otherwise specified, the analysis that follows is based on weighted data.
Because the number of affirmances in the population is more than three times the number
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explaining the court's result. The vast majority of these were
published decisions, all of which were obtained through Lexis or
Westlaw searches. Unpublished decisions-including opinions and
also summary orders-were secured with the assistance of the General
Counsel's office. 6
A range of data was collected for the 555 analyzed cases.' The
factual data compiled from each case included: month and year of
court decision; identity of circuit court; and whether the Board result
or case outcome being affirmed or reversed had favored union,
employees, or employer." In addition, Board results were further
of reversals, the number of affirmances in the sample were weighted more heavily.
Without looking at all the data in a given population, it is impossible to calculate a
population's actual mean; rather, one calculates a "best guess" mean from the sample
taken. In layperson's terms, a confidence interval is supposed to indicate how far the
sample mean may vary from the actual mean, and how likely it is that one has guessed
wrong-e.g., a 95% confidence interval signifies a 5% chance that the sample mean is
nowhere near the actual mean. Given a sample size of 275, one can estimate proportions
between .20 and .50 with a 95% confidence interval of ± .05. Proportions that occur less
frequently--e.g., proportions below .10-can be estimated with a 95% confidence interval
of ± .03. See generally HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL STATISTICS 213-18 (revised 2d
ed. 1979) (explaining confidence intervals); IvY LEE & MINAKO MAYKOVICH, STATISTICS:
A TOOL FOR UNDERSTANDING SOCIETY 331-36 (1995) (same).
86. Of the 555 decisions being reviewed, all but a few of the 280 reversals included
accompanying opinions. In the very rare instances where the court reversed with no
opinion, the Board's subsequent decision disclosed the issue(s) reversed and the reason(s)
for reversal. By contrast, over ten percent of the 275 affirmances were summary, i.e., a
one-word or one-sentence order, with no published or unpublished explanation. The party
that loses before the Board generally does not raise every issue anew on appeal. Although
there is no way to be certain-absent a court opinion-as to which issues litigated before
the Board were also decided by the appellate court, a reasonable degree of confidence
may be attained by reviewing the Board decision and also reviewing the parties' briefs on
appeal to see which issues were presented to the court. Accordingly, in order to chart the
issues raised on appeal for the 36 summary affirmances, I reviewed the Board decision and
the appellate court briefs-the latter are on file at the Board library in Washington, D.C.
87. The data were initially collected from the cases by Shalu Buckley, Jordan Burch,
Leo Fuchs, and Thomas Krebs, research assistants and now graduates of The Ohio State
University College of Law. For each case, a research assistant prepared a one- to two-
page summary and I then reviewed all summaries and accompanying decisions.
Occasionally, I corrected ministerial errors, or made changes in issue coding decisions. See
infra note 89 and accompanying text.
88. Board results were subdivided into three main categories, each of which involves
two possible outcomes that may then be affirmed, or reversed, by the appellate courts.
For Board results where the employer had been charged with a ULP under § 8(a) or (f),
the result was either for union or employees (charging party) or for employer (res-
pondent). For Board results where the union had been charged with a ULP under § 8(b)
or (e), the result was either for employer or employees (charging party) or for union
(respondent). For Board results where the dispute concerned the nature or scope of the
remedy under § 10(c), the result was either for union or employees (broad relief granted)
or for employer (relief narrowed or rejected). At times, a Board result covered more than
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coded based on the particular statutory issues adjudicated by the
Board and litigated on appeal.' 9
2. Limitations of the Data Analysis
Before proceeding to examine the results of this data compilation
and analysis, it is worth noting the limitations of such an empirical
study. One obvious factor is that the study does not reflect the
universe of unfair labor practice charges brought under the NLRA.
More than 97% of ULP charges are disposed of before they ever
reach the Board-through dismissal or withdrawal at a preliminary
stage, informal settlement prior to trial, or formal resolution before
one category: Board decisions often involved both employer liability under § 8(a) and
relief against the employer under § 10(c).
Apart from these three basic case outcome groupings, there were cases where the
dispute involved discrete issues that affected ULP status but were separately classified,
such as procedure, jurisdiction, or constitutional matters. Finally, there were rare
cases-30 out of the 1,224 total-where the Board result involved "strange" outcomes:
either the union and the employer each prevailed on some issue(s), or the employees
prevailed against both the employer and the union. The analysis of outcomes in part II
infra focuses on the three basic case outcome groupings; together, they encompassed some
94% of the appellate court cases in the population.
89. For instance, if the Board result being reviewed involved a violation of § 8(a)(5),
the classification of case outcome was broken down into one or more of six issue codes
that recurred with some frequency in appellate court opinions: bad faith bargaining; good
faith doubt as to continued majority status; failure to comply with information requests;
disagreement as to whether a topic was a mandatory subject of bargaining; unilateral
contract modifications; and a general § 8(a)(5) catchall.
The issue codes relevant for present purposes are set forth in detail in part II.C infra.
Issue code classifications were performed initially by research assistants, based on close
readings of appellate court opinions supplemented by review of Board opinions when
necessary. I reviewed all issue code entries and suggested revisions on approximately 10-
15% of the entries. We met regularly to resolve any differences based on my suggested
changes, and also to discuss whether new codes should be added. The final list of issue
codes evolved over the first several months of data collection. At the start, we identified
issue codes based on traditional types of recurring ULPs, such as §§ 8(a)(1) through (5),
and basic categories within each section, such as mixed motive discipline under § 8(a)(3).
As other issues appeared with sufficient frequency (six to eight occurrences was a rule of
thumb), we added them as separate issue codes; occasionally, we deleted a code that was
occurring very rarely. Data collection proceeded first on the 280 reversals and then on the
275 affirmances. Because a number of issue codes were added during data collection on
reversals, I rechecked all issue code decisions at the completion of the reversals stage, and
made adjustments in an effort to ensure consistency. I also rechecked all issue code
decisions on affirmed cases at the completion of that stage, although relatively few
adjustments were necessary on the affirmances. Thus, while no coding scheme that relies
on analytic judgments can be error-proof, various steps were taken to ensure quality
control.
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the case is tried or appealed to the Board." Given that my purpose
is to explore the nature and extent of Board-court conflicts over
matters of statutory interpretation, the omission of these early
resolutions is understandable. Still, it should be recognized that the
Act's meaning and effectiveness with respect to pre-Board disposition
of ULP charges is simply not addressed.91
In addition, there are some risks involved when seeking to assign
significance to the level of Board-court tensions within a recent,
relatively short time frame. The comparative absence of friction on
a certain substantive issue often reflects nothing more than judicial
deference to the Board's expertise. On occasion, however, such
harmony may conceal a history of divergent Board interpretive efforts
from an earlier period, efforts that were abandoned only after
repeated judicial expressions of skepticism or repudiation.92
90. See William N. Cooke et al., The Determinants of NLRB Decision-Making
Revisited, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 237,238-39 (1995) (stating that the Board decided
only about 2.5% of all ULP cases closed in fiscal year 1990); 55 NLRB ANN. REP. 157
(1990) [hereinafter 1990 ANN. REP.] (showing that out of more than 32,000 unfair labor
practice cases closed in 1990 fiscal year, fewer than 1,100 reached stage of a Board order);
54 NLRB ANN. REP. 211 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 ANN. REP.] (showing numbers for 1989
fiscal year: nearly 30,000 cases closed; fewer than 1,100 reached stage of Board order).
91. Within the universe of judicially litigated cases, the study omits several types of
appellate court decisions involving NLRB participation. These decisions include cases
reviewing the grant or denial of injunctive relief under § 10G), cases reviewing Board
petitions for an adjudication of civil contempt, and cases involving potential Board liability
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA). Although these other cases all featured Board participation before the appellate
courts, they did not involve judicial review of Board adjudications on ULP matters. In
most instances (FOIA, EAJA, and § 10(j) cases), the decision appealed from was rendered
by a district court, and the Board was simply a party on appeal. The contempt cases
involved alleged failures to comply with prior court decisions enforcing a Board order.
The General Counsel treats these other cases-which are far fewer in number--differently
from the Board orders that triggered the 1,224 court decisions under examination here.
Appeals from Board adjudications involving alleged ULPs are handled by the Appellate
Division of the General Counsel. Appeals involving FOIA, EAJA, § 10(j) or contempt
matters are handled by separate branches within the General Counsel operation. See
generally 1990 ANN. REP., supra note 90, at 16-18, 193-94 (describing disposition of these
other non-ULP matters).
92. See e.g., Cincinnati Newspaper Guild, Local 9 v. NLRB, 938 F.2d 284, 288-89
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (affirming Board decision that employer's wage proposal did not
constitute bad faith bargaining, and observing that the Board, after numerous reversals,
"now seems to have accepted the courts' repeated teaching that an employer's bargaining
position is not itself bad faith but only evidence of bad faith, so that a finding of bad faith
bargaining must be bolstered by additional evidence"). Only once in the seven-year period
was the Board reversed on a bad faith bargaining issue. See infra Table Six. Further, in
approximately one-half of the cases where the Board was affirmed on this issue, it held in
favor of the employer-that frequency of pro-employer judgments was higher than for any
other issue under § 8(a). Accordingly, it would seem that Board-court harmony on the
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Moreover, while a time frame in which Board and courts are shaped
by one political party has the virtue of presenting differences in
relatively "pure" institutional terms, the absence of partisanship may
result in reversal rates that are artificially low when viewed in the
larger context of the Act's history.93
The limitations described above, and others,94 counsel in favor
of a careful review of study results. Caution, however, need not give
way to skepticism. Analysis of case outcomes and issue-specific
outcomes can offer real insights into the divergent perspectives of
Board and courts and the possible reasons for these differences.
B. Examining General Case Outcomes
1. Classifying Based on Board Results
It is useful to think of general case outcomes as involving four
distinct options. Assuming the General Counsel has charged the
employer (or union) with one or more unfair labor practices, the
Board may decide that the employer (or union) is liable or it may find
no violation; either result (liability or no-liability) may then be
affirmed or reversed by the court of appeals. In practice, Board
decisions reviewed by the courts found liability against the charged
bad faith bargaining issue signifies judicial triumph over the Board rather than judicial
deference to the agency. Cf Becker, supra note 28, at 534 (describing how sharp decline
in litigation over preliminary issues in representation proceedings reveals not consensus
between employers and unions, but rather unions' decision that they must accept elections
on employers' terms as a lesser evil than the massive delay of litigation).
93. Data taken from the Board's Annual Reports indicate that from 1960-92, the
percentage of Board orders enforced in full was 66.9%. The rate of success varied widely:
it was below 60% in the 1960s, rose to 72% in the early 1970s, declined slightly to 65%
in the early 1980s, and was above 75% from 1985-92. The highest success rate was
achieved during the period under study here; this also is the period least affected by
partisan divisions in terms of presidential appointments to the Board versus the courts.
See 25 NLRB ANN. REP., Table 19 (1960) through 57 NLRB ANN. REP., Table 19 (1992).
94. Certain extrinsic factors affect the tensions between Board and courts as well.
Such factors include the motivation of the litigants when deciding to appeal or to resist
compliance, see infra part I.B.2, and also may include the influence of congressional
committees in monitoring the Board or delaying confirmation of nominees, the pressure
felt by sitting Board members to secure or maintain the approval of Presidents who hold
the power of reappointment, and the larger economic environment that may substantially
affect the number of charges being filed. See generally Terry M. Moe, Control and
Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1094
(1985) (describing pattern of mutually adaptive adjustment among Board members, their
staff, and the constituents that litigate before the agency).
970 [Vol. 74
A FAMOUS VICTORY
party-employer or union-in nearly ninety-five percent of the
cases." The dramatic Board tilt in favor of liability may be
explained as a function of two factors. First, the General Counsel-a
public prosecutor-generally litigates only if persuaded that the
complaint has merit, and weaker ULP claims therefore tend to fall
out prior to Board adjudication. Second, charged parties found liable
by the Board often opt for appellate litigation rather than voluntary
compliance-for strategic as well as merits-based reasons-whereas
cases in which no violation is found will go to court only if the
charging party chooses to expend its own resources on appeal.96
From a substantive viewpoint, the Board's ULP decisions
typically arise in one of three contexts: they may resolve charges
against the employer; they may resolve disputes over the scope and
content of relief against the charged employer; or they may resolve
charges against the union. Over seventy-five percent of the court
cases reviewing Board decisions during our seven-year period involved
ULP charges against an employer.97 By contrast, nearly sixteen
percent of the court cases reviewed Board orders resolving remedial
disputes against a violating employer, while fewer than nine percent
of the court cases involved ULP charges against a union.9" This
95. Of 1,027 appellate court cases in which the employer was charged with a ULP or
the union was charged with a ULP, the Board found liability in 963, or 93.8%. The
liability rate for cases involving employer ULPs was somewhat higher at 94.8%; the rate
for cases involving union ULPs was 84.5%. See infra Tables One and Two. Court cases
in which both employer and union were charged with a ULP were very rare and are not
examined in this study. See supra note 88.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 104-05 (discussing strategic appeals by charged
parties); infra note 103 (noting agency practice prohibiting General Counsel from
appealing cases in which no violation is found). The presence of conservative General
Counsels appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush also may play a role here. It is
plausible to suggest that General Counsels operating under a conservative mandate would
be less willing to "push the envelope" with novel or ambitious approaches to liability; one
result of such caution could be an unusually high success rate for the ULP charges that are
fully litigated.
97. Of 1,224 appellate court decisions, 922 reviewed a Board result in which the
employer had been charged with a ULP.
98. There were 188 cases reviewing Board decisions that resolved requests for relief
against a violating employer; a very small number of court cases involved Board decisions
that resolved requests for relief against a violating union. Of the 1,224 court cases, 105
reviewed a Board result in which the union had been charged with a ULP. While the
proportions of "employer liability," "remedy against employer," and "union liability" cases
add up to approximately 100%, that figure is slightly misleading. Some 6% of the court
cases either affirmed or reversed both remedial disputes against an employer and also ULP
charges against that employer. See infra note 115. Offsetting this "double counting," some
6% of all court cases arose outside the three major categories referred to in text and are
therefore omitted from further discussion. Those cases involved disputes that were purely
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distribution is not surprising: the Act's primary mission is to regulate
and protect employee efforts to organize and engage in collective
bargaining, and the vast majority of ULP disputes litigated before the
Board can be expected to (and in fact do) allege thwarting of those
employee efforts by employers.
Given the range of Board results being reviewed-finding liability
or refusing to so find; determining employer liability as distinct from
union liability; determining appropriate relief as distinct from any
issue of liability-the analysis of appellate court outcomes tracks these
different distinctions."
2. Board Result: Liability Versus No Violation
Initially, I consider a distribution of results that is relevant less as
a matter of its independent weight than as a predicate to understand-
ing the results that follow. A reviewing court during this period was
significantly"° less likely to reverse, remand, or modify a Board
order finding an employer liable than an order determining that no
employer ULP had been committed. Similarly, there was a sig-
nificantly lower likelihood of reversal, remand, or modification for
Board orders finding a union liable when compared with orders
determining that the union committed no ULP. These results are
presented in Table One, addressed to court cases in which an
jurisdictional or procedural, or that involved a strange hybrid outcome, see supra note 88,
as well as cases involving requests for relief against a violating union.
99. One could analyze the Board's overall rate of success before the appellate courts,
perhaps comparing it to the overall success rates of other agencies. See generally Peter H.
Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Ad-
ministrative Law, 1990 DUKE LJ. 984,1015-22 (discussing various federal agencies' success
rates when appearing before reviewing courts). For present purposes, however, a
disaggregated approach to agency success rate is more useful in understanding the nature
of Board-court tensions.
100. The use of "significant" refers to results that are statistically significant, using the
chi-square statistic (Pearson's coefficient). Chi-square enables one to test the "null
hypothesis" that two variables are independent of each other, i.e., that the results were
obtained by chance rather than by a relationship between the variables. For instance, in
Table One the two variables are Board finding (employer liability or no employer liability)
and court decision (affirmance or reversal). If the chi-square statistic is significant, this
warrants rejecting the null hypothesis and concluding that the variables are related. A
result that is significant at the .05 level (p. : .05) means that there is only a 5% chance that
a true hypothesis (i.e., no relationship) was rejected. The .05 level of significance is
commonly used in the social sciences. See BLALOCK, supra note 85, at 161; LEE &
MAYKOVICH, supra note 85, at 281-82; DAVID S. MOORE, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND
CONTROVERSIES 416 (3d ed. 1991). I follow that convention by treating results that are
significant at the .05 level as "statistically significant;" see also infra note 133 (discussing
one-tailed significance tests).
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employer ULP was charged, and Table Two, addressed to court cases
in which a union ULP was charged. 1'
TABLE ONE: EMPLOYER ULP CHARGED
Board Finds ULP Board Finds
No ULP
Affirmed 703 31
Reversed 172 16
% Reversed 19.7 34.0
Chi-square = 5.80; p < .05
Unweighted chi-square = 3.18; p < .10
TABLE TWO: UNION ULP CHARGED
Board Finds ULP Board Finds
No ULP
Affirmed 76 10
Reversed 13 6
% Reversed 14.7 37.0
Chi-square = 4.61; p < .05
Unweighted chi-square = 2.54; p = .11
In my view, the lower reversal rate for Board decisions finding
liability is -attributable primarily to the motivation of the litigants in
deciding to pursue an appeal or await the General Counsel's pursuit
101. The results reported in this Table and others are based on weighted data.
Weighting the data was necessary because the proportions of affirmed versus reversed
cases in the sample did not match those in the population. Specifically, the sample consists
of 275 affirmances and 280 reversals whereas the population consists of 944 affirmances
and 280 reversals. The affirmances were weighted more heavily in the analyses, reflecting
their occurrence in the population. While this weighting was essential in order to report
accurately the reversal and affirmance rates as they appear in the population, making
statistical inferences based on weighted data can be problematic. In particular, the value
of the chi-square is directly proportional to the number of cases. See BLALOCK, supra
note 85, at 288; LEE & MAYKOVICH, supra note 85, at 382-83. Because of this potential
problem, all of the analyses were conducted on both weighted and unweighted data. P-
values are reported for both weighted and unweighted data when the chi-square is
significant for weighted but not unweighted data.
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of enforcement.'O° When the General Counsel loses before the
Board, a decision to appeal from the no-liability determination is very
likely to reflect a sincerely-held judgment that the Board is wrong on
the merits.1" The same cannot be said for employers or unions that
are deciding whether to appeal from liability determinations.
Employers found liable for discriminatory discharges and failures to
bargain in good faith may often pursue appeals-or force the Board
102. This difference might also be attributable to the increased presence of internal
Board tensions accompanying no-liability determinations subsequently reversed by the
courts. Such internal tensions could be manifested in two distinct ways. First, one might
anticipate that because no-liability determinations represent the Board's rejection of its
own General Counsel's position, dissenting opinions would accompany such rejections
more often than in instances where the Board has endorsed the General Counsel's
allegations of unlawful conduct. If Board dissents from no-liability decisions are
encouraging a "harder look" on appeal, one might further expect that the dissents would
appear more often in no-liability decisions subsequently reversed than in decisions
subsequently affirmed. Alternatively one might focus on the presence of disagreements
between the Board and the administrative law judge (ALJ) who tried the case. Given that
the AU weighs the evidence and assesses the credibility of the witnesses, perhaps Board
decisions to reject the ALJ's recommendation of liability receive less deference or respect
from a reviewing court. Disagreements among Board members, or between the Board and
an AU, could result in higher reversal rates either because litigants and courts respond
to the "smell" of conflict, or because the presence of such conflict is a true indicator of
"mistaken" legal or factual analysis.
A partial review of Board opinions offers little real support for internal Board
disagreements as a substantial explanatory factor. Focusing on Board decisions in which
the employer was charged with a ULP, one finds there was far more disagreement
accompanying no-liability decisions. Board members dissented from no-liability
determinations over five times as often as they dissented from liability determinations,
Similarly, AIl-Board conflict occurred in cases where the Board issued a no-liability
decision roughly five times more frequently than in cases where the Board issued a liability
decision. Yet this higher level of intra-agency disagreement does not correlate well with
subsequent judicial disposition. Board members dissented from five of the sixteen no-
liability decisions subsequently reversed (31%) but from seventeen of the thirty-one
decisions subsequently affirmed (55%). As for Board-AUJ conflict, it occurs nearly as
often in no-liability decisions subsequently affirmed (ten of thirty-one, or 32%) as in no-
liability decisions subsequently reversed (six of sixteen, or 37%).
Given the low absolute number of employer no-liability Board decisions included in
this study (47 total, as opposed to 875 employer liability decisions), one hesitates to draw
too many inferences. Still, the figures on intra-agency disagreements regarding no-liability
decisions suggest that some other factor-such as litigant motivation-plays a more central
role in accounting for appellate court reversal rates.
103. Pursuant to agency guidelines, the General Counsel may not appeal from an
adverse Board determination. See Ida Klaus, The Taft-Hartley Experiment in Separation
of NLRB Functions, 11 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 371,381,389 (1958). A charging party
may decide not to appeal for strategic reasons unrelated to the substance of the legal
issues, such as conserving scarce resources, waiting for a more favorable set of facts, or
waiting for a more friendly circuit in which to test the legal issue. The most plausible non-
merits strategic factor that would induce a charging party to pursue an appeal-forcing the
opposition to expend resources on further litigation--does not seem overly persuasive.
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to seek enforcement-because they will benefit from the additional
months or years of delay prior to final resolution. By extending the
litigation process in cases they do not expect to win, employers may
effectively chill employee organizing efforts or diminish the prospects
for negotiation of first contracts.'0 " Unions may well appeal liability
determinations or compel Board enforcement petitions for analogous
strategic reasons. Tne spent prolonging litigation may allow the
union to repeat its questionably legal secondary activities or to exert
continuing pressure on dissident employees, even when the union
does not expect to prevail in court. °5 To the extent that appeals
from liability determinations by employers and unions have less to do
with the merits of the Board decision than appeals from no-liability
determinations, this discrepancy would help account for the high
affirmance/low reversal rate where the Board determination is one of
liability.
The presence of such strategic motives also is likely to mask the
full measure of Board-court disagreements regarding the substantive
meaning of the Act. Given that charged parties trigger appellate
court involvement in many cases best characterized as meritless, the
reversal rates analyzed in the ensuing discussion under-
represent-perhaps substantially-the scope of genuine conflict
between the Board and the courts of appeals during the seven-year
period. Indeed, this development may itself be attributable in part to
the statutory aging process. Litigants' evolving familiarity with a
104. See, eg., Cooke, supra note 90, at 241 (reporting on author's earlier study that
showed employers benefited from contesting §§ 8(a)(3) and (5) complaints because lengthy
litigation reduced likelihood that unions would obtain first contracts); Jeffery A. Smisek,
New Remedies for Discriminatory Discharges of Union Adherents During Organizing
Campaigns, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 564, 565-66 (1983); Weiler, Promises, supra note 10, at
1788-93 (contending that employers benefit from contesting discriminatory discharges of
union activists because lengthy litigation diminishes prospects for successful organizing
campaign). In addition, delayed resolution of discriminatory discharge cases makes it more
likely that discharged employees will have settled into new jobs and will have lost interest
in reinstatement.
105. During this seven-year period, two of the most frequent types of union ULPs
charged were illegal secondary activity, prohibited under § 8(b)(4), and illegal coercion or
restraint of individual employees, prohibited under § 8(b)(1)(A). Illegal secondary activity
that occasioned a ULP charge is likely to be halted pendente lite through the securing of
injunctive relief under § 10(1), but recurring misconduct is not punishable more severely
(e.g., by a contempt order) until the court of appeals issues an enforceable order. With
respect to illegal coercion or restraint, delays in enforcement may enable the union to
maintain pressure against employees who refuse to become members or who resign to
cross picket lines during a strike. Still another factor for unions may be constituent
politics: unions may decide to appeal from liability determinations to "keep faith" with
their members or officers whose offending conduct is at issue.
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statute's enforcement scheme may well abet their efforts at circum-
vention, especially where-as here-Congress has not tightened or
even revisited the scheme for a protracted period of time."6
3. Board Result: Employer Liability Versus Union Liability
When examining appellate court cases reviewing Board ULP
decisions, a further inquiry involves differences in reversal rates keyed
to whether the Board result favored the union or the employer.
Table Three presents appellate court cases reviewing Board liability
determinations, which comprise well over ninety percent of all such
cases."°7 The courts during this seven-year period reversed Board
determinations of employer liability or union liability at a relatively
low rate.'08 While reversals did occur with greater frequency when
the Board found employers liable, that difference was not statistically
significant.
TABLE THREE: EMPLOYER AND UNION LIABILITY
Board Finds Board Finds
Employer ULP Union ULP
Affirmed 703 76
Reversed 172 13
% Reversed 19.7 14.7
Chi-square = 1.30; p = .25
The modest difference in reversal rates set forth in Table Three
raises questions about the assertion made by some scholars that
federal courts are "result-oriented" in favor of employers and against
106. The last observation obviously requires fuller treatment than can be provided in
this setting. It is worth pondering, though, whether the NLRA-which was regarded as
having a state-of-the-art enforcement approach in 1935-has become inadequate and
subject to ready manipulation as resistance to enforcement has grown more sophisticated
and judicial dockets have become more crowded. See, e.g., infra note 257 (discussing
congressional updating of other enforcement schemes and failure to update NLRA).
107. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
108. The annual reversal rates for Board decisions finding liability either against an
employer or against a union ranged between 14.5% and 25.6%, with the fiscal year
(October 1-September 30) breakdowns as follows: FY 1987, 16.3% (25/153); FY 1988,
17.6% (23/131); FY 1989, 14.5% (22/152); FY 1990, 14.6% (20/137); FY 1991, 25.2%
(31/123); FY 1992, 25.6% (30/117); FY 1993-94, 22.2% (341153).
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unions."°  If employers found liable under section 8(a) are not
treated significantly better on appeal than unions found liable under
section 8(b), then perhaps political ideology does not figure so
prominently in explaining tensions between the Board and appellate
courts.
Before deciding, however, that the limited differential identified
in Table Three is conclusive, one would have to examine more closely
certain other factors. For example, the centrist character of the Board
itself during this seven-year period may have produced decisions that
in the aggregate were less pathbreaking or controversial, and
therefore less susceptible to reversal."' More generally, insofar as
strategic motives play a prominent role in pursuing appeals, employers
may well rely on such motives to a greater extent than unions."' If
109. Federal judges traditionally have had far more in common with management than
with organized labor, in terms of class background and ideological orientation. Prior to
enactment of the NLRA, federal courts were consistently hostile to workers' interests in
unionization and collective action. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING
OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 33, 52-53, 151-52, 199-201 (1991). See generally
WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES AND LABOR UNIONS
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937 (1994) (describing unions' persistent criticism of both
state and federal courts, and their efforts to restrict the exercises of judicial power). Since
1935, federal courts have often been accused of limiting if not undermining protections
accorded under the NLRA for various forms of concerted activity. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER
L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE
ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, 239-41 (1985); Michael C.
Harper, The Case for Limiting Judicial Review of Labor Board Certification Decisions, 55
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 262,298 n.163 (1987); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the
Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 293-
336 (1978).
110. See, e.g., Clifford Oviatt Jr., The Bush NLRB in Perspective: Does the Playing
Field Need Leveling?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 47, 93 (1993) (former Board member under
President Bush summarizing Board's recent decisional record as moderate and middle-of-
the-road); AFL-CIO LAWYERS COORDINATING COMMITEE, THE LABOR LAW
EXCHANGE, No. 12: THE STEPHENS BOARD iii (1993) (describing Board decisions from
1986-93 as moderately pro-management and more balanced than the extreme pro-
employer Board of the early 1980s).
111. Employers have more to gain in the long-term by pursuing "losing" appeals that
will deter organizing campaigns or prevent the negotiation of first contracts. See supra
note 104 and accompanying text. Union gains from delayed resolution are more finite:
e.g., an extra period of secondary activity that ends when appellate court enforcement
occurs and the offending union becomes subject to contempt proceedings. Recent statistics
from the Board tend to support this hypothesis. During our seven-year period, employers
contested adverse ULP determinations in the courts of appeals nearly ten times more often
than unions did. See supra Table Three (875 employer appeals versus 89"union appeals).
Yet the ratio of meritorious ULPs found by the Board against employers as opposed to
unions was roughly four to one. See DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 83,
86 (1989 and 1990 Board data indicate approximately 10,000 meritorious 8(a) charges and
2,500 meritorious 8(b) charges per year). Employers' far greater propensity to challenge
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employers do litigate strategic appeals more frequently than unions,
this would tend to conceal a higher differential in reversal rates based
on appellate court resistance to the Board's substantive position."'
Finally, a comparison between general case outcomes that are "pro-
union" and outcomes that are "pro-employer" may be incomplete in
important respects. Such a comparison fails to consider the nature
and merits of the particular issues raised on appeal-including the
possibility that reversal rates may vary considerably for certain
specific employer liability or union liability issues."
4. Board Result: Liability Versus Requested Relief
When one turns to appellate review of Board decisions that
resolved remedial disputes against an employer, the results differ
markedly from the liability area. These disputes involved Board
efforts to seek back pay, reinstatement, a bargaining order, or some
other form of relief under section 10(c) against an employer found to
have violated section 8." A reviewing court during this period was
significantly more likely to reverse, remand, or modify a Board order
granting the requested relief than a Board order finding liability
against an employer. The results are presented in Table Four."'
liability in the courts may be partly attributable to their ability to bear the at times
substantial costs of appellate litigation. But employers' willingness to pursue more appeals
for strategic reasons is likely to be a significant factor as well.
112. For instance, assuming arguendo that one-third of employer appeals are pursued
for tactical reasons unrelated to the merits of the case, while only one-sixth of union
appeals are strategic in nature, such appeals are almost certain to end in affirmance. If
one were able to remove those cases from the mix, the resulting comparison of reversal
rates in sincere merits-based appeals would show a greater difference between employer
and union.
113. See infra part II.C (discussing reversal rates for certain issue-specific Board
outcomes with respect to employer liability and also relief against employers).
114. Judicial review of Board efforts to seek relief against a violating union was
exceedingly rare; such cases are omitted from study. See supra note 98.
115. Table Four includes a lesser number of "employer ULP" cases than appeared in
Tables One and Three. There were 77 court cases during this period in which Board
determinations that found employer liability and granted relief against the employer either
were both reversed (65 cases) or were both affirmed (12 cases). For purposes of
comparing reversal rates between the two categories, these overlapping cases were
removed. Looking at all 176 court cases in which a Board determination granting relief
against an employer was either reversed or affirmed, the reversal rate drops to 31.8%; this
is still a very high figure when contrasted with the 19.7% reversal rate for determinations
of employer liability.
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TABLE FOUR: RELIEF AGAINST EMPLOYERS VERSUS
EMPLOYER LIABILITY
Board Grants Relief Board Finds
Against Employer Employer ULP
Affirmed 55 638
Reversed 44 160
% Reversed 44.4 20.1
Chi-square= 29.78; p < .05
The appellate courts' enthusiasm for reversing Board remedial
orders is surprising in light of Supreme Court pronouncements in this
area. As a general matter, the Court's leading recent decision gives
agencies broad authority to apply ambiguous text-such as the
language of section 10(c)" 6-so long as the agency's approach is
"based on a permissible construction of the statute." 1 7 With respect
to section 10(c) in particular, the Court has almost invariably found
Board applications to be permissible. Indeed, long before Chevron
set a new general standard of deference to agency interpretations of
ambiguous text, the Supreme Court recognized the Board's special
expertise in fashioning remedies to effectuate NLRA policies, and
deferred on numerous occasions to the Board's exercise of its
remedial discretion."' Yet despite this history, the appellate courts
in recent times have been extraordinarily hostile to this very remedial
discretion. A particular aspect of the appellate courts' hostility is
explored in detail in Part III.
116. Section 10(c) authorizes the Board to order relief against culpable employers as
follows: "such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without
back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this [Act]." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994).
117. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843 (1984) (emphasis added).
118. See, eg., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610-16 (1969) (bargaining
order); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1964) (order to
resume operations); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348-52 (1953) (back
pay); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) (reinstatement). But cf.
Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 312-17 (1979) (holding that Board abused its
discretion in ordering employer to turn over confidential test data to union). See generally
ABF Freight Sys. Inc. v. NLRB, 114 S. Ct. 835, 839-40 (1994) (discussing Court's
"consistent appraisal of the Board's [broad] remedial authority" going back more than 50
years).
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C. Examining Issue-Specific Outcomes
1. Classifying Based on Specific Issues
The above analysis of Board-court tensions keyed to general case
outcomes before the Board produced results that are interesting and
in some instances surprising. Yet this case outcome analysis fails to
take account of important variations among cases. Although most
appellate court decisions addressed only one substantive issue, over
one-fourth of the reversals involved a reversal of multiple Board
issues" 9 and nearly one-half of the affirmances involved the affir-
mance of two or more issues.' 2° A case outcome analysis fails to
consider the distinction between single-issue and multi-issue cases.
Moreover, in more than one-third of the cases classified as reversals,
the courts also affirmed the Board's determination on certain
issues.121 Although the case outcomes are classified as reversals
because the Board lost on at least one of its determinations, the
Board frequently prevailed on many or even most legal claims being
litigated before the appellate court. A case outcome analysis does not
reflect the presence of these mixed-result cases, much less the
distinction between mixed-result outcomes that are mostly reversals
and those that are mostly affirmances.
In an effort to capture more accurately the complexities of
Board-court tensions during this seven-year period, the study
subdivided general case outcomes into issue-specific components. An
issue-specific analysis can account for the two important variations
just identified: single-issue versus multi-issue cases, and mixed
outcomes.'22  Issue-specific results also facilitate recognition of
particular legal claims that are flashpoints or areas of recurrent
conflict between the Board and the appellate courts. Such recognition
provides a firmer foundation for subsequent doctrinal discussion.
In pursuing issue-specific outcomes, the study focused on two
general case categories: Board decisions finding employer liability,
and Board decisions granting relief for that employer liability. These
119. Of 280 reversals, 76 reversed the Board on two or more distinct substantive issues.
120. Of 944 affirmances, 480 affirmed the Board on two or more distinct legal issues.
121. Of 280 reversals, 106 cases involved some issues being affirmed, although the case
as a whole was reversed, remanded, or modified.
122. There are additional ways of subdividing outcomes that might illuminate variations
present among individual cases. See Cooke, supra note 90, at 247 (distinguishing between
simple and complex cases based on whether more than three Board members participated
and whether the case appeared in NLRB annual reports)..
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are the two largest case categories," and they therefore allow the
most scope for classification into subgroups of meaningful numerical
size. Employer liability and remedies-against-employers also are the
two categories that lie at the core of the Board's statutory mis-
sion, making them appropriate subjects for further analysis.
2. Board Result: Bargaining-Related ULP Issues Versus Other
ULP Issues
Board decisions finding employer liability are predicated on
section 8(a) of the NLRA, which sets forth a range of employer unfair
labor practices. Four types of ULP issues recurred with sufficient
frequency to be classified as major issue categories: (i) violations of
section 8(a)(1), consisting primarily of employer inter-
ference-through threats, interrogation, improper benefits, etc.-with
employee organizing campaigns and employee efforts to secure a fair
representation election; (ii) violations of section 8(a)(3), consisting of
various forms of employer discriminatory actions taken against union
members or union supporters; (iii) traditional violations of section
8(a)(5), consisting of employer failures to bargain in good faith with
a recognized or certified union; and (iv) technical violations of section
8(a)(5), consisting of employer challenges to the Board's certification
of the union pursuant to section 9. This last group of challenges,
labeled in Table Five as "9" for convenience, could be litigated only
when the employer refused to bargain with the duly certified
union." The reversal rates for these four issue categories are set
forth in Table Five."
123. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
124. See supra text immediately following note 98.
125. Employers often object to a union's certification by the Board, based on a
challenge either to the scope of the bargaining unit or to the union's misconduct during
the election campaign. Because the Board's certification of election results under § 9(c)
is not a final order, an employer typically tests the validity of the certification by refusing
to bargain with the certified union, thereby committing a "technical" violation of § 8(a)(5)
that is appealable to the courts. These technical § 8(a)(5) violations were separately
classified under § 9.
126. The data for "all 8a" issues includes the four major issue categories plus 8a2, 8a4,
and 8f, each of which appears in Table Six. When calculating "% Reversed" for a
particular issue in Tables Five, Six, and Seven, the denominator equals all occurrences of
that particular issue while the numerator equals only those occurrences where the courts
reversed the Board on that particular issue.
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TABLE FIVE: EMPLOYER LIABILITY; MAJOR ISSUE CATEGORIES
Affirmed Affirmed Reversed
Issue, Issue, Issue, % Reversed
Affirmed Reversed Reversed
Case Case Case
8al 305 69 51 12.0
8a3 350 53 57 12.4
8a5 291 48 64 15.9
9 195 10 38 15.6
all 8a 1,156 185 222 14.2
At least two aspects of these results are worth noting. First, the
reversal rate for employer liability issues is considerably below the
19.7% reversal rate for employer liability cases. This lower rate is
attributable to the multi-issue and mixed outcome factors discussed
above. Because there are many more multi-issue affirmances than
multi-issue reversals, and because so many reversed cases also include
affirmed issues, an issue-specific analysis yields a higher proportion of
affirmances.'27
Second, the reversal rate for bargaining-related ULP issues -8a5
and 9-is significantly higher than the rate for the two other major
employer violations-8al and 8a3." One factor that might
contribute to this differential is the relative lack of judicial familiarity
with the types of misconduct involved in bargaining-related ULP
issues. An unlawful refusal to bargain involves employer conduct
directed against the union as an entity. The clash of complex
strategies between two collective enterprises-both at and away from
the negotiating table-has no obvious parallels in public law outside
the NLRA. By contrast, allegations of unlawful threats, inter-
rogations, or discriminatory discharges typically implicate employer
127. Looking at the universe of all cases and all issues, there are 378 reversed issues in
the 280 reversed cases, an average of 1.35 reversed issues for each reversed case. By
contrast, the 944 affirmed cases contained 1,775 affirmed issues, an average of 1.88
affirmed issues for each affirmed case. Further, 106 of the 280 reversed cases included at
least one affirmed issue, and there were 270 affirmed issues in those 106 cases.
128. For comparison of reversal rates of 8a5 and 9 combined (15.8%) versus 8al and
8a3 combined (12.2%), chi-square = 4.07, p < .05 for weighted data; chi-square = 5.63, p
< .05 for unweighted data.
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actions directed against individual employees. These actions often are
comparable to prohibited conduct in other areas of public law,29
and courts reasoning by analogy may find it easier to influence or
accept the Board's analytic approach.
The disparity regarding bargaining-related ULP issues becomes
more dramatic upon further subdivision of the four major issue
categories. Table Six presents reversal rates for nineteen distinct ULP
issues for which the Board found employer liability with some
frequency. These issues include sub-groupings of the four major issue
categories, as well as several employer liability issues not captured
within those categories.'
129. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248-50 (1989) (addressing
mixed motive issues analogous to 8a3); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274,284-87 (1977) (same); 26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections §§ 374-85 (1966) (addressing
range of political election misconduct analogous to 8al that is prohibited by federal or
state law, including electioneering, bribery, illegal advertising, and voter intimidation).
130. The ULP issue categories in the left-hand column of Table Six are as follows:
8al Misc: Catchall for 8al violations not otherwise identified
8alB: Conferring or promising benefits during campaign
8a1i: Interrogation
8alS: Employer solicitation policies
8alSu: Surveillance
8alT: Threats
8a2: Domination or interference with labor organization
8a3 Misc: Catchall for 8a3 violations not otherwise identified
8a3MM: Mixed motive discrimination against union members or
supporters
8a4: Retaliation for filing charge or testifying under Act
8a5 Misc: Catchall for 8a5 violations not otherwise identified
8a5BF: Bad faith bargaining, including surface bargaining
8a5GFD: Good faith doubt as to continued majority status
8a5I: Refusal to provide information requested by union
8a5MS: Refusal to bargain on mandatory subjects
8a5MT: Unilateral midterm modifications or other unilateral pre-
impasse changes
9S: Technical 8a5 based on challenge to identity or scope of bar-
gaining unit
9U: Technical 8a5 based on challenge to union's/employees'
conduct during campaign
8f: Pre-hire agreement
For a discussion of the development of these issue codes, see supra note 89. Most
issues were readily identifiable based on the descriptive and analytic discussion in the
appellate court opinions. As a general matter, when the issue was not sufficiently
identifiable, it was placed in the "catchall" category--e.g., an 8a5 ULP that did not plainly
belong in one of the five more specific subgroups. The 8a3 ULPs other than mixed motive
discrimination probably could have been subdivided into several classifications; that
adjustment may be made as part of a subsequent study focused on the 8a3 area. The sum
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TABLE SIX: EMPLOYER LIABILrrY; SPECIFIC ULP ISSUES
Affirmed Affirmed Reversed
ULP Issue, Issue, Issue, %
Issue Affirmed Reversed Reversed Reversed
Case Case Case
8al Misc 62 19 14 14.7
8alB 23 4 5 15.6
8a11 79 14 11 10.6
8alS 10 7 9 34.6
8alSu 24 3 2 6.9
8alT 106 22 10 7.2
8a2 3 1 3 42.9
8a3 Misc 165 31 29 12.9
8a3MM 185 22 28 11.9
8a4 7 2 4 30.8
8a5 Misc 151 13 17 9.4
8a5BF 7 7 1 6.7
8a5GFD 34 4 13 25.5 -
8a5I 37 6 16 27.1
8a5MS 14 4 3 14.3
8a5MT 48 14 14 18.4
9S 120 4 21 14.5
9U 76 6 17 17.2
8f 3 2 5 50.0
of "affirmed issues, affirmed cases" for all 19 issues listed in Table Six differs slightly from
the total for all 8a "affirmed issues, affirmed cases" in Table Five because of rounding due
to the weighting of cases.
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Board decisions ordering relief against employers for their ULP
conduct are exercises of the Board's authority under section 10(c) of
the NLRA. The court cases studied from our seven-year period
reviewed Board remedies of several distinct types: (i) orders focused
on back pay awards for employees victimized by employer ULP
conduct; (ii) orders requiring the offending employer to bargain with
the union; (iii) other orders requiring a range of equitable relieft
including reinstatement, continued payments to employee benefit
plans, continued operation of certain programs or facilities, and broad
cease-and-desist directives. The reversal rates for these three types
of relief are presented in Table Seven.
TABLE SEVEN: RELIEF AGAINST EMPLOYER; SPECIFIC ISSUES 3'
Affirmed Affirmed Reversed
Issue, Issue, Issue, %
Affirmed Reversed Reversed Reversed
Case Case Case
10BP 51 11 18 22.5
10BO 24 2 16 38.1
10c Misc 48 17 25 27.8
all 10c 123 30 59 27.8
The issue subgroups identified in Tables Six and Seven disclose
considerable variations in the court's reversal rates when compared
with the two broad aggregations--"employer liability" and "relief
against employer"-to which they belong. Most specific issues reflect
reversal rates similar to or below the relevant aggregated rate, but a
small number of issues were reversed at rates significantly above the
norm. Two of the issues are the focus for the remainder of this
Article: (i) employer refusals to bargain based on asserted good faith
doubt as to the union's continued majority status; and (ii) the
imposition of bargaining orders as a remedy.
131. The remedial issues in the left-hand column are as follows: 10BP-back pay
awards against employer; 10BO-bargaining orders; 10c Misc--catchall for 10c relief not
otherwise identified.
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I chose to concentrate on these two issues for several reasons.
First, judicial reversals occurred in high enough volume, and across a
large enough number of circuits, to warrant further inquiry regarding
the precise nature of Board-court conflicts. In addition, the reversal
rate for the two issues was at or near the top of their respective "peer
groups" when considering issues that were litigated with some
regularity. Finally, the two issues are related in that each directly
implicates the core concept of collective bargaining and the extent to
which bargaining relations should be protected or limited under the
Act.
Appellate courts reversed section 8(a)(5) determinations that
were based on the good faith doubt issue at a rate significantly higher
than the rate of reversal for virtually all other "employer liability"
determinations. Similarly, the courts reversed Board-imposed
bargaining orders at a rate significantly in excess of the reversal rate
for all other "relief against employer" determinations." The
absolute number of reversals for each issue-thirteen and sixteen,
respectively-may not seem large. Yet from the Board's perspective,
one-or at most two-issue-specific reversals by a circuit court within
a relatively short time period may constitute an ominous if not
definitive statement of the circuit's position on that issue. The Board
may even seek to avoid subsequent enforcement efforts in that circuit,
by opting to litigate in another circuit where feasible or by settling the
dispute.
A more realistic indicator of the magnitude of Board-court
tensions on these two issues may be the number of different circuits
in which the Board has been reversed. In that regard, the thirteen
132. For comparison of reversal rates of 8a5GFD versus all other "employer liability"
determinations, chi-square = 5.42, p < .05 for weighted data; chi-square = 4.49, p < .05 for
unweighted data. Most other issues for which the reversal rate was significantly above the
norm of 14.2 occurred far less frequently, e.g., 8a2 (occurred as appellate court issue 11
times); 8a4 (occurred as issue 13 times); 8f (occurred as issue 10 times). The one
statistically significant issue with a comparable frequency rate was 8a5I, also a bargaining-
related ULP: chi-square = 8.28, p < .05 for weighted data; chi-square = 5.73, p < .05 for
unweighted data.
133. For comparison of reversal rates of 10BO versus all other "relief against employer"
determinations, chi-square = 2.83, p < .05 (one-tailed) for weighted data; chi-square = 3.54,
p < .05 (one-tailed) for unweighted data. I used a one-tailed significance test in this
instance because my hypothesis is directional: the question is whether 10BO reversals
occur more often than reversals in other "relief against employer" issues. The one-tailed
test is appropriate for this type of directional hypothesis. See, e.g., LEE & MAYKOVICH,
supra note 85, at 285-87; BLALOCK, supra note 85, at 163-64. Some of my other
hypotheses are also directional and would have supported a one-tailed test, but those
results were equally significant using the more conservative two-tailed test.
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good faith doubt reversals occurred in ten different circuit courts,
while the sixteen bargaining order reversals occurred in six different
circuits." This broad range of appellate court resistance is
intriguing when combined with the high reversal rates.135  Further,
the good faith doubt and bargaining order issues are related in that
134. The Board was reversed on the good faith doubt issue in all circuits except the
Third and Eighth. There were three reversals in the D.C. Circuit, two in the Tenth
Circuit, and one in all others. The bargaining order reversals were somewhat more
concentrated: five reversals in the D.C. Circuit, three each in the Second, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits, and one reversal apiece in the First and Fifth Circuits. Still, the fact that
50% of the circuits reversed, remanded, or modified a Board bargaining order indicates
the ample scope of Board-court tension on this issue, especially given that three of the six
remaining circuits (Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh) reviewed no bargaining order issues at
all based on the sample of 275 affirmed cases.
135. Variation among circuits may also be a factor worth considering when studying
reversal rates. Data compiled on court decisions reviewing Board cases that included
"employer liability" determinations or "relief against employer" determinations indicate
considerable differences in reversal rates across circuits:
Employer Liability Relief Against Employer
% Reversed (Total Cases) % Reversed (Total Cases)
1st Circuit 27.9 (14) 100.0 (1)
2d Circuit 10.6 (85) 61.7 (18)
3d Circuit 4.0 (100) 14.9 (20)
4th Circuit 34.6 (58) 22.7 (9)
5th Circuit 34.1 (47) 54.0 (7)
6th Circuit 28.3 (148) 31.2 (45)
7th Circuit 19.9 (116) 59.5 (8)
8th Circuit 27.1 (52) 27.9 (14)
9th Circuit 9.1 (98) 7.7 (26)
10th Circuit 16.3 (37) 100.0 (1)
11th Circuit 8.2 (49) 0.0 (0)
D.C. Circuit 29.3 (72) 34.2 (26)
Among courts of appeals with a higher frequency of reviewing Board decisions finding
employers culpable and ordering relief against them, the Third and Ninth Circuits were
consistently most supportive of the Board while the D.C. and Sixth Circuits were
consistently most hostile to Board determinations. Still, the presence of reversals in so
many different circuits on the two identified issues suggests that judicial resistance to the
Board's position is widespread and justifies further analysis.
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both involve Board efforts to protect or promote bargaining relation-
ships in the face of employer assertions that individual employee
choice is being compromised. 6  Given the steady attrition in the
proportion of the private workforce that operates under a collective
bargaining agreement, disagreements over whether a collective
bargaining relationship should be established or maintained assume
special significance. For all of these reasons-the extraordinary
reversal rate, the range of circuits resisting Board positions, and the
importance of conflict over the survival of bargaining relationships-I
now consider the two identified issues in greater detail.
III. DOCTRINE PURSUED: BARGAINING STABILITY AND
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
In embarking on an examination of the good faith doubt and
bargaining order issues, it is important to clarify the limited nature of
my objectives. A comprehensive assessment of the law on good faith
doubt and bargaining orders is beyond the scope of this Article. 37
This Part seeks instead to describe the various aspects of
disagreement between Board and courts regarding these matters, and
then to analyze the disagreement in terms that reconcile the divergent
strands. As explained below, the bargaining order conflict identified
empirically in Part II is best understood as raising two distinct yet
related substantive issues. Accordingly, the discussion that follows is
divided into three sections: one on good faith doubt and two on
bargaining orders. For each issue, I present a brief historical back-
ground, then describe the nature of Board-court tensions during our
seven-year period, and conclude by discussing a conflict in underlying
values that helps explain the various tensions.
136. See discussion infra part III.
137. For further analysis of these issues, see, e.g., Joan Flynn, A Triple Standard at the
NLRB: Employer Challenges to an Incumbent Union, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 654 (addressing
good faith doubt); Terry A. Bethel & Catherine A. Melfi, Judicial Enforcement of NLRB
Bargaining Orders: What Influences the Courts?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 139 (1988)(addressing enforcement of initial recognition bargaining orders); Andrea S. Christensen
& Thomas G.S. Christensen, Gissel Packing and "Good Faith Doubt" The Gestalt of
Required Recognition of Unions Under the NLRA, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 411 (1970)
(addressing bargaining orders to establish initial recognition for union); Norman J. Fry,
The Decontextualization of Labor Relations in Successorship Cases: Williams Enterprises
v. NLRB and Sullivan Industries v. NLRB, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1616, 1642-48 (1993)
(addressing bargaining orders to restore status of incumbent union).
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A. Good Faith Doubt
1. Background
A union enjoys a virtually irrebuttable presumption of majority
status for a reasonable period after it has won an election and also for
the duration of a collective bargaining agreement.' Beyond the
protected period established under the Board's certification bar and
contract bar doctrines, employees may contest the union's status by
petitioning for a decertification election.'39 The question arises,
however, as to what an employer may do to challenge an incumbent
union's status. When a union that has had bargaining rights in the
immediate past is confronted with an employer claim that the union
has lost its majority, how should that claim be evaluated?
Under the Board's well-settled approach, an employer may
lawfully withdraw recognition from an incumbent union provided that
the withdrawal was based on a good faith doubt as to the union's
continued majority status, which doubt is supported by sufficient
objective considerations.' Historically, the Wagner Act did not
address either employee decertification petitions or employer-initiated
petitions to hold a representation election; absent those statutory
options, the Board allowed employer refusals to bargain as a
legitimate means of challenging a union's continued majority
status.'" The Taft-Hartley Amendments authorized both employer
138. See NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272,290 n.12 (1972) (sustaining
Board position that irrebuttable presumption also attaches for period of collective
bargaining agreement); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98-104 (1954) (upholding Board
position that union enjoys irrebuttable presumption of majority status for one year after
being certified by Board); see also 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1994) (barring any election within
12 months of a preceding valid election); NLRB v. Sierra Dev. Co., 604 F.2d 606, 607 (9th
Cir. 1979) (comparable presumption of majority status arises for reasonable period of time
following employer's voluntary recognition of union). See generally COX ET AL., supra
note 7, at 273-74 (discussing Board doctrines barring new election for one year following
certification of a collective bargaining representative and for up to three years of a
collective bargaining agreement's existence).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (1994) (requiring Board to order decertification election if
petition signed by 30% of bargaining unit members).
140. See NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 778 (1990). An
employer also may lawfully withdraw recognition from an incumbent union if it establishes
that at the time of its withdrawal the union, in fact, no longer enjoyed majority status. Id.;
see COX ET AL., supra note 7, at 346.
141. See Huch Leather Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 394,400-01 (1939); Report of NLRB to Senate
Committee on Education and Labor Upon S. 1000, S. 1264, S. 1392, S. 1550, and S. 1580,
76th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2, 179 (1939) (stating that employer is not obligated to bargain
with union "if the employer, in good faith, is not convinced that a labor organization
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election petitions and employee decertification petitions, thereby
providing explicit statutory means for testing whether an incumbent
union retained majority support.' Nonetheless, the Board decided
that even after Taft-Hartley, an employer with a good faith doubt as
to an incumbent union's majority status could lawfully refuse to
bargain once the protected period had expired, and that such good
faith doubt could be established without the filing of either an
employee decertification petition or an employer petition for an
election."' The Board has steadily adhered to this approach as a
matter of principle. At the same time, the Board as a matter of
practice has tended to require from the employer substantial objective
evidence that the union lacks majority support in order to establish a
successful good faith doubt defense.'
2. Recent Differences Between Board and Appellate Courts
During our seven-year period, the appellate courts displayed
considerably more sympathy for employer assertions of good faith
doubt than did the Board. The extraordinarily high reversal rate with
respect to the good faith doubt issue reflected disagreement on a
range of distinct legal matters, as well as occasionally divergent
approaches to evaluating the factual record.
One legal controversy involved the status of replacement workers
hired during a strike called by the union. The Board, after extended
vacillation, had concluded that such replacements should not be
presumed either to oppose the union or to support the union in the
represents a majority"); see also Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2, 1917 (1947)
(statement of NLRB chair Paul M. Herzog, observing that if employer declines to bargain
because of good faith doubt, "[t]he Board will not compel him to do so, unless he is
proven wrong in a proceeding under section 8(5) of the [Wagner] Act").
142. Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 9(c), 61 Stat. 136, 144-45 (1947) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 159(c)(1)(B), (e) (1994)).
143. Celanese Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 672-74 (1951). The Board initially concluded
that an employer could not repudiate an existing bargaining relationship based on good
faith doubt, because Taft-Hartley had specified the means by which the employer's duty
to bargain could be dissolved. United States Gypsum Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 964, 966 (1950).
A year later, the Board modified its position in Celanese. See generally Flynn, supra note
137, at 683-85 (discussing Board's development of the Celanese rule).
144. See, e.g., Wald Transfer & Storage Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 592, 592-94 (1975), enforced
mem., 535 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977); Bartenders, Hotel,
Motel & Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 651, 651-54 (1974). See
generally Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 788-93 (describing how various forms of conflict
between employees and their union are compatible with employees' desire for continued
representation by that union).
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same ratio as other employees in the bargaining unit.45 According-
ly, an employer challenging an incumbent union's majority status in
connection with a strike had to justify its refusal to bargain by
producing objective evidence that striker replacements had repudiated
the union in sufficient numbers to establish good faith doubt. Several
appellate courts during this period rejected the Board's "no
presumption" presumption with respect to striker replacements, and
concluded that employers were justified in doubting that the striker
replacements supported the union."4  While the courts in each
instance also cited other factors as supporting the employer's
withdrawal of recognition, they all relied on the presence of striker
replacements as a factor tending to undermine union support. The
Supreme Court ended this appellate court trend in 1990, when it
sustained the Board's position as a reasonable exercise of its
discretion.' 47
A second area of legal dispute involved operation of the Board's
contract bar doctrine. The Board applied this doctrine expansively,
determining that once an employer and a union enter into a valid
collective bargaining agreement, the union's majority status may not
be challenged for the duration of the contract-up to three
145. See Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1344-45 (1987), enforced, 891
F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 496 U.S. 925 (1990). The Board has a longstanding
presumption that new employees hired under non-strike circumstances support the union
in the same ratio as the employees they replace. E.g., National Plastics Prods. Co., 78
N.L.R.B. 699, 706 (1948), enforced, 175 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1949). By contrast, the Board
initially presumed that replacements hired during a strike opposed the union, Stoner
Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440,1444 (1959), then reversed itself and presumed that striker
replacements-like other new employees-support the union in the same proportion as
the employees they replaced, Cutten Supermarket, 220 N.L.R.B. 507, 509 (1975), and
finally settled on a "no-presumption" presumption in 1987. See Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S.
at 779-82.
146. See Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 1428, 1433-34 (10th Cir. 1990),
denying enforcement of 289 N.L.R.B. 358 (1988); Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 871
F.2d 980, 987-88 (11th Cir. 1989), denying enforcement of 286 N.L.R.B. 295 (1987), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 924 (1989); Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.2d 362, 366-
67 (5th Cir. 1988), denying enforcement of 287 N.L.R.B. 350 (1987), rev'd, 494 U.S. 775
(1990).
147. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 788-96. The Court relied on the Board's empirical
analysis that even though replacements often do not favor the incumbent union, the
circumstances of each strike vary so much that the probability of replacement opposition
simply is not strong enough to justify an anti-union presumption. The Court cited in
particular. (i) circumstances in which replacements desire union representation despite
their willingness to cross the picket line; (ii) circumstances in which the union's weak
bargaining position leads it to forsake any demand that replacements be ousted; (iii)
circumstances in which the interests of strikers and replacements converge once the strike
has ended and job rights have been resolved. See id. at 788-93.
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years-even if a majority of employees have withdrawn their
support."4 A number of appellate courts, however, were critical of
the Board's expansive approach, citing problems they perceived with
contract formation or with intervening changes in the bargaining unit.
Thus, employer refusals to bargain with an incumbent union were
sustained or reinstated where the court determined that the union
lost-or might well have lost-majority support between the time the
employer offered a contract and the time of union acceptance;149 or
where the court questioned application of the contract bar rule to a
workforce that had experienced substantial turnover.Y Further, in
the analogous area of presumed majority status following an
employer's voluntary recognition of the union,"' the Board was
rebuked for applying the presumption in the face of evidence that the
union had misrepresented its majority status prior to obtaining the
employer's recognition.5"
A third area of legal wrangling centered on the employer's use
of polling in an effort to show loss of majority support for an
incumbent union. During this period, the Board continued its policy
of applying the same standard to assess whether an employer may poll
its employees that it applies to assess whether an employer may
withdraw recognition: Does the employer have sufficient objective
148. See, eg., EPE, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B, 191, 193,200 (1987) (rejecting employer's good
faith doubt argument despite decertification petition signed by majority of unit employees),
affd in relevant part, 845 F.2d 483, 490 (4th Cir. 1988); Auciello Iron Works, Inc., 303
N.L.R.B. 562, 564-67 (1991) (finding that collective bargaining agreement came into
existence, and that employer's admitted withdrawal of recognition the following
day-based on doubts that union had had majority support when it accepted offer-was
unlawful under contract bar doctrine), remanded, 980 F.2d 804, 811-13 (1992).
149. See Chicago Tribune Co. v. NLRB, 965 F.2d 244,249-51 (7th Cir. 1992) (refusing
to apply contract bar doctrine where union lost support of its workers prior to accepting
contract offer), denying enforcement of 303 N.L.R.B. 682 (1991); Auciello Iron Works, Inc.,
980 F.2d at 811-13 (remanding for clarification as to whether union lacked majority
support at the time it purported to accept the contract).
150. See El Torito-La Fiesta Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 852 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1988)
(unpublished disposition), 1988 WL 72981, at *1 (remanding for clarification as to why
contract bars employer challenge to incumbent union's majority status even though only
8 of 180 current employees were working when contract was formed), denying enforcement
of 284 N.L.R.B. 518 (1987).
151. See supra note 138 (citing NLRB v. Sierra Dev. Co., 604 F.2d 606, 607 (9th Cir.
1979)).
152. See Royal Coach Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 838 F.2d 47, 51-54 (2d Cir. 1988)
(determining that once employer showed the union misrepresented its majority status in
seeking voluntary recognition, burden shifted to General Counsel to show that union had
obtained requisite majority support at time it secured recognition; and that General
Counsel did not meet his burden), denying enforcement of 282 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1987).
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considerations on which to base a reasonable good faith doubt as to
the union's continued majority status.53 The Board defended its
use of the same rigorous good faith doubt standard because employer
polling and employer withdrawal of recognition share similar
purposes-to test whether the union still enjoys majority support, and
they carry similar risks-lost recognition for the union and lost
representation for the employees.'-' Some appellate courts,
however, rejected the Board's approach to polling. They applied a
lesser burden for employers seeking to conduct a poll-namely,
whether there is substantial, objective evidence of a loss of union
support even if that evidence does not itself justify withdrawal of
recognition.15
Still another area of legal controversy during this period
concerned the Board's approach to employer assertions of good faith
doubt that relied on employee decertification efforts later found to
have been tainted by the employer's own misconduct. The Board
adopted a stern position towards such employer misconduct,
concluding that a decertification election set aside due to the
employer's objectionable actions could not be used to support the
employer's good faith doubt,"6 and that a successor employer's
unlawful refusal to bargain with the incumbent union automatically
tainted a subsequent employee petition for decertification so that the
petition could not be used to support good faith doubt. 7 One
court of appeals, the D.C. Circuit, expressed repeated objections to
the Board's approach. The court took the position that employer
153. See Texas Petrochemicals Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1057, 1059 (1989), modified and
remanded, 923 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1991).
154. Id. at 1060-61.
155. See Texas Petrochemicals Corp. v. NLRB, 923 F.2d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 1991)
(adopting lesser burden but affirming Board finding that employee poll was improper on
separate ground that employer failed to notify union of the poll); Clesco Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 915 F.2d 1570 (6th Cir. 1990) (unpublished disposition), 1990 WL 142349, at *3
(reversing Board's asserted application of the lesser burden to reject an employer poll on
grounds that Board lacked substantial evidence to support its findings). Several circuits
had rejected the Board's "good faith doubt" approach to polling even before 1986. See
Mingtree Restaurant, Inc. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1295,1297-99 (9th Cir. 1984); Thomas Indus.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 687 F.2d 863, 868-69 (6th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. A.W. Thompson, Inc., 651
F.2d 1141, 1144-45 (5th Cir. 1981).
156. St. Agnes Medical Ctr., 287 N.L.R.B. 242,242-43 (1987), affd in part and vacated
in part, 871 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
157. Sullivan Indus., Inc., 302 N.L.R.B. 144,149 (1991), enforcement granted'in part and
denied in part, 957 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Williams Enterprises, Inc., 301
N.L.R.B. 167, 174 (1991) (finding that employer's unlawful threats and interrogation
tainted subsequent employee petition for decertification).
1996]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
misconduct preceding employee decertification efforts did not so
readily warrant the exclusion of those efforts when assessing the
employer's asserted good faith doubt. Rather, the court continued,
the Board should examine the totality of circumstances in each case
to determine whether the employer's misconduct "significantly
contributed to" the employees' subsequent attempt to decertify their
union.158
Apart from their disagreements regarding various discrete legal
matters, the Board and the appellate courts diverged on a number of
occasions regarding their characterizations of the factual record."5 9
When seeking to establish a good faith doubt justification for refusals
to bargain with an incumbent union, employers traditionally invoke
a wide range of factors as indicative of employee dissatisfaction.16°
Each of these factors may be insufficient standing alone to establish
good faith doubt. Both the Board and courts acknowledge, however,
their obligation to consider the cumulative effect of all such factors in
determining whether the employer's refusal to bargain in a particular
instance was justified.'6'
Despite this professed unity on the need to consider the
aggregative impact of all doubt-inducing factors, there is some tension
in the application of the "cumulative effect" approach. When the
Board rejects an employer's good faith doubt assertion, it at times
seems to be considering and dismissing each factor individually rather
than evaluating the totality of all factors. 62 The courts of appeals,
158. See Sullivan Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Williams
Enterprises v. NLRB, 956 F.2d 1226, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1992); St. Agnes Medical Ctr. v.
NLRB, 871 F.2d 137, 145-47 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
159. See, eg., NLRB v. Oil Capital Elec., Inc., 5 F.3d 459, 463-64 (10th Cir. 1993),
denying enforcement of 308 N.L.R.B. 1149 (1992); Chesapeake Plywood Inc. v. NLRB, 917
F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 1990) (unpublished disposition), 1990 WL 162514, at *7-8, denying in part
enforcement of 294 N.L.R.B. 201 (1989); Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 871 F.2d
980, 992 (11th Cir. 1989), denying enforcement of 286 N.L.R.B. 295 (1987), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 924 (1989).
160. Such factors may include, for example: less than majority union membership
within the bargaining unit; substantial declines in union membership or dues checkoff
authorizations; substantial employee turnover; criticism of union expressed in employee-
generated letters or employer-conducted polls; personal and specific statements from many
unit members that they do not want the union. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra
note 64, at 574-77.
161. See, e.g., Oil Capital Elec., Inc., 5 F.3d at 462-64 (purporting to consider cumulative
effect); U.S. Mosaic Tile Co. v. NLRB, 935 F.2d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 1991) (same);
Transport Serv. Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 22, 33 (1991) (same), enforcement granted in part and
denied in part, 973 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1992).
162. See, e.g., Oil Capital Elec., Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 1149, 1152-53 (1992) (analyzing
factors individually and making no reference to their cumulative effect), enforcement
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by contrast, tend to emphasize that a combination of factors may
justify good faith doubt, and they seem more diligent in discussing the
cumulative impact of aU factors raised. That diligence is evident in
cases enforcing the Board's rejection of a good faith doubt
defense" as weU as cases reversing the Board for ignoring
cumulative effect."6
3. Maintaining Bargaining Stability Versus Crediting
Employee Discontent
There were certain recurring differences in emphasis between the
Board and courts that seem to characterize their approaches to the
good faith doubt issue. The Board worried most about the impor-
tance of stable and continuing collective bargaining relationships, and
the danger that employers would disrupt or subvert those relation-
ships by invoking the mantra of renewed free choice. Although the
priority assigned to maintaining stable bargaining relationships was
often implicit in the Board's approach, it occasionally was expressed
in ringing terms:
The presumption of continuing majority status essentially
serves two important functions of Federal labor policy.
First, it promotes continuity in bargaining relationships....
The resulting industrial stability remains a primary objective
of the Wagner Act, and to an even greater extent, the Taft-
Hartley Act. Second, the presumption of continuing
majority status protects the express statutory right of
employees to designate a collective-bargaining representative
of their own choosing, and to prevent, an employer from
impairing that right without some objective evidence that the
representative the employees have designated no longer
enjoys majority support.... [T]he employer's burden of
denied, 5 F.3d 459 (10th Cir. 1993); Tile, Terrazzo & Marble Contractors Ass'n, 287
N.L.R.B. 769,783-84 (1987) (same), enforced, 935 F.2d 1249 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1031 (1992); Bryan Memorial Hosp., 279 N.L.R.B. 222, 225 (1986) (same),
enforced, 814 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987); see also ACL Corp.,
278 N.L.R.B. 474,480-81 (1986) (considering and rejecting numerous factors individually,
making brief conclusory reference to collective consideration).
163. See, e.g., NLRB v. Laverdiere's Enterprises, 933 F.2d 1045,1052-53 (1st Cir. 1991),
enforcing in relevant part 297 N.L.R.B. 826 (1990); U.S. Mosaic Tile Inc. v. NLRB, 935
F.2d 1249, 1258-59 (11th Cir. 1991), enforcing 287 N.L.R.B. 769 (1987).
164. See NLRB v. Oil Capital Elec., Inc., 5 F.3d 459, 463-64 (10th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that Board failed to consider cumulative effect of various good faith doubt
factors).
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proof [in adducing sufficient evidence to establish good faith
doubt] is a heavy one."6
From the Board's perspective, allowing striker replacements to
be presumed opponents of the incumbent union-as opposed to
requiring a demonstration of their opposition based on objective
evidence-would invite an undermining of the status quo, which is the
presence of a bargaining relationship."6  Further, allowing
employers to poll employees already represented by a union without
having good faith doubt of the union's majority status "could disrupt
collective bargaining and frustrate the policy of the Act favoring
stable relations."'67  Similarly, crediting employee concerns that
follow a successor employer's unlawful delay in recognizing the
incumbent bargaining representative is likely to encourage feelings of
employee disaffection toward the union that are "not conducive to
industrial peace."'" In each instance, the Board favored continuity
of a bargaining relationship as promoting the fundamental goal of
industrial peace, and viewed with suspicion the employer's reliance on
"employee rights" to challenge that bargaining relationship.
The courts of appeals had a different angle of vision on the good
faith doubt issue. Judicial attention tended to be directed at the
importance of preferences being expressed by current employees and
the danger that employees would be represented by a union that most
of them did not want. Once again, the priority assigned to employee
free choice was most often implicit in the courts' analyses. By
allowing employer polling based on less substantial evidence of lost
union support than would be required for employer withdrawal of
recognition, the courts encouraged a nuanced, and sympathetic,
165. Pennex Aluminum Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. 439,441 (1988) (quoting Pennco Inc., 250
N.L.R.B. 716, 716-17 (1980), enforced, 684 F.2d 340 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 994
(1982)), enforced, 869 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1989).
166. If striker replacements were presumed to oppose the union, employers who wished
to discontinue a bargaining relationship could simply bargain hard to induce a lawful strike
and then hire enough permanent replacements to approximate the number of former
employees, thereby creating the basis for good faith doubt. A presumption of opposition
also would enable employers to reap instant benefits from a petition to decertify the union.
See Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1344 (1987), enforced, 891 F.2d 230
(9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 925 (1990). For additional reasons to reject the anti-
union presumption, see supra note 147.
167. Texas Petrochemicals Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1057, 1061 (1989).
168. Sullivan Indus., Inc., 302 N.L.R.B. 144, 149 (1991) (quoting Fall River Dyeing &
Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 40 (1987)), enforcement granted in part and denied
in part, 957 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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approach to assessing employee discontent. 69 By insisting that an
employer's unfair labor practices must "significantly contribute" to a
later decertification effort in order to bar the employer from relying
on that effort when it withdraws recognition, the courts accorded
preferred status to the expression of employee disaffections. 7 °
Further, by limiting the scope of the contract bar doctrine where the
union's majority support at time of contract formation was subse-
quently questioned, the courts invited ongoing inquiry into the scope
of employees' dissatisfaction with their union.'7 ' The courts'
perspective in the latter context was aptly summarized in an opinion
by Judge Posner:
As for the Board's rule that a union's unconditional accep-
tance of an offer for a collective bargaining contract is valid
and binds the company unless circumstances have changed
since the company's offer was made or renewed, we do not
think the rule should apply to a case such as this where
between the original offer and its renewal the union lost the
support of the workers. That would give too much weight to
the interests of unions and too little to the interests of
workers.'72
In focusing attention on Board-court disagreements regarding
good faith doubt, I do not mean to suggest that the appellate courts
have repudiated the importance of preserving collective bargaining
stability: an affirmance rate of seventy-five percent on the good faith
doubt issue belies any such notion. 73 Nor should the Board be
viewed as elevating bargaining stability to the exclusion of other
values under the Act.7 Indeed, the Board's long-term approach to
169. See Texas Petrochemicals Corp. v. NLRB, 923 F.2d 398,402 (5th Cir. 1991). The
court was not unaware of the risk of employer abuse, but concluded that it could minimize
that risk by requiring procedural safeguards in polling, and that this minimized risk was
outweighed by the risk of a nonmajority union being perpetuated. See id.
170. See Williams Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 956 F.2d 1226, 1234-36 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
As a corollary, the courts accorded diminished status to the employer-related origins of
that disaffection, and its effects on industrial stability.
171. Chicago Tribune Co. v. NLRB, 965 F.2d 244, 249-50 (7th Cir. 1992), denying
enforcement of 303 N.L.R.B. 682, 692 (1991).
172. Id at 250 (emphasis added). By contrast, the Board's reluctance to permit inquiry
into the motives of parties accepting a collective bargaining agreement rested in large part
on the concern that such inquiry "would create endless possibilities for protracted litigation
which would ultimately destroy collective bargaining." Chicago Tribune Co., 303 N.L.R.B.
682, 692 (1991).
173. At the same time, a high proportion of strategic appeals by employers may dilute
the significance of this 75% affirmance rate. See supra part II.B.2.
174. The Board was criticized by the Supreme Court for undermining bargaining
stability just before the period being studied here. See NLRB v. Financial Inst.
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the good faith doubt issue has been recently challenged as inadequate
to achieve its own objectives, 75 and the Board may have occasion
to rethink its traditional position in the near future. 7 6
Our present task, however, is to understand why the recent
reversal rate for good faith doubt issues is so high when compared
with appellate court review of other issues of employer liability for
ULP conduct. Significantly, the Board's regular attention to
preserving bargaining stability reflects a value that has been repeated-
ly recognized by the Supreme Court as central to the Act.'" By
favoring such stability, the Board "enable[s] a union to concentrate on
obtaining and fairly administering a collective bargaining agreement
without worrying that, unless it produces immediate results, it will lose
majority support."'7 Moreover, the Board's concern that employer
assertions of employee rights could disrupt bargaining stability also
echoes strong Supreme Court perceptions. "To allow employers to
rely on employees' rights in refusing to bargain with the formally
designated union is not conducive to [industrial peace]."'79
The courts of appeals' persistent concern with indicia of majority
employee disaffection suggests a reluctance to embrace bargaining
stability as a core value." Part IV offers a possible explanation for
the appellate courts' lack of zeal regarding the importance of
Employees, Local 1182,475 U.S. 192,208-09 (1986) (invalidating Board requirement that
non-union employees must be allowed to vote for affiliation before employer may be
ordered to bargain with affiliated union, and reasoning that such a requirement
undermines stable bargaining relationships by allowing challenges to continued
representation on grounds other than a question of representation).
175. See Flynn, supra note 137, at 663-99 (arguing that Board should stop applying
same good faith doubt standard to evaluate employer polls, employer withdrawals of
recognition, and employer petitions for election, and should adopt policy favoring elections
and banning or disfavoring polls and withdrawals of recognition).
176. See General Counsel's Position Statement on Reconsideration by the Board at 25-
26, Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp., 13-CA-29377 (1995) (urging Board to (i) require
that employer's evidence of loss of majority support for incumbent union be tested in
secret ballot election before permitting withdrawal of recognition, and (ii) grant employer
petitions for such an election if supported by expressed opposition to union from 30% of
employees in bargaining unit).
177. See, e.g., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 794 (1990); Fall
River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 38 (1987); Financial Inst.
Employees, 475 U.S. at 209; Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 100-03 (1954).
178. Fall River, 482 U.S. at 38 (citing Brooks, 348 U.S. at 100).
179. Financial Inst Employees, 475 U.S. at 209 (citing Brooks, 348 U.S. at 103).
180. The Act provides that an employer must not knowingly recognize a minority
union, and the Supreme Court has supported that value also. See ILGWU v. NLRB, 366
U.S. 731, 739 (1961). But knowing recognition of a minority union is not implicated in
these cases, where the issue is simply good faith doubt about continuing majority status.
Disputes between rival unions also are not implicated here.
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bargaining stability, and their abiding concern with the majority status
of the union.
B. Initial Recognition Bargaining Orders
1. Background
Unions seeking to represent an unorganized group of employees
traditionally secure recognition through the election and certification
procedures set forth at section 9(c) of the Act.18' There are oc-
casions, however, when the employer's ULP conduct has so interfered
with or undermined the election process that the employees' rejection
of the union in an election is not properly viewed as reproducing
employee free choice." The question then arises as to whether the
Board may order an employer to recognize and bargain with the
union, based on a pre-election authorization card majority,"
pursuant to its remedial authority to "take such affirmative action...
as will effectuate the policies of this Act."' 4
The Wagner Act did not limit the designation of collective
bargaining representatives to those that had prevailed in an elec-
tion,'" and the Board used its remedial powers to order bargaining
when the union's card majority had been eroded by subsequent
employer ULPs.'8 ' The Taft-Hartley Amendments left undisturbed
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1994). The Board traditionally has favored the election
process as the fairest means of obtaining exclusive representative status. See Aaron Bros.,
158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1078 (1966); COX ET AL., supra note 7, at 318.
182. In some instances, the union has not actually lost the election: either no vote
occurred because the ULP charges blocked the election, or the vote was inconclusive
because challenges to determinative ballots were never resolved in light of the ULPs.
183. The present discussion presupposes that the union has presented persuasive
evidence of a card majority. The authority to issue non-majority bargaining orders under
the NLRA-an authority suggested but not firmly established by the Supreme Court in
the Gissel case discussed below-was litigated before the Board and appellate courts prior
to 1986, and was not an issue during our seven-year period. See generally Conair Corp.
v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1377-84 (D.C. Cir.) (rejecting Board's position that it had
authority to issue non-majority bargaining orders), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1241 (1983);
Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578,583-87 (1984) (overruling Board's own precedent
and agreeing with Conair court that Act precludes non-majority bargaining orders).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994).
185. See Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 9(c), 49 Stat. 449,453 (1935) (allowing Board to resolve
a representation dispute by conducting an investigation, whereupon the Board "may take
a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascertin [sic] such
representatives").
186. See, eg., Franks Bros. Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 898, 917 (1942), enforced, 137 F.2d 989,
994-95 (1st Cir. 1943), affd, 321 U.S. 702, 704-06 (1944). See generally Christensen &
Christensen, supra note 137, at 417-18 (discussing Board's early use of its remedial
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the Board's authority to issue bargaining orders against mischievous
employers."s During the 1950s and 1960s, the Board continued to
require such employers to recognize and bargain with unions that had
earlier established card majorities, without requiring proof that the
union still enjoyed majority support at the time bargaining was
directed."s Although several appellate courts in the 1960s criticized
the Board's exercise of its bargaining order authority,89 the
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Board's approach in NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co."9
The Court in Gissel endorsed the Board's position that "the key
to the issuance of a bargaining order is the commission of serious
unfair labor practices that interfere with the election processes and
authority, and Supreme Court deference to that authority in Franks Bros.). Despite the
Act's contemplation of non-electoral means for determining majority employee preference,
the Board from an early point relied almost invariably on elections-and not authorization
cards-when certifying an exclusive representative under § 9. See Joe Hearin, 66 N.L.R.B.
1276, 1283 & n.11 (1946); Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526, 531-32 (1939). The
Board, however, continued to use its § 10 remedial powers to order bargaining in response
to employer ULPs, even when no election had taken place. See Lebanon Steel Foundry,
33 N.L.R.B. 233, 256 (1941), enforced, 130 F.2d 404, 409 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
659 (1942); P. Lorillard Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 684, 699-700 (1939), modified, 117 F.2d 921,924-
26 (6th Cir. 1941), rev'd, 314 U.S. 512, 513 (1942).
187. If anything, the legislative history accompanying Taft-Hartley suggests that
Congress knowingly reaffirmed the Board's powers in this area. The House-passed
Hartley bill would have amended § 8(a)(5) to require that employers recognize certified
unions only, i.e., not unions "designated" through a card majority under § 9(a). See H.R.
3020 (as passed by House), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1947), reprinted in 1 LMRA LEGIS.
HST., supra note 67, at 178. The proposed change was not approved by the Senate, and
was rejected in Conference. See H.R. 3020 (as passed by Senate), 80 Cong., 1st Sess. 81
(1947), reprinted in 1 LMRA LEGIS. HIST., supra note 67, at 239; H.R. CONF. REP. No.
510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1947), reprinted in 1 LMRA LEGIS. HIST., supra note 67, at
545. See generally Howard Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB
Election, 65 MICH. L. REV. 851, 861-62 (1967) (emphasizing importance of the 1947
legislative history).
188. See, e.g., Bryant Chucking Grinder Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1526, 1530 (1966), enforced,
389 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 908 (1968); Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85
N.L.R.B. 1263, 1265 (1949), modified and enforced, 185 F.2d 732,739-45 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
cert denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951). Between 1954 and 1964, the Board adopted the position
that if a union with a card majority participated in an election after the employer had
denied its request for recognition, the union could not then obtain the ULP remedy of a
bargaining orde'. See Aiello Dairy Farms Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1365, 1367-68 (1954),
overruled by Bernell Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277, 1284-86 (1964). During this 10-
year period, the volume of Joy Silk bargaining order cases decreased significantly. See
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 64, at 527.
189. See, eg., NLRB v. S.E. Nichols Co., 380 F.2d 438, 442-45 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB
v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 564-71 (4th Cir. 1967); Engineers & Fabricators,
Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 1967).
190. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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tend to preclude the holding of a fair election."'' In explicitly
rejecting the argument that the bargaining order was a harsh remedy
that unduly prejudiced employees' section 7 rights not to belong to a
union, the Court viewed such remedial orders as appropriate to deter
an employer's efforts to " 'profit from [its] own wrongful refusal to
bargain' ""9 and also to "effectuat[e] ascertainable employee free
choice"'9 by "re-establish[ing] the conditions as they existed before
the employer's unlawful campaign."'94  The Court acknowledged
that employee choice might be adversely affected by a bargaining
order if the union would have lost the election even without the
employer's serious misconduct. 9 But the Court dismissed such an
effect as "minimal at best," because of the employees' right to
decertify the union after a reasonable interval, and the union's
incentive to defeat such a decertification effort by bargaining to satisfy
a majority of unit members.'96
The Supreme Court in Gissel approved the Board's authority to
issue bargaining orders for two categories of serious employer
misconduct. Category one consisted of exceptional cases, marked by
"outrageous" and "pervasive" ULPs that make it impossible to
conduct a fair and reliable election; category two encompassed "less
extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices which
nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine majority strength and
impede the election processes."'97 In deciding whether ULPs were
"outrageous" enough under category one to make a fair election
impossible, or whether "less pervasive" category-two ULPs were of
sufficient impact to make a fair election improbable, the Supreme
Court stated unequivocally that the Board, not the appellate courts,
should make those determinations "based on its expert estimate as to
the effects on the election process of unfair labor practices of varying
191. 1d at 594 (stating Board's current practice).
192. Id. at 610 (quoting Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944)).
193. Id. at 614.
194. Id. at 612.
195. d at 612 n.33.
196. Id at 612 n.33, 613; see also NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson & Co., 386 F.2d 551, 557
(4th Cir. 1967) (Sobeloff, J., concurring specially) (observing that "a minority union facing
a hostile employer can cause the employees little harm while having strong incentive to
do them much good," and citing Brooks and Franks Bros. as reflecting the Supreme Court
position that "there are other values-such as the need to deter employer unfair
practices-in our labor policy which may on occasion override the desideratum of majority
representation").
197. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 614 (emphasis added) (discussing categories one and two).
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intensity."'98 The Court then exemplified its deferential approach
to agency expertise in this remedial area, by affirming a previously
enforced bargaining order in which the Board had given a brief and
unelaborated statement as to why the employer's misconduct made it
impossible to conduct a fair election.'
2. Recent Differences Between Board and Appellate Courts
At the time Gissel came down, the decision was viewed as a
significant victory for the Board, vindicating its broad remedial
authority and limiting the scope of judicial review in this area.'K In
the twenty-five years since Gissel was decided, however, the Board
and appellate courts have clashed repeatedly over the circumstances
in which a wrongdoing employer may be required to bargain with a
union that has not been previously certified or voluntarily recognized
as majority representative."°1 During our recent seven-year period,
the split between Board and courts involved three distinct areas of
recurring disagreement.
One major controversy concerned whether the Board should
consider changed circumstances in the workplace since the employer
committed the violations. The issue is whether a bargaining order
that once would have been proper may become inappropriate due to
substantial employee turnover, employer restructuring, the
replacement of key management wrongdoers, or the simple passage
of months (or years) between misconduct and adjudication. The
Board has resisted the "changed circumstances" doctrine, maintaining
198. ld. at 612 n.32.
199. See id. at 615 (affirming First Circuit's enforcement of bargaining order in which
Board made a finding that employer's threats of reprisal in effect made this a case of
"extraordinary" misconduct); The Sinclair Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 261,265, 269 (1967) (briefly
stating Board's rationale).
200. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Union Authorization Cards and NLRB
Orders to Bargain, 83 HARv. L. REv. 247-52 (1969); Christensen & Christensen, supra
note 137, at 421-22; Claire Rubin, Case Comment, Establishing a Labor Representative:
Authorization Cards and Employer Free Speech, 50 B.U. L. REV. 111, 114-16 (1970);
Supreme Court Upholds Unions on Bargaining Without Election, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
1969, at 35; Unions with Employe [sic] Authorization Cards Can Bargain for Workers, Top
Court Decides, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1969, at 6.
201. See, e.g., Bethel & Melfl, supra note 137, at 142; Benjamin W. Wolkinson et al.,
The Remedial Efficacy of Gissel Bargaining Orders, 10 INDUs. REL LJ. 509, 517 (1989);
Robert G. Pugh, Jr., Note, "After A1 Tomorrow Is Another Day": Should Subsequent
Events Affect the Validity of Bargaining Orders?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 505,512-20 (1979). As
discussed in part III.C infra, the disagreement regarding Gissel has spilled over into the
related area of bargaining order remedies to restore a union that had previously been
certified or voluntarily recognized.
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that any Board consideration of subsequent events as "mitigation"
would effectively reward employers for their wrongdoing and also
would encourage employers to prolong the litigation process in an
effort to avoid their bargaining obligation.' 2
Appellate courts in this period regularly rejected the Board's
position, insisting upon full and careful consideration of changed
circumstances, and explaining that such consideration would best
effectuate employee free choice by not" 'do[ing] violence to majority
will at the time the bargaining order issues.' "' In the first few
years after Gissel was decided, a number of appellate courts had
supported the Board's position on changed circumstances, concluding
that the need to deter employer misconduct outweighed any risk that
a current employee majority might be temporarily
disenfranchised. By the end of 1993, however, all but one appel-
late court to consider the subject had concluded that changed
circumstances since the employer's violations are necessarily relevant
whenever the Board is deciding whether to issue a bargaining
order.2
A second area of repeated conflict involved just how detailed the
Board's findings must be to support the need for a bargaining order
instead of a more traditional remedy. The Board typically offered a
202. See, eg., M.P.C. Plating Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 583, 583 (1989), affd in part, 912 F.2d
883 (6th Cir. 1990); Camvac Int'l, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 816, 823 (1988); Impact Indus., Inc.,
285 N.L.R.B. 5, 6 (1987), enforcement denied, 847 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1988). As appellate
courts have become hardened in their view that changed circumstances must be evaluated,
the Board has adopted a more strategic position, often arguing that even if subsequent
events may be relevant in principle, they do not alter the need for a bargaining order in
a particular case. See e.g., The Salvation Army Williams Memorial Residence, 293
N.L.R.B. 944, 945-46 (1989), enforced mem., 923 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1990).
203. Camvac Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1989) (unpublished disposition),
1989 WL 65727, at *3 (quoting NLRB v. Creative Food Design Ltd., 852 F.2d 1295, 1302
(D.C. Cir. 1988)); see Somerset Welding & Steel, Inc. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 777, 781 (D.C.
Cir. 1993); Avecor, Inc. v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 935-36 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert denied, 502
U.S. 1048 (1992); M.P.C. Plating, Inc. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 883, 888-89 (6th Cir. 1990);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1156, 1160 (7th Cir. 1990); Impact Indus.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 847 F.2d 379, 383 (7th Cir. 1988).
204. See, eg., NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347,353 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. DIT-
MCO, Inc., 428 F.2d 775,781 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Staub Cleaners, Inc., 418 F.2d 1086,
1089-90 (2d Cir. 1969); NLRB v. L.B. Foster Co., 418 F.2d 1, 4-5 (9th Cir. 1969); see also
NLRB v. Schill Steel Prods., Inc., 480 F.2d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 1973) (refusing to consider
employee turnover in cases of serious and continuing employer misconduct).
205. See NLRB v. Cell Agric. Mfg. Co., 41 F.3d 389,397-98 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing eight
circuits rejecting Board position, and only one circuit, the Ninth, supporting Board);
J.L.M., Inc. v. NLRB, 31 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing two more circuits opposed to
Board position).
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separate summiary of the employer ULPs, describing the specific
misconduct that was serious enough to have had a lasting coercive
impact on the employees, and concluding with a short explanation as
to why a bargaining order would protect majority employee sen-
timents more effectively than traditional remedies such as a cease and
desist order or a new election.' As part of its explanation, the
Board recognized that elections are a preferred method of deter-
mining employee free choice, but invoked its broad authority to select
the most appropriate remedy for employer misconduct, as conferred
by the Supreme Court in Gissel.2°'
The appellate courts during this period were hardly deferential
toward the Board's "broad" authority to issue a bargaining order.
Rather, the courts emphasized that the bargaining order-including
specifically the category two bargaining order-was an "extra-
ordinary" and "very harsh" remedy, and that its potential impact on
employee free choice meant it should be granted only as a "last
resort" in "extreme cases."2" Accordingly, the courts demanded
that the Board provide a detailed and reasoned explanation for why
more traditional remedies were not available or adequate.2 9
Applying this standard, the courts often held the Board's findings
unacceptable, criticizing its stated refusal to rely on ordinary remedies
as lacking in analysis or discussion, conclusory or formulaic, and
mechanical.21 °
206. See, e.g., Somerset Welding & Steel, Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 32, 33-34 (1991); Avecor,
Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. 727,748-50 (1989); Camvac Int'l, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 816,822-23 (1988);
Montgomery Ward & Co., 288 N.L.R.B. 126, 129-30 (1988).
207. E.g., Montgomery Ward, 288 N.L.R.B. at 129-30 (citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614-15 (1969)); Camvac Int'l, 288 N.L.R.B. at 822 (same); Somerset
Welding & Steel, 304 N.L.R.B. at 33 (same); Avecor, 296 N.L.R.B. at 748, 750
(paraphrasing Gissel).
208. See Avecor, Inc. v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (describing
bargaining order as extraordinary remedy), cert. denied sub nom. Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Int'l Union v. Avecor, Inc., 502 U.S. 1048 (1992); M.P.C. Plating, Inc. v. NLRB,
912 F.2d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 1990) (limiting bargaining orders to "extreme cases"); Impact
Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 847 F.2d 379,383 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that bargaining orders may
be granted only in instances of "last resort"); NLRB v. Quality Aluminum Prods., Inc., 813
F.2d 795, 797 (6th Cir. 1987) (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (summarizing Sixth Circuit view
of bargaining order as "very harsh" remedy).
209. See, e.g., Somerset Welding & Steel Inc. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir.
1993); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 1990); Camvac
Int'l, Inc.*v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1989) (unpublished disposition), 1989 WL 65727,
at *3.
210. See Avecor, 931 F.2d at 938; M.P.C. Plating, 912 F.2d at 889; Montgomery Ward,
904 F.2d at 1159; Camvac Int'l, 1989 WL at *3.
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A final area of disagreement involved the Board's judgment that
certain extreme or "hallmark" ULPs were so invasive of employee
free choice that they typically were viewed as justifying the imposition
of a bargaining order. The Board often cited threats of a plant
closure, discharge of visible union supporters, and promises of
additional wages as highly coercive "hallmark" violations.21' The
appellate courts did not challenge the Board's hallmark violations
approach as openly as they criticized the Board's position on changed
circumstances or its failure to provide detailed justifications for
disfavoring traditional remedies. Yet the courts during this period did
pick away at the Board's hallmark findings, by determining that
individual violations were not so egregious in effect, or that the
reduced number of violations surviving review might not be
cumulatively pervasive, or that the Board had not explained satisfac-
torily why the particular ULPs had such a severe impact.21' On
occasion, appellate court judges supported their skepticism about the
severity of ULP impact by suggesting that as a general matter,
employees reacting to such employer misconduct were "hardier than
the Board lets on. ,21
3. Establishing Bargaining Stability Versus Respecting
"Pure" Free Choice
The various disagreements about the propriety of issuing a Gissel
bargaining order reflect a fundamental difference in emphasis between
the Board and the appellate courts. As a remedial device, the
bargaining order serves two familiar objectives. It deters future
employer misconduct in the organizing and election period, by
assuring that the current miscreant employer does not profit from the
commission of serious unfair labor practices. It also restores a
substantial measure of employee choice, by implementing the most
recent untainted expression of majority preference.
In addition to these remedial features, however, the bargaining
order from the Board's perspective constitutes "affirmative ac-
211. See, eg., Somerset Welding & Steel, 304 N.L.R.B. at 33; Avecor, 296 N.L.R.B. at
749; M.P.C. Plating, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 583, 583 (1989); Montgomery Ward, 288 N.L.R.B.
at 129.
212. See Somerset Welding, 987 F.2d at 780-81 (stating that individual violations were
less egregious in effect); Avecor, 931 F.2d at 935-36 (remanding to determine if surviving
ULPs are sufficiently pervasive); M.P.C. Plating, 912 F.2d at 889 (stating that more
considered explanation needed).
213. Montgomery Ward, 904 F.2d at 1163 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
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tion"'214 to effectuate the Act's central policy favoring stable bar-
gaining relationships. A bargaining order accords an irrebuttable
presumption of majority status so that the union has a chance to
perform its collective bargaining role for a reasonable period of
time.2 5 This extended protection for the bargaining process distin-
guishes the bargaining order from other more traditional forms of
relief Unlike an order for a new election, the bargaining order
requires that bargaining actually take place, without the delay of
another campaign and without the risk that coercive misconduct will
not have worn off. Unlike a cease and desist order, the bargaining
order enables a union to devote full energy to securing a collective
bargaining agreement without the fear of an imminent decertification
effort.2 6 In this context,; the Board's steadfast opposition to the
changed circumstances doctrine takes on additional meaning. By
rejecting or downplaying the relevance of events subsequent to the
unfair labor practices, the Board not only resists rewarding employers
for their misdeeds but also cultivates conditions conducive to the
establishment of ongoing bargaining relationships.
One tradeoff for the extended protection of favorable bargaining
conditions is a limitation on current-employee prerogatives. In this
regard, the courts and the Board differ in their understanding of what
uncoerced or "pure" free choice means and how it is to be effec-
tuated.2 7 From the appellate courts' perspective, the decertification
bar that accompanies a bargaining order is a threat-if not an
affront-to pure employee choice. Rather than focusing on the card
214. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994).
215. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613 (1969). The Board has
adopted a case-by-case approach to determining what constitutes a reasonable period of
time for bargaining following a Gissel order, a settlement agreement, or an employer's
voluntary recognition of the union. The reasonable period may be one year, borrowing
from the period of protection accorded under the election bar doctrine. See 29 U.S.C. §
159(e)(2) (1994); Gissel, 395 U.S. at 612 n.33. On occasion, the Board has found a
reasonable period to be as little as three to four months, based on its determination that
the nascent bargaining relationship has been given a fair chance to succeed during that
time period. See, e.g., Tajon, Inc., 269 N.L.R.B. 327, 327-28 (1984); Brennan's Cadillac,
Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 225, 225-27 (1977).
216. Cf. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 100 (1954) (describing union's need for "ample
time for carrying out its mandate on behalf of its members" following its election victory).
217. Cf Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1394-95 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald, J.,
dissenting) (describing dilemma of "how the employees, having been subjected to
relentless employer pressures not to choose a union, can be best restored to some kind of
equilibrium in which they can choose freely for or against the Union," and supporting
Board's position that "this can happen only if a short-term bargaining order is put into
effect"), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1241 (1984).
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majority as the best available evidence of employee preference, the
courts regard reliance on such a majority as an unfortunate subor-
dination of employees' present desires. Judicial reluctance leads to
the characterization of bargaining orders as having the "drastic
consequence of forcing union representation on employees. 2 18 The
fear of this "drastic consequence" has even led courts that were
supporting the basic remedy to require that the Board notify all
current employees of their right to seek decertification. 19
Tensions over the value of bargaining orders have affected
traditional notions of Board expertise as well. The sometimes
abbreviated quality of explanations for the Board's choice of a
bargaining order remedy would seem to draw considerable support
from Supreme Court pronouncements extolling the expertise of
agencies when enforcing statutory text in general, when selecting a
suitable remedy under the NLRA, and when determining that a
bargaining order is the precise remedy appropriate to the case.2
Yet the appellate courts, while often professing to respect the Board's
expertise, in fact have engaged in exacting review of Board findings
and reasoning. Occasionally the courts' skeptical attitude is openly
displayed:
We emphasize once again that a bargaining order is not a
snake-oil cure for whatever ails the workplace; it is an
"extreme remedy" that must be applied with commensurate
218. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 1990) (internal
quotation marks omitted). General data on election results suggest that a bargaining order
may be viewed as a more "drastic" incursion on employee free choice today than it was
in earlier periods. See Peter D. DeChiara, The Right to Know: An Argument for
Informing Employees of Their Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 431, 451 (1995) (reporting that union win rate in NLRB elections fell from
75% before 1950 to 60% in 1960s and to less than 50% by 1989). Of course, it remains
debatable whether the lower union win rate is attributable in substantial part to the
proliferation of serious employer ULPs that chill employee support for the union and
make a bargaining order appropriate. See generally Weiler, Promises, supra note 10, at
1776-1804 (linking decline in union victory rate to growth of employer intimidation tactics).
219. See NLRB v. Star Color Plate Serv., 843 F.2d 1507,1510 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 488
U.S. 828 (1988); NLRB v. Synergy Gas Corp., 843 F.2d 1510, 1510 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 846 (1989).
220. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984) (giving
deference to agencies as interpreters of ambiguous text); Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177, 190-96 (1941) (giving deference to Board as interpreter of § 10(c) text); NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969) (giving deference to Board as selector
of bargaining order from among panoply of § 10(c) remedies).
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care. By requiring specific findinFs, the courts try to keep
the Board from overprescribing.22
Based on such strong language, one might expect that the Board
was issuing large numbers of bargaining orders during our period of
study. In fact, the number of initial recognition bargaining orders has
declined precipitously in the years since Gissel. The Board issued
over 100 such orders per year in the late 1960s but only 67 per year
between 1970 and 1979.' While information on developments
since 1980 is less complete than for earlier periods, data collected
from recent years indicate that the number of Gissel bargaining orders
continues to fall sharply.'
Bargaining orders are hardly a panacea to assure stability or
continuity of collective bargaining. Indeed, available evidence
221. Avecor, Inc. v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
Once again, I do not mean to suggest that appellate courts were invariably hostile to
Board judgments on this issue. Cf supra text accompanying note 173 (recognizing high
absolute affirmance rate on good faith doubt issue). There were bargaining order cases
in which the courts exhibited genuine deference to the Board's remedial discretion. See
Dlubak Corp. v. NLRB, No 93-3018, slip op. at 11 (3d Cir. July 29, 1993), enforcing 307
N.L.R.B. 1138 (1992); NLRB v. International Door Inc., 985 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1993)
(unpublished disposition), 1993 WL 5611, at *1-2, enforcing 303 N.L.R.B. 582 (1991);
NLRB v. Salvation Army, No. 90-4093, slip op. at 2-3 (2d Cir. Dec. 14, 1990), enforcing
293 N.L.R.B. 944 (1989). But given the extraordinarily high reversal rate when compared
with remedial matters in general, the degree of judicial frustration and anger about Board
judgments is surely the appropriate focus of attention.
222. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 596 n.7 (noting that Board issued 117 bargaining orders
based on a card majority in 1966 and 157 in 1967); Wolkinson et al., supra note 201, at 509
n.2 (noting that average number of Gissel bargaining orders issued by NLRB between 1970
and 1979 was 67.5 per year).
223. Because the Board stopped gathering data on Gissel bargaining orders after 1980,
see Wolkinson et al., supra note 201, at 509 n.2, information on post-1980 developments
is at best imprecise. My own research into Board decisions from 1985 through 1993
revealed 113 Gissel bargaining orders issued by the Board in that nine-year period, an
average of fewer than 13 per year. See Search of Westlaw FLB-NLRB database (Aug. 30
and Sept. 20, 1995) (search for decisions containing "GI" and date of 1985 through 1993
found 344 decisions; review of texts yielded 113 in which Gissel orders issued). Electronic
search results were selectively cross-checked with Weekly Summary of NLRB Cases, a
document issued by the Board's Division of Information. Review of all weekly summaries
for 1988, 1990, and 1991 yielded exactly the same Gissel bargaining order decisions
produced from the Westlaw search.
It is possible that additional Gissel orders were issued by Administrative Law Judges
or Regional Offices and never appealed to the full Board, but such instances should be
quite rare. Employers who are determined to resist unionization by committing egregious
misconduct are unlikely to surrender early in the litigation process, especially given that
their success rate when challenging these bargaining orders in the courts is so high. Even
assuming arguendo that there were as many as 15 bargaining orders per year, that number
represents a decline of over 75% since the 1970s. The falloff substantially exceeds the
more general decline in election activity during this period. See infra note 227.
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indicates that Gissel orders provide relatively weak protection in
securing a long-term bargaining relationship or even in obtaining a
first contract.- 4  In one respect, that result is not surprising. A
remedy that simply requires the parties to sit down and negotiate
cannot guarantee that the process will end in a collective bargaining
agreement, particularly when one of the parties already has
demonstrated hostility to the very presence of the other.' Yet the
appellate courts' extraordinary reaction to this exercise of Board
authority may also have contributed substantially to its lameness as
a remedy. The extent to which the courts have effectively encouraged
employer resistance to bargaining deserves further attention.2 6 It
is clear, however, that the courts regard Gissel bargaining orders with
far less sympathy than the Board, and that the Board's interest in
pursuing this remedy has abated steadily since Gissel even while the
number of serious ULPs committed by employers during election
campaigns seems to have risen.' 7
224. See Weiler, Promises, supra note 10, at 1795 n.94 (citing 1982 study as indicating
that only 37% of unions operating under Gissel order procure a first contract, whereas
63% of unions certified through the election process obtain a first contract; and that
unions starting with Gissel order have less than 10% chance of securing long-term
bargaining relationship with the employer).
225. See also John T. Neighbours & Mark J. Sifferlen, Bargaining Orders: A Call for
Restraint, 10 LAB. LAW. 301, 314-15 (1994) (relying on earlier empirical studies that
questioned whether employer ULPs really deter employee support for union, to suggest
that Gissel's core assumption-that the union would have won election absent employer
ULPs-may be erroneous).
226. There is evidence that the appellate courts have been obstacles to enforcement of
Gissel bargaining orders since at least the late 1970s. See Bethel & Melfi, supra note 137,
at 142-54; Pugh, supra note 201, at 512-20.
227. One of the "hallmark" ULPs deemed serious enough to justify a bargaining order
is the discriminatory discharge of union supporters in violation of § 8(a)(3). See supra note
211 and accompanying text. During the first 10 years after the Gissel decision, the number
of § 8(a)(3) charges doubled (from 9,290 out of 13,601 total § 8(a) charges in 1970 to
18,315 out of 31,281 total charges in 1980) while the number of certification elections-a
proxy for union organizing activity-declined by a small amount (7,773 elections in 1970;
7,296 elections in 1980) and the percentage of all ULP charges against employers that were
found meritorious by the General Counsel increased slightly (34.2% in 1970; 39.0% in
1980). See Weiler, Promises, supra note 10, at 1780 (relying on data compiled from NLRB
Annual Reports). But cf Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for
Unions: Another Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 953
(1991); Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U.
CHi. L. REv. 1015 (1991) (debating the merits of whether § 8(a)(3) charge data accurately
reflect the extent of serious employer misconduct during election campaigns).
Since 1980, the number of § 8(a)(3) charges has declined, as part of a comparable
reduction in overall charges against employers that parallels an even larger falloff in union
election activity. See 1990 ANN. REP., supra note 90, at 6, 137, 168 (3,536 elections; 11,886
§ 8(a)(3) charges; 24,075 total § 8(a) charges; 41% of all ULP cases found meritorious);
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C, Incumbent Restoration Bargaining Orders
1. Background
The previous section dealt with bargaining orders that follow a
union's unsuccessful electoral quest for initial recognition, and rely on
the pre-election card majority as the best means of "effectuating
ascertainable employee free choice."' In a separate and distinct
context, the Board has long utilized bargaining orders as a remedy for
an employer's unlawful refusal to bargain with a union that-as of the
date of the wrongful refusal-already enjoyed the status of exclusive
representative under section 9." Typically, the union has been
previously designated as majority representative-either through
voluntary recognition by the employer or certification by the
Board-at the time the employer unlawfully thwarts bargaining.ll
The employer contends that in light of evidence that the union has
lost its majority status since the unlawful conduct occurred, an
immediate election to test majority status is the appropriate remedy.
The Board's consistent position has been that under these
circumstances, an order to bargain for a reasonable period is the
traditional affirmative remedy to restore the status quo ante. ' In
refusing to consider evidence that the incumbent union no longer
enjoys majority support, the Board has relied on two policy jus-
tifications. First, the employer's unlawful refusal to bargain, along
with "[t]he necessary delays incident to the adjudication of [the]
dispute," inevitably have "a deterring effect upon the organizational
1989 ANN. REP., supra note 90, at 6, 191, 222 (3,670 elections; 11,567 § 8(a)(3) charges;
22,345 total § 8(a) charges; 37% of all ULP cases found meritorious). The decline in §
8(a)(3) charges is most sensibly attributed to diminished election activity-perhaps
combined with diminished union confidence in the Act itself, see sources cited supra note
10-rather than to increased law-abiding conduct by the employer community. In any
event, there were 28% more § 8(a)(3) charges filed in 1990-21 years after Gissel-than
in the year following the Court's decision, even though the number of certification
elections declined by over 50% during that 20-year period.
228. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969).
229. See Inland Steel Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 783, 814-16 (1938), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 109 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1940).
230. See, e.g., P. Lorillard Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 684, 699-700 (1939) (ordering employer to
bargain with voluntarily recognized union), modified in relevant part, 117 F.2d 921, 924-26
(6th Cir. 1941), summarily rev'd, 314 U.S. 512, 513 (1942); Poole Foundry & Mach. Co.,
95 N.L.R.B. 34, 36 (ordering employer to bargain with Board-certified union), enforced,
192 F.2d 740, 742 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952).
231. See Williams Enterprises, 312 N.L.R.B. 937, 940 (1993), on remand from 956 F.2d
1226 (D.C. Cir. 1992), aff'd, 50 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1995).
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activity of the union and a discouraging influence upon members
already gained which tends to influence them to drop from the
ranks." 2  It is therefore necessary "to restore to the union the
bargaining opportunity which it should have had in the absence of
unlawful conduct." 3  Second, unless the injury to the employees'
collective bargaining rights is remedied by an order to bargain,
employers would be encouraged to evade their bargaining obligation,
"by profiting from the discouraging effects of [their] already ac-
complished violation of that very obligation."'  The Supreme
Court on more than one occasion has approved the Board's position
with respect to status quo ante bargaining orders, invoking both the
Board's broad remedial authority to effectuate the policies of the Act
and the Board's twin justifications set forth above.2'
2. Recent Differences Between Board and Appellate Courts
From the Board's perspective, the longstanding policy favoring
orders to restore preexisting bargaining relationships was in no way
affected by the Supreme Court's Gissel decision, which applied to
nonincumbent unions seeking initial recognition. In a Gissel-type
setting, the preferred remedy is a fair election to negate the effects of
an unfair election; the bargaining order is the unusual remedy invoked
when a fair election is impracticable. By contrast, the bargaining
order in an incumbent union setting is the customaiy remedy for a
wrongful refusal to bargain. In restoring the union to its prior status
as the collective bargaining representative, the Board sees "no need
for a special showing of Gissel factors," and typically declines to give
any specific justification for the ordern" 6
232. Inland Steel, 9 N.L.R.B. at 815.
233. Williams Enterprises, 312 N.L.R.B. at 940.
234. Inland Steel, 9 N.L.R.B. at 816; see Williams Enterprises, 312 N.L.R.B. at 940
(discussing need to prevent wrongdoing employer from "escap[ing] its bargaining
obligation as the result of the predictably adverse effects of its unlawful conduct on
employee support for the union").
235. See Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 703-04 (1944) (discussing Board's
policy justifications in detail); NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512, 513 (1942) (citing
Board's broad remedial authority). See generally NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396
U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (endorsing Board's remedial authority "to restore, so far as possible,
the status quo that would have obtained but for the [employer's] wrongful act").
236. See Williams Enterprises, 312 N.L.R.B. 937, 941-42 (1993). The Gissel factors
include explaining (i) how the employer's ULPs had the tendency to undermine majority
strength; (ii) why ordinary remedies, especially a rerun election, would be inadequate to
effectuate employee choice; and (iii) what the effect is of changed circumstances on the
prospects for a fair election. See supra text accompanying notes 191-213.
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The appellate courts during our seven-year period were far more
willing to treat Gissel as directly relevant to the restorative bargaining
order and then to apply their rigorous version of Gissel to bargaining
orders in the incumbency setting. The D.C. Circuit took the lead,
rebuking the Board on several occasions for failing to balance
competing interests and to explain clearly its reasons for requiring
bargaining over an extended period of time. 7 Several other circuits
have refused to enforce incumbent-restoration bargaining orders,
relying on the analogy to Gissel to conclude that an election or a
cease and desist order were the only suitable remedies.S
Status-quo-ante bargaining orders were rejected for a variety of
case-specific reasons, including the less than egregious nature of the
employer's unlawful conduct-' 9 the amount of employee turnover
or disaffection expressed since the unlawful conduct;240 the substan-
tial passage of time, especially if inordinate delay was attributable in
part to the Board itself;24' and the Board's failure to give a reasoned
explanation for its action. 42  Regardless of the particular cir-
cumstances, however, the courts' basic position was that even a
restorative bargaining order is an extreme remedy, to be imposed only
after a careful assessment of the competing needs to deter employer
misconduct and protect employee free choice. The courts' reluctance
to enforce the temporary decertification bar that characterizes this
form of relief was succinctly summarized by the Fifth Circuit: "We
are unable to approve an approach which mechanically places
237. See, e.g., Sullivan Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890,903-05 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Williams
Enterprises v. NLRB, 956 F.2d 1226, 1236-38 (D.C. Cir. 1992); St. Agnes Medical Ctr. v.
NLRB, 871 F.2d 137,147-49 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The D.C. Circuit first took the position that
a Gissel-type analysis applied to incumbent restoration bargaining orders in People's Gas
Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1980). That court has continued to reject
incumbent restoration bargaining orders for failure to adhere to its Gissel-type analysis.
See Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d 1243, 1247-49 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Caterair Int'l v.
NLRB, 22 F.3d 1114, 1121-23 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
238. See NLRB v. Thill Inc., 980 F.2d 1137, 1142-43 (7th Cir. 1992) (allowing cease and
desist order only); NLRB v. Laverdiere's Enterprises, 933 F.2d 1045, 1053-56 (1st Cir.
1991) (remanding for election); Texas Petrochemicals Corp. v. NLRB, 923 F.2d 398,403-06
(5th Cir. 1991) (remanding for election); see also NLRB v. Koenig Iron Works, 856 F.2d
1, 4 (2d Cir. 1988) (denying all relief).
239. See, e.g., Thil, Inc., 980 F.2d at 1138-39, 1143; St. Agnes Medical Ctr., 871 F.2d at
148; Laverdiere's Enterprises, 933 F.2d at 1054.
240. See, e.g., Thill Inc., 980 F.2d at 1142; Texas Petrochemicals, 923 F.2d at 405.
241. See, e.g., Thill Inc., 980 F.2d at 1142; Laverdiere's Enterprises, 933 F.2d at 1054-55;
Texas Petrochemicals, 923 F.2d at 404; Koenig Iron Works, 856 F.2d at 3-4.
242. See, e.g., Sullivan Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890,904-05 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Williams
Enterprises v. NLRB, 956 F.2d 1226, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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deterrence above employee free choice on the scale 'of values under
the Act."243
3. Restoring Bargaining Stability Versus Promoting
"Pure" Free Choice
The conflict in values between the Board and appellate courts is
most striking in the context of restorative bargaining orders. The
Board relies heavily on the value of a continuing bargaining relation-
ship, and the vulnerability of an incumbent union and its majority
supporters when that relationship is disrupted. After determining that
an employer has wrongfully refused to bargain, the Board's res-
toration of bargaining for an extended time period-regardless of
fluctuations in majority status during that period-is "necessary to
give the order to bargain its fullest effect, i.e., to give the parties to
the controversy a reasonable time in which to conclude a
contract."244
The parties need a reasonable period of insulation, the Board
contends, because even a long history of collective bar-
gaining-frequently present in the cases reviewed here245-- can be
wiped out when an employer cuts off recognition and the resultant
litigation takes time to resolve.2 Employees support unions in
order to obtain the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement. If
there is no bargaining for years-perforce no possibility of an
agreement-a likely result is substantial erosion of respect and
support for the union.247 In this respect, an incumbent union re-
243. Texas Petrochemicals, 923 F.2d at 406.
244. Poole Foundry & Mach. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 34, 36 (1951), enforced, 192 F.2d 740,
742 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952).
245. See, e.g., Sullivan Indus., 957 F.2d at 892 (collective bargaining relationship for 40
years); Texas Petrochemicals, 923 F.2d at 400 (collective bargaining relationship for almost
30 years); Laverdiere's Enterprises, 933 F.2d at 1047 (collective bargaining relationship for
9 years).
246. See Lancaster Foundry Corp., 82 N.L.R.B. 1255, 1256 (1949); Inland Steel Co., 9
N.L.R.B. 783, 815-16 (1938).
247. See Midway Foodmart, Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. 152, 152 n.2 (1989); Karp Metal Prods.
Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 621, 624, enforcement granted in part and denied in part, 134 F.2d 954 (2d
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 728 (1944). The disruption of a long-term bargaining
relationship can be particularly difficult when a successor employer is involved, because
the employees need representation as soon as possible to protect their terms and
conditions during transition. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S.
27, 49 (1987). See generally Fry, supra note 137, at 1646-47 (stating that employee job
security and the establishment of an effective new bargaining relationship by the union are
primary concerns in successorship cases). Successor employers were involved in a number
of the restorative bargaining order reversals studied here. See e.g., Williams Enterprises,
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seated at the negotiating table through a bargaining order following
years of litigation is comparable to a union seated at that table
following Board certification or voluntary employer recognition.24
The restored union needs a reasonable period in which to reestablish
effective communication with its members, reconstitute employee
energy and commitment for the bargaining process, and resume
efforts to negotiate a contract.
At one level, the Board resists the notion that a restorative
bargaining order imposes any limits on employee free choice. Rather,
it is the renewed process of collective bargaining that makes free
choice possible at all. In light of the subversive effects of the
employer's past refusal to bargain, the employees' real desires are
purely speculative until the Board's restorative order has been
complied with.249
But even if there are limits in terms of postponing the fulfillment
of currently expressed employee desires to reject the union, those
limits are both temporary and correctable. The Board has steadfastly
maintained that the "insulated remedial bargaining period [i]s a
reasonable limitation of free choice," and has pointed to decades of
Supreme Court statements unequivocally supporting its judgment on
this very point.
For the appellate courts, hostility toward the restorative bar-
gaining order seems almost inevitable when one considers the
combined effect of their views that (i) employee discontent with the
union, whenever expressed, deserves careful treatment, and (ii)
bargaining orders trump employee free choice. The courts focus on
the balance between deterring misconduct and protecting employee
free choice, while virtually ignoring the statutory interest in continuing
prior bargaining relations. There is remarkably little reference in
these court opinions to the relevance, much less importance, of
bargaining stability. Indeed, the courts' insistence that restorative
bargaining orders are analogous to initial recognition bargaining
956 F.2d at 1231-32, Sullivan Indus., 957 F.2d at 894, Texas Petrochemicals, 923 F.2d at 400.
248. See Keller Plastics Eastern Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 586-87 (1966).
249. See Karp Metal Products, 51 N.LR.B. at 627 n.11 (citing International Ass'n of
Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 82 (1940)).
250. Williams Enterprises, 312 N.L.R.B. 937, 942 (1993) (citing Franks Bros. Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1944) and NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613
(1969)), enforced, 50 F.3d 1280 (4th Cir. 1995).
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orders discounts the very presence of a preexisting bargaining
relationship."
Relying on post-ULP evidence of substantial employee discon-
tent, the courts' primary concern is to vindicate the immediate desires
of current employees. 2 Bargaining orders are a threat to that
concern, precisely because they postpone the expression of employee
sentiments. Thus, in the courts' view, enforcement of a restorative
bargaining order "without ascertaining the employees' present desires
... would be tantamount to ignoring their statutory rights,"'
whereas a Board-certified election "would be most responsive to the
wishes of the employees, whose free choice is a primary concern of
the NLRA."
Finally, in emphasizing the promotion of employee free choice in
its purely contemporaneous form, the courts have signaled that they
have little patience for Board assertions grounded in precedent or
history. The appellate courts' insistence that current employees
remain free from the extreme restrictions of a decertification bar is a
far cry from the Supreme Court's earlier conclusions that a bargaining
order is not a harsh remedy and does not involve any injustice to
employees who oppose the union.5 Moreover, the courts'
promotion of "pure" free choice in the immediate context deviates
from Gissel's stated goal of "effectuating ascertainable employee free
choice" based on the majority sentiments that prevailed when the
251. See Sullivan Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F2d 890, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1992); id. at 909-10
(Silberman, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for ignoring distinctive aspects of restorative
bargaining order).
252. Decertification petitions were often filed in the reversed cases, although there is
disagreement about the employer's role in fostering such petitions. Compare Texas
Petrochemicals Corp. v. NLRB, 923 F.2d 398, 405 (5th Cir. 1991) (describing decer-
tification petition as "unsolicited") and NLRB v. Laverdiere's Enterprises, 933 F.2d 1045,
1047 (1st Cir. 1991) (describing employer as playing no role in initiating petition drive)
with Williams Enterprises v. NLRB, 956 F.2d 1226, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (recognizing
employer ULPs in months before decertification petition, but questioning whether
employer misconduct "significantly contribute[d]" to the subsequent loss of majority
support) and Sullivan Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890, 904-05 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(requiring Board to explain why employee decertification petition was tainted by
employer's unlawful refusal to bargain).
253. Texas Petrochemicals, 923 F.2d at 406.
254. Laverdiere's Enterprises, 933 F.2d at 1054. Ironically, by ordering an election even
in cases where they affirm the employer's unlawful refusal to bargain, the courts in effect
have given the employer what it sought in the first place: an immediate chance to rid itself
of the union. See id; Texas Petrochemicals, 923 F.2d at 404-05.
255. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,612 (1969); Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB,
321 U.S. 702, 705 (1944).
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employer's unlawful conduct occurred. 6  One court, forsaking the
Wagner Act's original commitment to expansive Board authority in
determining remedies, has gone so far as to suggest that more
searching judicial review is appropriate where Board remedies are at
stake, because the Act's remedial structure may reflect "persisting
congressional distrust of the Board." 7
D. Conflict Recently Magnified
Before proceeding to Part IV, which seeks to explain the various
conflicts described in this Part from the standpoint of the NLRA as
an aging statute, it is worth considering whether the identified
doctrinal tensions are properly viewed as being of recent and distinct
vintage. Some of the tensions present during our seven-year period
have roots in earlier Board-court differences. 8 A reader is entitled
to ask whether those earlier disagreements are substantially iden-
tical-in quantitative and qualitative terms-to the disagreements that
arose between 1986 and 1993. If so, then reasonable explanatory
approaches presumably would focus on historically-grounded
differences between Board and courts that persist to this day. If not,
then it makes more sense to analyze the recent differences as a
256. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 614 (emphasis added).
257. NLRB v. Thill Inc., 980 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1992). Section 10 of the Wagner
Act gave the Board substantial new power to issue orders enforceable in the courts of
appeals; in crafting that section, the authors consciously departed from the weak
enforcement status of labor boards under the NIRA. See supra text accompanying notes
53-55. The provision's supporters did not anticipate the delays in obtaining an effective
order that have come to characterize Board enforcement in recent decades. Since 1935,
Congress has enacted statutes to make orders of many other federal agencies self-enforcing
unless a petition for review is filed by an aggrieved party within 30 or 60 days.
Enforcement delays attributable to the operation of §§ 10(e) and (f) were not, however,
recognized as an issue during congressional debate over the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-
Griffin Amendments. See 1 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS Jan. 1968-June 1970, at 239-51 (1971) (summarizing
enforcement practices for other federal agencies and describing history and development
of Board enforcement powers through Landrum-Griffin Amendments). Congressional
gridlock over the NLRA has resulted in no substantial legislative changes since 1959. See
supra text accompanying note 16. Given that Congress initially acted in a deliberate effort
to confer broad enforcement authority on the Board, a failure to update this authority as
part of a larger legislative incapacity should hardly be characterized as "persisting
congressional distrust of the Board."
258. See, e.g., Julius G. Getman & Stephen B. Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board
Expertise, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 684-85 (1972) (discussing earlier conflicts over Board
approach to initial recognition bargaining orders); supra note 155 (discussing earlier
conflicts over Board approach to employer polling).
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function of recently emerging factors, and to talk in terms of the
statutory aging process.
This is not an easy question to answer. In part, the question
itself suggests a false dichotomy-between total continuity and
distinctive discontinuity-with regard to prior periods of a statute's
life. From a practical standpoint, the aging process, in statutes as
elsewhere, is likely to be a more gradual one. Tensions associated
with an aging statute do not simply manifest themselves overnight,
although their emergence may accelerate in certain compressed time
periods. Moreover, while a longitudinal empirical study might address
whether the recent conflicts described here were significant in earlier
periods as well, such a study is beyond the scope of this Article. 9
Still, there are sound reasons to believe that Board-court conflicts
regarding the survival of bargaining relationships increased noticeably
in scope and intensity during our seven-year period. With respect to
incumbent restoration bargaining orders, appellate court reversals
were virtually unknown until the start of the period, but by 1993 five
circuits had declined to enforce such orders." ' With respect to
initial recognition bargaining orders, Board-court differences over the
meaning of Gissel first arose in the 1970s, but the differences have
deepened and broadened in recent years. 61  The increased anger
expressed by appellate courts is especially remarkable given that the
number of Gissel bargaining orders issued by the Board has declined
sharply during our seven-year period.262 As for the good faith doubt
259. Such a longitudinal study would require considerable investment of resources to
identify and analyze appellate court decisions from comparable earlier periods that
involved these same bargaining-related issues. Moreover, the task of identifying a
"comparable" period of time is not without difficulty. Throughout the 1986-93 period,
both the Board and the appellate courts were dominated by Republican appointees.
Because partisan shifts in presidential power were a major factor in appointments during
earlier decades, partisanship and political ideology may well figure more prominently than
divergent institutional perspectives when accounting for Board-court differences during
these earlier periods. See also supra text accompanying note 92 (identifying problem of
determining whether absence of Board-court tension on specific issue at particular point
in Act's history is due to judicial deference to Board expertise, or to Board surrender
following repeated appellate court attacks).
260. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text (describing D.C. Circuit's initial
foray in 1980, and proliferation of appellate court reversals starting in late 1980s).
261. See, eg., supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text (describing increase in
appellate court resistance to Board's position on changed circumstances); supra notes 209-
10 and accompanying text (describing appellate courts' insistence that Board provide
detailed, reasoned explanation for why traditional remedies are unworkable; this factor
seems less prominent in the earlier four-year period of 1979-82, see Bethel & Melfi, supra
note 137, at 142-57).
262. See supra note 223.
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issue, some strands of Board-court tension existed well before the
start of our period while others arose only after 1986.211 But the
Board's tenacity over time and across almost all circuits, in the face
of significantly high reversal rates, is itself noteworthy. While the
Board's traditional policy of non acquiescence may have contributed
to its persistence,26" the Board's willingness to yield to appellate
court pressures on other issues26 suggests that something more is at
stake.
In short, the recent extraordinary reversal rates for the cluster of
issues examined here cannot be accounted for simply by invoking the
past as prologue. Because there are ample grounds for concluding
that recent Board-court disagreements in this area constitute a
distinctive set of occurrences, a different explanation is warranted.
IV. DIVERGENT APPROACHES TO AN AGING LAW
It should by this point be apparent that the NLRB and the
appellate courts have been engaged in a fundamental recurring
conflict during the recent seven-year period. The Board's restrictive
approach to employer professions of good faith doubt, and its
recourse to bargaining orders in other than extreme circumstances,
263. An example of preexisting tension is the Board's "good faith doubt" approach to
employer polling, discussed supra text accompanying notes 153-55. The Board set forth
its position in Montgomery Ward & Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 717,717 (1974); the appellate courts
first rejected it in NLRB v. A.W. Thompson Inc., 651 F.2d 1141, 1144-45 (5th Cir. 1981).
See Flynn, supra note 137, at 667. An example of more recent tension is the controversy
over striker replacements, discussed supra text accompanying notes 145-47. The Board's
conclusion that such replacements should not be presumed either to oppose or support the
union was reached only in 1987; appellate court reversals occurred between 1988 and 1990,
at which time the Supreme Court upheld the Board's position.
264. The Board has long contended that it is entitled to pursue its understanding of
NLRA policy despite conflicting interpretations offered by appellate courts. See Acme
Indus. Police, 58 N.L.R.B. 1342, 1344-45 (1944). Accordingly, the Board has at times
refused to acquiesce in appellate court rulings, even from numerous different circuits, if
the Board disagrees with the courts' interpretation of national labor policy and the
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the specific policy issue. On many occasions,
however, the Board does yield to the prevailing interpretation of the Act offered by the
appellate courts. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE LJ. 679, 706-07 (1989). See generally Rebecca Hanner
White, Time for a New Approach. Why the Judiciary Should Disregard the "Law of the
Circuit" When Confronting Nonacquiescence by the National Labor Relations Board, 69
N.C. L. REv. 639, 650-71 (1991) (arguing that Board's policy of nonacquiescence is both
lawful and proper).
265. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 264, at 706 (referring generally to frequency
of Board acquiescence); supra note 92 (discussing Board acquiescence to appellate courts
during this period on issue of bad faith bargaining).
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reflect a primary attention to the value of stable bargaining relation-
ships. To be sure, employee choice is not ignored as a statutory
value. When minimizing employer doubts or assertions about
majority status, the Board invokes previously expressed majority
support as what it considers the best available evidence of genuine
employee free choice. At the same time, by establishing a high
threshold for evidence of employee opposition to the union that a
majority had earlier empowered, and by postponing the employees'
opportunity to reject that union for an extended "reasonable" period,
the Board also subordinates individual choice, at least temporarily, in
order to encourage the success of the collective bargaining enterprise.
The Board's pronounced preference for fostering bargaining stability
is well-rooted in its own historical practices.266 Further, the Board's
position is consistent with the Act's original emphasis on preserving
and promoting the collective bargaining process.267
The courts of appeals have adopted a very different attitude
toward the two issues described above. In their sympathetic
treatment of good faith doubt assertions and their skeptical approach
to bargaining orders, the courts have elevated the value of employee
free choice, allowing employers to become in effect a primary vehicle
for the expression of their employees' discontent. The courts'
emphasis on the transcendent importance of free choice has led them
to minimize the goal of deterring employer misconduct, and largely
to disdain the objective of establishing, maintaining, or restoring
bargaining stability. The appellate courts have expressed their strong
support for free choice despite various Supreme Court opinions that
seem to point in a different direction.2" In doing so, the courts
have regularly discredited the Board's expertise and discretion, again
defying conventional Supreme Court wisdom in this respect.269
266. See supra text accompanying notes 140-44 (describing Board's approach to good
faith doubt); text accompanying notes 186-97 (describing Board's historical practice of
issuing initial recognition bargaining orders); text accompanying notes 229-35 (describing
Board's practice of issuing restorative bargaining orders).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 20-34 (describing Act's central policy of
encouraging collective bargaining).
268. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 38-40, 47-50
(1987); NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees, Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192, 208-09 (1986);
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610-13 (1969); Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 702, 703-06 (1944), all discussed in part III supra.
269. See NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786-87 (1990);
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984); Gissel, 395 U.S. at 612
n.32; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 190-96 (1941), all discussed in part III
supra.
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Given the extraordinary reach and manifest depth of the conflict
over statutory meaning, one is entitled to ask what is really going on.
I believe that this unusual Board-court tension is appropriately
explained by viewing the doctrinal and factual disagreements from the
perspective of the NLRA as an aging statute. In this Part, I outline
the broad terms for such an explanation.'
It is my contention that the appellate courts are engaged, albeit
often subconsciously, in an effort to reshape a now venerable law in
light of changing external norms. The notion that courts should be
permitted or encouraged to limit and reshape the direction of older
laws has been hotly debated among legal academics." 1 Much less
has been written, however, about the practical realities of courts
engaged in the "updating" of a particular statute, especially when the
administrative agency given primary authority for statutory enforce-
ment does not share the judiciary's renovative aspirations.2
Because the appellate courts' efforts here are opposed by an expert
agency that is tending the flame of original legislative purpose, the
270. The persistent conflict between the Board and appellate courts that is set forth in
part Ill could also be characterized in somewhat different terms. Rather than viewing the
high reversal rates as reflecting a tension between bargaining stability and pure employee
choice, one might recast the disagreement as pitting a Board determined to restore
conditions conducive to true free choice following corrosive employer intrusions against
courts that view employees as sufficiently mature and robust to make their own choices
without the paternalistic protections imposed by the Board. A treatment of this alternative
perspective is beyond the scope of this Article. See JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION
REPRESENTATION ELECHONS: LAW AND REALITY, 139-46 (1976). See generally David
L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REv. 519, 521 (1988) (arguing
that courts should hesitate to act for paternalistic reasons given our basic societal
commitment to the value of self-determination). Even under a "paternalism-type"
analysis, however, the Board-court conflict may be properly understood as part of the
statutory aging process. See infra note 303.
271. Compare CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 79-119 (contending that courts are the
institution best suited to retire or limit obsolete statutes, and that they should be given
authority to perform this role) with Archibald Cox, A Common Law for the Age of
Statutes, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1463, 1467-73 (1982) (book review) (questioning whether courts
should be given such authority) and Abner J. Mikva, The Shifting Sands of Legal
Topography, 96 HARV. L. REv. 534, 540-43 (1982) (book review) (same) and Samuel
Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon Common Law for a
Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1135-46 (1982) (book review) (same). For
examples of scholars' divergent perspectives as to the legitimacy and efficacy of judicial
updating of older texts, see William N. Eskridge Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1165
(1993); Martin Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative
Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TULANE L.
REV. 803 (1994).
272. Cf. Langevoort, supra note 4, at 718,732 (describing how judicial updating of New
Deal banking laws has relied heavily on deference to agency expertise).
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judicial updating gives rise to troubling questions about the
interpretation and application of an aging statute.
A. Alternative Explanations Considered
Preliminarily, it should be acknowledged that "judicial updating"
is not the only possible larger explanation for the persistent conflict
under review. One alternative would posit the presence of a general
result-oriented jurisprudence, whereby the Board performs its role of
historical advocate for, or captive of, pro-union interests, and the
courts display their traditional favoritism toward employers and show
little sympathy for union efforts to survive or prosper.273
This account seems flawed in several respects. Although the
Board during this period was more moderate and centrist than it had
been earlier in the 1980s, it scarcely could be described as a captive
of union supporters.274  Moreover, the Republican party's
dominance of both Board and appellate court appointments
minimized the role of political ideology as a distinguishing factor
between the two institutions.275 Most important, the appellate court
case outcomes were not systematically result-oriented during this
period: the courts did not reverse Board determinations of employer
liability significantly more often than Board determinations of union
liability.276 To be sure, appellate court action on our identified
273. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 47-48 (contending that agencies become
"captives" in the sense that they view compliance with old regulatory positions as
equivalent to compliance with the public interest); FORBATH, supra note 109, at 37-58, 150-
58 (describing federal courts' historical and persistent discomfort over concerted activity
by employees); ToMLINS, supra note 109, at 239-41 (same); Harper, supra note 109, at 298
n.163 (same).
274. See Oviatt, supra note 110, at 92-94; AFL-CIO LAWYERS COORDINATING
COMMrITEE, supra note 110, at 1-29. Notwithstanding the presence of career civil servants
as staff attorneys for each Board member, the members themselves-along with their chief
counsel, whom they appoint-primarily determine the direction of decisionmaking. During
this period, Board members were all appointed by Presidents Reagan or Bush. Six of the
11 Reagan-Bush appointees came directly from private industry or management-side
private practice, three had been Republican appointees elsewhere in federal government,
and two came from inside the Board. None of the 11 had represented unions in their
prior professional careers. The Board chair for virtually the entire period from 1985-92
was James Stephens, former chief labor counsel to conservative Republican Senator Orrin
Hatch. See FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY 362-64 (6th ed. 1990); FEDERAL
REGULATORY DIRECTORY 392-94 (5th ed. 1986); FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY
378-81 (4th ed. 1983).
275. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Table Three and accompanying discussion. Although the raw numbers
are much smaller, the courts also were not significantly more likely to reverse Board
determinations finding unions not liable (37% reversed) than Board determinations finding
1996] 1021
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
bargaining-related issues does manifest a pronounced judicial tilt
toward employers. But because these judicial decisions are not part
of a more general pro-employer stance, the extraordinarily high
reversal rates for the specific issues under review require a more
particularized explanation.
Another alternative hypothesis would emphasize the shift in
statutory priorities evidenced by changes in the NLRA itself. The
Taft-Hartley Amendments codified employees' right to refrain from
union-related activity, and made employee freedom of choice a more
central statutory value.2' The appellate courts in this period could
be viewed as simply according proper respect to that new section 7
right, unlike the Board, which continued to rely on superseded
Wagner Act precedents.
Once again, a number of problems arise regarding this
hypothesis. As noted earlier, Taft-Hartley's focus was on union
misconduct that coerced or interfered with employees' new section 7
choice to refrain.27 The good faith doubt and bargaining order
issues involve no such union misconduct. Rather, they presuppose
wrongdoing by an employer that then asserts employee free choice to
shield it from either liability or substantial affirmative relief. In
addition, Taft-Hartley's protection of free choice was directed
primarily at coercive union expansion through organizing and
economic self-help, activities that had been perceived as subject to
union abuse.279 The Wagner Act's support for ongoing or incipient
collective bargaining relationships, and its protection of bargaining
stability against wrongful employer refusals to cooperate, were largely
undisturbed by the 1947 Amendments." ° Perhaps the strongest
indication that Taft-Hartley effected no major change with respect to
the impact of free choice on bargaining stability is the record of
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Over a period of nearly four
decades since 1954, the Court in a variety of settings has recognized
the importance of establishing and maintaining stable bargaining
relationships even at some cost to "pure" employee free choice." I
employers not liable (34% reversed). See supra Tables One and Two.
277. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 66-67, 187 and accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 794-95 (1990);
Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 38-40, 47-50 (1987); NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610-13 (1969); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 100-03
(1954).
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Neither result-oriented opposition to unions nor insights into the
meaning of the Taft-Hartley Amendments can explain adequately the
appellate courts' pronounced preference for free choice at the expense
of bargaining stability. Instead, I believe it is appropriate to consider
the Board-court disagreements from the broader perspective of the
tension between dynamic statutory interpretation and originalism, and
to portray the courts as in effect recasting the good faith doubt and
bargaining order issues in light of background legal and factual
changes that have occurred since Taft-Hartley.
B. Judicial Updating Described
The idea that courts can and should interpret statutes dynamically
to conform them to subsequent legal and factual developments is by
now quite familiar.' In summary form, proponents observe that
many statutes enacted decades earlier remain substantially unchanged
even though the political, economic, and legal assumptions and
conditions that existed at the time of their enactment no longer
obtain. As these statutes age, controversies arise that require
application of the unchanged text in a social setting altered by new
developments in marketplace structure, statutory rights and duties,
and constitutional law. Confronted with statutes-or statutory
provisions-that (i) do not "fit" with the current legal and factual
"landscape," and (ii) may well not enjoy contemporary majority
support, courts engage in innovative forms of statutory construction.
Judicial innovation at times follows the lead of administrative
initiatives. For instance, if the regulatory agency primarily responsible
for statutory enforcement takes action to readjust original legislative
priorities so as to accommodate changes in the nature of the regulated
marketplace, courts may then ratify the updating process by deferring
to administrative expertise.' Agencies, however, may be viewed
282. The account that follows draws on the work of numerous scholars; in its
abbreviated form, it does not purport to do justice to the nuances and complexities of
dynamic statutory interpretation. Although all scholars cited here advocate some form of
dynamic interpretation, they differ as to the precise contours of that approach. See
CALABRESI, supra note 4; Eskridge, supra note 271; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994); Daniel A. Farber,
Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989); Langevoort,
supra note 4; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L.
REv. 405 (1989).
283. See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 687-718 (describing how judicial updating of 1933
Glass-Steagall Act to end separation of commercial and investment banking relied heavily
on steps taken by Comptroller of Currency and Federal Reserve Board that allowed
commercial banks to expand into securities field and allowed securities firms to acquire
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as obstacles to the updating of aging statutes. They may become
captured by interest groups that oppose changing the original rules.
Or they may be overly committed to preserving the status quo that
they themselves expended considerable resources to erect. In these
circumstances, the judiciary must act on its own if it is to update or
limit the meaning of original statutory text. Courts often continue to
invoke the rhetoric of fidelity to original legislative intent, which is
asserted to be a neutral principle of statutory construction.' Yet
in relying on contemporary legal values, unanticipated social and
economic changes, and an overarching "meta-intent" that the law be
effective over time, courts may well generate applications of a statute
that depart dramatically from what the enacting legislature would
have contemplated or intended. When such departures occur late in
the statutory life-cycle, long after the enacting congressional majority
and its supporters have left the scene, courts are unlikely to be
constrained by the risk or threat of legislative override. Indeed, to
the extent that dynamic judicial interpretations are consonant with
current priorities in the legal culture, they may receive little or no
congressional criticism and thereby acquire an aura of legitimacy.
This model of dynamic interpretation to update an aging statute
is useful when considering the Board-court conflict under review. The
NLRA recognizes both the central value of stable collective bar-
gaining relationships and the importance of the right of free choice,
including the right to refrain from union membership or represen-
tation. The appellate courts during our period attached considerably
less importance to bargaining stability (and relied far more heavily on
employee free choice) than would be warranted by reference to
original legislative intent, or relatively consistent Board judgments, or
even periodic Supreme Court interpretations.
The appellate courts' recalibration of the statutory balance
arguably reflects a sensitivity to substantial changes in the legal and
socio-economic culture over the past twenty-five or more years. On
the one hand, bargaining stability has become less important because
it no longer figures as a vital means to achieve the major goals
underlying the NLRA. Reducing industrial strife and restoring mass
purchasing power are not the critical national concerns that they were
during the period of the Great Depression and World War II. The
relative prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s helped remove the sense of
control of banks).
284. Courts may also rely on other assertedly neutral principles, such as the plain
meaning of the text or the canons of construction.
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economic urgency that had initially given rise to a federal policy
favoring the practice of collective bargaining.
Promoting a fairer distribution of economic resources remains a
prominently stated congressional goal, but the goal is now addressed
primarily through federal statutes that focus on minimum entitle-
ments' or the right to equal treatment in the workplace 86  In
enacting a new generation of federal workplace statutes, Congress in
the 1960s and early 1970s assuredly did not mean to supplant the role
of collective bargaining as a means of redressing economic disparities
between workers and management in the private sector. But
following the proliferation of these statutes, along with the sharp
decline in private sector support for unions since 1970, Congress is
now far more receptive to government regulation-and far less willing
to rely on private labor-management negotiations-as a mechanism
for ordering employment relations and redistributing economic
resources.27
Democratic self-government in the workplace, the fourth and
final major congressional goal advanced by stable collective bar-
285. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994);
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977,30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(originally enacted as Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969); Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994);
Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §8 2001-2009 (1994); Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (WARN), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109
(1994); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §H 2601-2654 (1994).
286. See, eg., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 note, 206(d) (1994); Title VII
of 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1994); Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); ADEA Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
256, 92 Stat. 189 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); ADEA
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (codified in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C.); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 88 12101-12213 (Supp. V
1993); Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166,105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.,
and 42 U.S.C). See generally DuNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 105-09 (su-
mmarizing federal regulatory developments since the 1960s).
287. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FuTURE OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 22-25 (1990). Whether the expanded federal regulatory presence
was in some degree attributable to perceived weaknesses in the union movement, and
whether the growing reliance on positive federal law in turn accelerated the decline of
collective self-help efforts, are questions worth pondering. See Clyde W. Summers, Labor
Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 10-14 (1988).
Whatever the causal relationships may be, by the late 1980s neither Congress nor the
federal courts perceived stable collective bargaining relationships as the primary means to
promoting a fairer distribution of economic resources in the workplace.
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gaining relationships, has faded as a national priority for reasons
perhaps best understood to be part of a larger shift in societal norms.
Professor Thomas Kohler has persuasively suggested that the steady
decline in union density is related to a larger unraveling of our
mediating institutions, including religious congregations, fraternal
groups, grassroots political clubs, and even families.28 Without
minimizing the importance of workplace-specific factors in accounting
for lost union support, Kohler asserts that the collapse of com-
munitarian habits of thought has diminished our interest in and
capacity for various forms of organizational self-rule at the local
level.2 Even if the connection to a withering of civic and religious
organizations is associational rather than causal, Kohler and others
have accurately observed that the Wagner Act's emphasis on
inculcating habits of democraic self-governance seems distinctly less
robust in today's social culture.
Just as bargaining stability has faded as a priority in the larger
legal and social setting of the workplace, the importance attached to
individual employee freedom has risen dramatically in recent decades.
Starting in 1963, the federal approach to regulating the workplace has
made individual rights and choices preeminent, not subordinate. 91
During the early decades of NLRA operation, Congress viewed
enforceable recognition for collectively bargained terms and con-
ditions of employment as the federal government's primary role in
affecting workplace relations.29 In the past thirty years, however,
288. Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work- Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues,
36 B.C. L. REV. 279, 290-95 (1995) [hereinafter Kohler, Civic Virtue]; Thomas C. Kohler,
The Overlooked Middle, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 229, 234-38 (1993) [hereinafter Kohler,
Overlooked Middle]; see also Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining
Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65, 68-75 (1995) (discussing decline of traditional
participatory civic and social organizations in United States). These mediating institutions
have traditionally brokered relations between individuals and the larger institutions that
dominate public life, i.e., the State and the Market Economy.
289. These factors, well-chronicled by other scholars, include structural changes in the
market economy, inadequate provisions of our labor laws, sophisticated employer
opposition to unionization, and public perceptions of American unions as tainted by
corruption and parochial self-interest. See Kohler, Civic Virtue, supra note 288, at 289;
Kohler, Overlooked Middle, supra note 288, at 234; supra notes 9-10 and sources cited
therein.
290. See Kohler, Civic Virtue, supra note 288, at 292-94; Kohler, Overlooked Middle,
supra note 288, at 235-37.
291. See supra notes 285 and 286 (identifying non-exhaustive list of 15 major federal
statutes, beginning with Equal Pay Act of 1963, that regulated workplace relations by
providing enforceable rights to individual employees).
292. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994), made a
subsidiary contribution by establishing minimum hourly wage and overtime provisions.
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support for collective determination of working conditions has become
a minor element amidst the rising tide of federal statutes that offer
rights and protections to employees on an individual and individually
enforceable basis. Federal laws addressing and defining substantive
terms or conditions of employment now dominate the legal landscape.
Federal courts have developed a perspective and expertise on
workplace relations from adjudicating the rights of individual
employees under these laws. Moreover, the new federal statutes often
relegate unions to the derivative status of facilitating individual
employee protections,2 93 and occasionally cast them on a par with
employers as potential threats to the realization of individual
rights.294 Thus, whereas unions under the NLRA-dominated legal
regime were leading actors seeking to achieve improved conditions for
employees, unions under the individual rights regime are more often
bit players or even obstacles to employees' economic amelioration.
Among the most important individual employee rights to receive
recognition in recent times has been the right to refrain. In the
broader social context, the freedom of choosing not to have one's
beliefs shaped or one's conduct limited by membership in a political
party, church, fraternal order, or union may be viewed as the
"positive" side of the diminished status accorded to those mediating
institutions.29 In addition, a major legal development enhancing the
293. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 2102, 2104 (1994) (specifying that 60-day notice of plant
closing required under WARN Act can go to unions in lieu of employees, although
employees are the aggrieved persons under the Act); Occupational Safety and Health
Administration Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1960.26(b) (1994) (requiring OSHA inspector to
consult with union representative during course of inspection, and to confer with that
representative at conclusion of inspection regarding apparently unsafe or unhealthful
working conditions); 29 C.F.R. § 1960.37(b) (1994) (requiring that employee members of
firm-specific occupational safety and health committees be designated by the union); see
also United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc.,
50 F.3d 1426, 1430-32 (8th Cir.) (holding that unions lack standing to sue for monetary
damages under WARN Act), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 335 (1995).
294. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) (making unions as well as employers primary
objects of liability for race and gender discrimination); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994) (same for
age discrimination); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12112 (Supp. V 1993) (same for disability
discrimination); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974)
(holding that employee's rights under Title VII cannot be waived by arbitration of same
claim under collective bargaining agreement, and suggesting that union's interest in
sacrificing individual claims for good of bargaining unit could threaten integrity of Title
VII's separate statutory scheme).
295. See generally GEORGE M. MARSDEN, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CULTURE 273-74
(1990) (describing individualistic perspectives on religion and religious institutions); DEAN
MCSWEENEY & JOHN ZVESPER, AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES 184-89 (1990) (linking
growth of individualist attitudes to decline of political party activism and affiliation). Cf
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value of individual free choice has been the constitutionalization of
the right to refrain. Over the past forty years, the Supreme Court has
given broad recognition to a First Amendment protection against
government-compelled speech or association.296 The Court has
extended to both the union setting and other group contexts an
individual's right to refrain from participating in, or being identified
with, the speech or conduct of a group to which she is compelled to
belong.29 Moreover, by relying explicitly or implicitly on the canon
of construing statutes to avoid constitutional problems, the Court has
strengthened private employees' rights to refrain from union activities
under federal labor law.29 The statutory issue in those cases
involved discrimination against employees who objected to certain
uses of their union dues or fees.299 It seems a fair inference,
however, that appellate courts may now be implying a comparable
constitutional urgency for employees' interest in objecting to
Putnam, supra note 288, at 70-75 (describing how decline of traditional participatory civic
organizations in the United States has been accompanied by growth of mass membership
organizations, supported anonymously by writing a check for dues, and how television and
the VCR have shifted American leisure pursuits to more individualized activities that
involve less social participation).
296. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 9-17 (1990) (upholding attorneys' right to
refrain from certain messages promulgated or activities engaged in by state bar); Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,232-37 (1977) (upholding employee's right to refrain
from participation in certain union activities or messages); International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,765-70 (1961) (same); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
714-17 (1977) (upholding individual's right to refrain from displaying state motto on license
plate). But cf Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85-88 (1980) (rejecting
asserted right of non-association by shopping center owner); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 792-95 (1978) (rejecting asserted right of non-association by corporate
shareholders). The Supreme Court initially articulated a First Amendment right to refrain
in West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 635-42 (1943), which involved
a religiously-based refusal to salute the flag; the Court gave the theory more general
application in the 1960s and 1970s.
297. See generally Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment,
4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1 (1995) (examining individual's right to refrain from
advocacy activities engaged in by large associations); Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments
to Service Institutions and Constitutional Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36
RUTGERS L. REV. 3 (1983) (same); David B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against
Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REV. 995 (1982) (same).
298. See Street, 367 U.S. at 749-50 (construing Railway Labor Act to protect individual
employees' rights of non-association and thereby avoid First Amendment problems);
Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745-54 (1988) (construing NLRA to
protect individual employees' rights of non-association by relying on Street as controlling).
299. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 738, 740 (describing issue presented as whether employer
collection and union expenditure of agency fees for purposes unrelated to collective
bargaining violated § 8(a)(3) of NLRA).
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representation by a union that assertedly no longer enjoys majority
support.3°
One further, related aspect of the importance currently attached
to individual freedom is a renewed and even increased faith in liberty
of contract as vital to enhancing the welfare of employees. 301 The
NLRA's commitment to collectivizing the employment relationship
arose at a time when Congress and the public had lost confidence in
the free market's ability to produce a healthy economy.3°2 That
confidence has been largely restored. With the reestablishment of
widespread acceptance of, if not support for, private contracting and
the efficiency of markets, the appellate courts may well be reflecting
a modem sense that collectivization reduces individual freedom and
should be required only upon a clear showing of current majority
approval. °3
Given the developments in our legal culture that have just been
described, one might well wonder why the Supreme Court has not
engaged in the same updating approach to bargaining-related issues
300. To be sure, appellate courts also could have practical reasons for their deep
distrust of bargaining orders. Union success rates in elections have declined below 50%,
see DeChiara, supra note 218, at 451, and courts may have come to believe that a short-
circuiting of the election process is more threatening to true majority will. Beyond these
practical justifications, however, the extent to which employees are now perceived as
asserting valid constitutionally related objections to certain aspects of forced union
association seems likely to enhance the value placed on objections framed as challenges
to the very majority-based existence of that forced association.
301. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 321-30 (4th ed.
1992); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947,955-
77 (1984). But see WEILER, supra note 287, at 72-78 (arguing that labor market includes
inherent imperfections that call for government intervention).
302. See Finegold & Skocpol, supra note 59, at 183.
303. A very similar type of "judicial updating" hypothesis would apply if one views the
instant Board-court conflict as reflecting divergent approaches to paternalism rather than
bargaining stability. See discussion supra note 270. In briefest terms, the primacy of an
individual rights statutory environment, and the reinvigoration of liberty of contract and
freedom to refrain, all presuppose an individual employee who is sophisticated and tough
enough to make her own choices. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d
1156, 1160-63 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J. concurring) (contending that employees are
not "wee, tim'rous beasties" readily scared or baffled by employer election misconduct;
rather, "as usual, employees are hardier than the Board lets on"). By contrast, the Board
continues to subscribe to the "ancient" view that individual employees are frequently
coerced by employers with vastly superior economic leverage, and that its mission under
the Act is to preserve conditions under which concerted activity has a fair chance to
succeed. Cf. Weiler, Promises, supra note 10, at 1816 (contending that while fully
informed employee choice is desirable in principle, a shorter election campaign is needed
in practice to reduce employers' well-documented penchant for engaging in illegal coercion
of their workers).
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as have the courts of appeals." I believe part of the answer lies in
the Supreme Court's diminished attention to the Act: a number of
the key Court decisions heralding the value of stable bargaining
relationships date from before 197005 and have not been revisited.
The Supreme Court has issued relevant decisions since 1980 as
well, 6 but on that score the Court's exceptional continuity with
earlier periods seems significant. The Supreme Court consists of only
nine members, whose service is generally measured in terms of
decades rather than years. It is therefore not surprising that more
recent Court decisions addressing our bargaining-related issues were
written or supported by Justices who came to the Court between 1956
and 1972, a time when collectivization of employment relations was
a more vibrant part of the legal culture.3
C. Judicial Updating Questioned
My speculation that appellate courts have been engaging in a
form of dynamic statutory interpretation to reshape the Act's meaning
with- regard to a cluster of bargaining-related issues is just
that-speculative. But assuming for the moment that judicial
updating is an important element in the interpretive equation, there
are troubling aspects to this approach.
The theory that courts should refurbish older statutory provisions
deemed anachronistic or obsolete has engendered a fair degree of
criticism.3 °8 The first precondition for updating-that a statute no
longer conforms to its surrounding legal "landscape"-is problematic
in descriptive terms. Statutes often are enacted for the purpose of
transforming the surrounding landscape by creating a new structure
304. One might also wonder why the Board itself has not done so; that issue is
discussed infra note 311 and accompanying text.
305. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96
(1954); Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
306. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990); Fall River Dyeing
& Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987); NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees, Local
1182, 475 U.S. 192 (1986).
307. Justice Brennan (appointed 1956) wrote the unanimous decision in Financial
Institution, Justice Blackmun (appointed 1970) wrote the 6-3 decision in Fall River, and
Justice Marshall (appointed 1967) wrote the 5-4 majority opinion in Curtin Matheson.
Between 1972 and 1990, only four new Justices joined the Court; thus, a majority of the
Justices were products of an era in which the NLRA was a central feature of the legal
landscape.
308. The criticisms presented here rely on the work of a number of legal scholars,
whose insights are not fully reflected in such a summary discussion. See CALABRESI, supra
note 4; Estreicher, supra note 271; Farber, supra note 282; Lessig, supra note 271; Sunstein,
supra note 282.
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of relationships that significantly alters the preexisting mix of legal
rights and duties. Legislatures are in general more competent than
courts to address such complex structural matters, and in exercising
that competence they frequently challenge or reject prior judicially
fashioned solutions. One might doubt whether courts are best
suited-or even well-suited-to the task of modifying that legislatively
created structure. More fundamentally, if alteration of the judicially
created legal landscape in order to effect a different "fit" is precisely
what the enacting Congress meant to accomplish, one might well
wonder why lack of fit with a new and unforeseen landscape should
subject such a structural statute to judicial tampering, which inevitably
must be only episodic or piecemeal.
The other precondition invoked to support judicial up-
dating-that a statute does not enjoy the current support of a
legislative majority-is suspect in normative terms. Our protracted
legislative process features delegation to committees, rules that limit
the agenda for floor action, and requirements of bicameralism and
presentment. These historical and constitutional constraints were
designed to impose a substantial barrier against the enactment of new
laws. One corollary is that older laws survive the erosion of political
coalitions and popular intensity that initially produced them, unless a
new political coalition or popular feeling is strong enough to
overcome the forces of legislative inertia. Allowing courts to diminish
the meaning of statutory language that has not been repealed, altered
or even specifically addressed by subsequent legislative action presents
serious problems of legitimacy.
These two challenges to judicial updating bear directly on the
appellate courts' apparent efforts to readjust the statutory balance
between free choice and bargaining stability under the NLRA. All
statutes depart in some way from prior law, or they would not have
been enacted. The NLRA, however, is exceptional in its anomalous
character. The Wagner Act was not a narrow measure inserted into
an existing body of common law. Nor was it an elaboration of
requirements that assumed the continued existence of an underlying
legal framework. Rather, it was meant to depart dramatically from
existing legal norms by creating a self-contained regulatory structure
to govern relations between management and organized labor. Such
a regulatory transformation of existing law, effected as a coherent
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whole by a legislative majority, is peculiarly il-suited to selective
judicial renovation. 09
In this regard, it may be worth distinguishing between judicial
updating intended to make a particular statute more effective in its
own terms310 and judicial updating intended to make federal law as
a whole more consistent or harmonious by reducing the scope or
diluting the meaning of the particular statute being updated. For the
latter form of dynamic interpretation, the argument is made that
generalist courts must act precisely because narrowly focused agencies
cannot. From the standpoint of both practicality and legitimacy,
agency officials charged with enforcing a statute should not be
expected to subvert that statute's application, especially if the grounds
for impairment are that the statute does not comport with extrinsic
developments in the law for which the agency is not responsible."'
Yet for statutes like the NLRA that impose a self-contained,
comprehensive regulatory scheme, the appellate courts' integrationist
perspective may bring considerable costs. Judicial efforts to reshape
the meaning of particular provisions threaten to distort or disrupt
operation of the overall statutory scheme.31 2 In this instance, the
Board monitors and supervises a set of complex interrelationships
among employer, union and employees. Appellate court updating of
309. See CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 134-35 (acknowledging that judicial updating is
hardest to justify with respect to a statute that reorganizes a whole area of law); Cox,
supra note 271, at 1467-68 (arguing that judges may lack the competence and
methodological tools to engage in the updating of regulatory or public law).
310. See Eskridge, supra note 271, at 1482-96 (discussing Supreme Court's dynamic
approach to interpretation of civil rights statutes in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) and
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)); see also Michael H. Gottesman &
Michael R. Seidl, A Tale of Two Discourses: William Gould's Journey from the Academy
to the World of Politics, 47 STAN. L. REv. 749, 765-66 (1995) (arguing for updated
interpretation of NLRA to effectuate its statutory purpose of promoting collective
bargaining relationships).
311. See CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 49. An agency like the NLRB might become
inclined to dilute or subvert the meaning of its enabling statute if the pressures of
presidential appointments, along with congressional confirmation and oversight, were
combined to push in that direction. See Moe, supra note 94, at 1100-02. Between October
1986 and November 1993, however, a Democratic Congress was not predisposed to
welcome such a development. More generally, systemic self-limiting interpretations by the
NLRB would probably require a sustained period of single-party control over 60 seats in
the Senate plus the presidency: these are the very political circumstances needed to allow
for legislative reform of the Act. See supra note 16.
312. Cf. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L.
REv. 1093, 1126-29 (1987) (contending that Chevron may reflect Supreme Court's effort
to enhance enforcement 6f complex federal statutory schemes by reducing role of lower
courts).
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the Board's approach has altered the rights and responsibilities of
employers, not just unions and employee members of a nascent or
mature bargaining unit. Indeed, employers that challenge or dissolve
bargaining relationships would appear to benefit from the courts'
interpretive changes at least as much as the disaffected employees
whose free choice interests they are asserting. Such windfall benefits
for employers inevitably alter, in fundamental and unforeseeable
ways, the balance of power between management and labor.
A key element in the NLRA's regulatory structure is the value
attached to ongoing collective bargaining activity. The promotion and
maintenance of stable bargaining relationships was an anomaly on the
legal landscape in 1935; the fact that it has become more anomalous
sixty years later313 should not be grounds for courts to reshape the
direction of the statute. Moreover, Congress in 1935 and 1947 struck
a balance between the competing federal policies of free choice and
bargaining stability. The Board's stance of subordinating immediate
or "pure" free choice in favor of the formation and maintenance of
collective bargaining relationships seems a fair reflection of that
balance. Insofar as the debate between Board and courts is not over
what Congress meant, but rather over the wisdom of adhering to what
Congress is known to have meant, that debate should be occurring in
Congress, not in the intermediate appellate courts.314
Advocates of the judicial updating approach might well point to
decades of congressional inattention or ambivalence toward collective
bargaining as evidence that courts are justified in reflecting current
rather than ancient legislative preferences. Congress, however, has
not acted to modify or repeal the commitments made in 1935 and
retained in 1947. That the Wagner Act was enacted under unusual
political circumstances3 ' does not diminish its applicability over
time. Congress's failure to pass significant reform in either direction
for nearly fifty years316 may not reflect popular satisfaction with the
NLRA, but its repeated refusal to approve proposals for change at
least signals that there is no consensus to alter the historic scheme.
313. The federal government's promotion of co-determination by occupational
subgroups through various New Deal statutes, see supra text accompanying notes 36-42,
did not become a dominant legal norm.
314. Cf. NLRB v. K & K Gourmet Meats, Inc., 640 F.2d 460, 470-74 (3d Cir. 1981)
(Gibbons, J., dissenting) (suggesting that judges on Third Circuit who believe Gissel was
wrongly decided are engaged in "guerilla warfare" to alter the legislative balance that had
been struck in favor of bargaining orders).
315. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
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If anything, it can be argued that the Act's strong endorsement for
bargaining stability should be assured until comparably unusual
political circumstances generate the legislative intensity required to
readjust Congress's original priorities.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined a particular conflict in statutory values
at a number of different levels. From a historical standpoint, the
establishment and maintenance of stable collective bargaining
relationships were deemed enormously important to the achievement
of original legislative goals. Upon empirical review, it became
apparent that the Board and appellate courts in recent times have
disagreed on just how important bargaining stability should continue
to be. A doctrinal analysis identified various legal and factual
iterations of the disagreement, and concluded that a common theme
was the tension between bargaining stability and perceived threats to
employee free choice. Finally, this tension was recast in a broader
context by suggesting that the courts may have been subordinating
original meaning to conform the statute to the current legal landscape.
One element missing from the multiple perspectives offered
regarding this congressional enactment is the current voice of
Congress. When the legislature does not revisit a regulatory statute
like the NLRA for decades, it enables other institutions to become
more influential in determining current statutory meaning. When the
Supreme Court's interest flags as well, the administrative agency and
the appellate courts become the principal arbiters of that meaning.
Conventional wisdom is that agency rulemaking and adjudication
shape current statutory meaning, and courts are broadly deferential
to the expertise and relative political accountability of the federal
bureaucracy.3 17 The conflict examined here indicates that on at least
some occasions, appellate courts exercise primary interpretive control.
Appellate courts may occupy a favored position as agents of
change for older federal laws such as the NLRA. In contrast to
Supreme Court decisions, appellate court rulings rarely come to the
attention of Congress and are thus unlikely to trigger legislative
oversight much less a serious override challenge.31 Yet because the
317. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984); David L.
Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 954-56(1992).
318. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretation of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MicH. L. REv. 1, 83-84 (1994) (observing
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appellate courts' reviewing relationship with agencies is regular and
constant instead of discretionary and episodic, their rulings have a
more profound and lasting effect on agency conduct. Moreover,
because the Supreme Court need not review appellate court rulings
and often does not do so even when a "certworthy" issue arises,
319
these rulings may well become the final word on statutory meaning.
The conflict presented here illustrates this last point. Congress
is unlikely to address the good faith doubt and bargaining order issues
in the foreseeable future. It has been unable to legislate on much
"hotter" aspects of NLRA interpretation over the past twenty years,
and the current stalemate on NLRA reform seems destined to
continue. The Board has modified its position on both good faith
doubt and Gissel bargaining orders in the face of appellate court
criticisms; it may be forced to do so on incumbent restoration
bargaining orders unless there is a major shift in appellate court
position. If the Supreme Court agreed to hear a good faith doubt or
bargaining order case, its decision might refocus the substantive
debate. But twenty-five years after Gissel, there is no indication that
the Court is interested in revisiting the tradeoffs between bargaining
stability and employee free -choice. If appellate courts were in a
position to be candid about their willingness to update the NLRA,
that too might generate public or political debate. Such candor,
however, would invite criticism of unorthodox if not heretical
approaches to statutory interpretation, and is hardly to be expected.
One can at least hope for more interest from legal academics.
This Article's contention that appellate courts are altering settled
meaning in an effort to conform a statute to extrinsic legal events
raises practical and normative questions that deserve additional
attention. The NLRA is one of many aging statutes being applied in
legal and social circumstances unknown to its original authors and
proponents. Further examination of the roles played by agencies and
that members of Congress have little familiarity with lower court decisions, because these
decisions are far more numerous than Supreme Court decisions and they attract little or
no media coverage); Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and
Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653, 662 (1992)
(discussing Congress's lack of awareness of lower court decisions).
319. See Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National
Court, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1400, 1405-06 (1987) (reporting that Supreme Court denies
certiorari in substantial number of intercircuit conflicts); cf Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter
W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1417, 1419 n.11 (1987)
(reviewing various studies that differ as to the extent of unresolved court conflicts over the
meaning of federal statutory provisions).
1996] 1035
1036 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74
appellate courts may lead to a better understanding as to what has
become of other famous victories.
